Get well soon!I'm infected with COVID which means that I have time to post a new update today
A New Beginning - Our 1992 Russian Federation
- Thread starter panpiotr
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- russia russian federation
Russia needs leaders who prioritize the interest of the country and not others.
Corruption must be reduced or better eliminate in order for Russia and the people to have better life ITTL.
1. After assassination attempt against Boris Berezovsky, pro-government oligarchs demand from President Fyodorov elimination of oligarchs centered around Boris Yeltsin. What should the Russian President do?
A) Crossing the line into terrorism and attempted political assassination, they are a threat that needs to be eliminated as soon as possible.
2. Who should be chosen as the new CEO of Gazprom?
A) He would seem to be someone with vision and not pro-Western, so likely to better serve our interests as choice of candidate.
3. Please write down how should the government deal with the Russian space program (Roscosmos)?
I'll add my support to the plans of @Kriss and @Empress_Boogalaboo.
4. Please write down on which conditions the future Union State between Belarus and Russia should be established?
I'll add my support to @Kriss's plan.
A) Crossing the line into terrorism and attempted political assassination, they are a threat that needs to be eliminated as soon as possible.
2. Who should be chosen as the new CEO of Gazprom?
A) He would seem to be someone with vision and not pro-Western, so likely to better serve our interests as choice of candidate.
3. Please write down how should the government deal with the Russian space program (Roscosmos)?
I'll add my support to the plans of @Kriss and @Empress_Boogalaboo.
4. Please write down on which conditions the future Union State between Belarus and Russia should be established?
I'll add my support to @Kriss's plan.
I hope you'll be okay and get well soon.I'm infected with COVID which means that I have time to post a new update today
A for 1, B for 2. Wouldn't want any oligarchs to get too cozy.
I'll pass on the space program question. I have expressed my opposition to Russia-Belarus integration, and that will not change.
I'll pass on the space program question. I have expressed my opposition to Russia-Belarus integration, and that will not change.
I would like to say what relations? As i don't expect anything positive. But I'll just wait and see.
Chapter Ten: Operation Deliberate Force and the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis (June - September 1995)
(The biggest winner of the recent purge was Roman Abramovich and other representatives of the so-called second wave of oligarchs)
The failed assassination attempt against Boris Berezovsky brought an abrupt end to a group of anti-government oligarchs centered around the opposition and Boris Yeltsin. After a thorough investigation conducted by the FSB, anyone connected to the assassination attempt was removed from the political and business scene in Russia. The government imprisoned people who were directly connected to Berezovsky's case, and their assets were nationalized by the state. Many other influential pro-opposition oligarchs were imprisoned under the accusation of tax evasion. Some oligarchs were "lucky" and were only forced by the government to sell off their assets and leave Russia, which allowed them to avoid legal proceedings. Anti-government oligarchs who were doing business with American and European partners tried to seek help in the West, unfortunately for them, the response from the West was very muted, as Western governments were much more interested in continuing with the current government a business relationship that is very beneficial to them. The destruction of the anti-government oligarchs brought a second wave of oligarchs, including Roman Abramovich, Alisher Usmanov, Vladimir Potanin, Mikhail Prokhov, who were able to expand their political and financial influence in Russia, but they completely understood and accepted the "rules of the game"—that is, the complete supremacy of the Russian government and President Fyodorov over them. The oligarchs were allowed to expand their business empires in Russia and abroad without any problems from the government, as long as they showed a complete loyalty to the Government and President Fyodorov. For their loyalty and support, President Fyodorov decided that Vladimir Yakovlev would be chosen as the new CEO of Gazprom, which was the final nail in the coffin of cooperation between President Fyodorov and Prime Minister Yavlinsky. Yavlinsky decided that the differences between him and President are too big and that further cooperation makes no sense. Nevertheless, Yavlinsky recognized that Fyodorov would win the presidential elections in 1996 against Yeltsin without much trouble, so his main priorities from now on would be limiting the influence of oligarchs and establishing his own liberal coalition before the next legislative elections in Russia in 1997.
Following the steadily improving economic and financial situation in Russia, the government could allocate more resources to the Russian space program (Roscosmos), which resulted in:
- beginning of the Russian Lunar mission, which aimed at putting man on the Moon by the year 2015;
- increased funding for research on new agricultural methods in space;
- increased funding for robotics and the Lunokhod Programme;
- expanded cooperation within the CSTO/CIS framework;
- modernization of current infrastructure;
- increased participation of Roscosmos in international space projects.
(Even though Lukashenko was mocked and disregarded by Moscow's political elite, in the end he was able to achieve all of his political goals)
After a series of negotiations, the governments of Russia and Belarus reached an agreement on the conditions under which the Union State would be established, which included:
- the Union State, instead of the confederation of Belarus and Russia, would result in priviledged annexation of Belarus by Russia;
- President of Belarus would serve as Vice President of the Union State;
- Russian institutions would serve as official institutions of the Union;
- Belarusian citizens will obtain the same right to vote as citizens of Russia;
- representation of the Belarusian population will be secured by the new Union constitution;
- Belarus would retain the right to secede from the Union;
- state property and its natural resources would be subjected to Belarusian institutions;
- Russia will be responsible for the fiscal, security and foreign policy of the Union;
- Russia will finance the modernization and expansion of Belarus' economy and industries;
- Russian rouble would be the official currency of the Union.
- President Fyodorov will act as the first president of the Union for 1 year and, in 2000, will resign from his position, which will result in early presidential elections;
- One presidential term will last 6 years;
- One canditate could serve 3 terms as President of the Union;
- Alexander Lukashenko will start as an independent candidate in 2000, but will be officially supported by the United Labour Party of Russia.
(Operation Storm)
Operation Storm was the last major battle of the Croatian War of Independence and a major factor in the outcome of the Bosnian War. It was a decisive victory for the Croatian Army (HV), which attacked across a 630-kilometre (390 mi) front against the self-declared proto-state Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), and a strategic victory for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). The HV was supported by the Croatian special police advancing from the Velebit Mountain, and the ARBiH located in the Bihać pocket, in the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina's (ARSK) rear. The battle, launched to restore Croatian control of 10,400 square kilometres (4,000 square miles) of territory, representing 18.4% of the territory it claimed, and Bosniak control of Western Bosnia, was the largest European land battle since World War II. Operation Storm commenced at dawn on 4 August 1995 and was declared complete on the evening of 7 August, despite significant mopping-up operations against pockets of resistance lasting until 14 August. Operation Storm was a strategic victory in the Bosnian War, effectively ending the siege of Bihać and placing the HV, Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the ARBiH in a position to change the military balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the subsequent Operation Mistral 2. The operation built on HV and HVO advances made during Operation Summer '95, when strategic positions allowing the rapid capture of the RSK capital Knin were gained, and on the continued arming and training of the HV since the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence, when the RSK was created during the Serb Log Revolution and Yugoslav People's Army intervention. The operation itself followed an unsuccessful United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission and diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict.
The HV's and ARBiH's strategic success was a result of a series of improvements to the armies themselves, and crucial breakthroughs made in the ARSK positions that were subsequently exploited by the HV and the ARBiH. The attack was not immediately successful at all points, but seizing key positions led to the collapse of the ARSK command structure and overall defensive capability. The HV capture of Bosansko Grahovo, just before the operation, and the special police's advance to Gračac, made it nearly impossible to defend Knin. In Lika, two guard brigades quickly cut the ARSK-held area which lacked tactical depth and mobile reserve forces, and they isolated pockets of resistance, positioned a mobile force for a decisive northward thrust into the Karlovac Corps area of responsibility (AOR), and pushed ARSK towards Banovina. The defeat of the ARSK at Glina and Petrinja, after a tough defensive, defeated the ARSK Banija Corps as well since its reserve was pinned down by the ARBiH. The RSK relied on the Republika Srpska and Yugoslav militaries as its strategic reserve, but they did not intervene in the battle. The United States also played a role in the operation by directing Croatia to a military consultancy firm, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), that signed a Pentagon licensed contract to advise, train and provide intelligence to the Croatian army.
The HV and the special police suffered 174–211 killed or missing, while the ARSK had 560 soldiers killed. Four UN peacekeepers were also killed. The HV captured 4,000 prisoners of war. The number of Serb civilian deaths is disputed—Croatia claims that 214 were killed, while Serbian sources cite 1,192 civilians killed or missing. The Croatian population had been years prior subjected to ethnic cleansing in the areas held by ARSK by rebel Serb forces, with an estimated 170,000–250,000 expelled and hundreds killed. During and after the offensive, around 150,000–200,000 Serbs of the area formerly held by the ARSK had fled and a variety of crimes were committed against the remaining civilians there by Croatian forces. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later tried three Croatian generals charged with war crimes and partaking in a joint criminal enterprise designed to force the Serb population out of Croatia, although all three were ultimately acquitted and the tribunal refuted charges of a criminal enterprise. The ICTY concluded that Operation Storm was not aimed at ethnic persecution, as civilians had not been deliberately targeted. The ICTY stated that Croatian Army and Special Police committed numerous crimes against the Serb population after the artillery assault, but that the state and military leadership was not responsible for their creation and organizing and that Croatia did not have the specific intent of displacing the country's Serb minority. However, Croatia adopted discriminatory measures to make it increasingly difficult for Serbs to return. Human Rights Watch reported that the vast majority of the abuses during the operation were committed by Croatian forces and that the abuses continued on a large scale for months afterward, which included summary executions of Serb civilians and destruction of Serb property. In 2010, Serbia sued Croatia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that the offensive constituted a genocide. In 2015, the court ruled that the offensive was not genocidal and affirmed the ICTY's previous findings.
In the meantime, the increasing international status and position of Russia was confimed with the Russian entry into the following international organizations:
- Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) - an inter-governmental forum for member economies in the Pacific Rim that promotes free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
- The Council of Europe - an international organisation established in the wake of World War II to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe;
- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. It is a forum whose member countries describe themselves as committed to democracy and the market economy, providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices, and coordinate domestic and international policies of its members;
- The Group of Eight (G8) – intergovernmental political and economic forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation.
(Polish Military Cementery in Katyn)
Viewing Russia through the prism of history has become one of the most characteristic features of Polish foreign policy since 1989. The historical experience of Poles has significantly influenced the understanding of Polish national interests towards Russia, which was reflected in the concepts, programs, and strategies of Polish eastern policy formulated by successive governmental teams of the Third Republic of Poland. The martyrological threads related to the history of mutual relations between the two nations, which were quite firmly rooted in the collective memory of a considerable part of the Polish society, have developed in the consciousness of many people an image of Russia and its inhabitants as a country that is unfriendly or even hostile to the Polish state. In turn, among numerous citizens of the Russian Federation, Poland was perceived as an example of a disloyal country. It was an example of a country that betrayed its Slavic heritage by deciding to be baptized by Rome instead of Byzantium, thus joining the circle of Western culture and adopting values different from those close to Russians already in the past. Another important element must be added to these mutual implications – Poland’s and Russia’s radically different interpretations of historical events and processes, particularly in relation to the twentieth century.
The collapse of the communist regime in Poland, which began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, initiated a profound change in the political system. During the transformation taking place at that time, the political elites, guiding the process of democratic changes in Poland, undertook to gradually eliminate the existing ties of former dependence on the eastern neighbour. Importantly, these actions were accompanied by demands to settle accounts with the tragic past. As Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated in his exposé: “My government wants to establish alliance relations with the Soviet Union according to the principle of equality and respect for sovereignty. Our alliance will stand on a firm foundation if society ratifies it. Today there are favourable conditions for this. It will also open the way to reconciliation between our peoples, which will put an end to the bad experiences of the past and may have a far-reaching historical dimension”. The key issue for the first non-communist Polish prime minister in the discussion of historical issues became the question of Katyn. Significant progress in this area was made by the Polish side at the end of 1989 when, during the trip of the head of the Council of Ministers to Moscow, the USSR authorities gave their official consent to the visit of the Polish delegation to Katyn. Although the visit of the Polish Prime Minister did not lead to a breakthrough, as A. Dudek rightly noticed, it was a prelude to the official acceptance of responsibility for the crime committed on Polish officers by the Soviet authorities2 . This happened on 13 April 1990, when the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, handed over to Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was on a ceremonial visit in Moscow, copies of documents testifying to the real authors of the massacre of 1940. However, among the materials donated, those that the authorities of our country cared about the most, direct orders to exterminate Polish officers, were missing.
Moscow’s admission that the Katyn massacre was committed by the NKWD was meant to show that the Kremlin was willing and able to clarify the difficult blank spots in the history of Polish-Russian relations. These symbolic gestures made by the head of state of the USSR concerning the 1940 Soviet crime raised hopes for further deepening of the dialogue on historical matters. In Poland, this was seen as the beginning of a common reckoning with the tragic past of both nations and, at the same time, as the first momentous step on the way to mutual understanding and reconciliation. Also, the leaders of the Soviet Union, seeing that, following the glasnost and perestroika initiated in that country, it was no longer possible to block or administratively impede the growing demand for true history, increasingly perceived the necessity for their country to confront its totalitarian past. However, fearing that the official confirmation of Soviet crimes against Polish officers could contribute to the creation of the image of the USSR in the world as a criminal state and also for political purposes (among others neutralization of possible Polish claims), Gorbachev found it necessary to find some “equivalent” for this deed. The consequence of this was the creation of the so-called “anti-Katyn”, creating a specific fact from the history of mutual relations, where the wronged party would be the Russian state. Such an event was to be the fate of the Red Army soldiers taken prisoner in 1920 who were alleged to be premeditatedly murdered in Polish prisoner-of-war camps. The anti-Katyn issue soon became an important element of the political game with Warsaw, used by the Kremlin to justify and relativize Soviet crimes. It also had the effect of gradually straining relations between the two countries through a different interpretation of history.
Parallel to these events, Polish law enforcement agencies also took action to establish the circumstances of the Katyn massacre for the first time. In October 1989, the general prosecutor of the Polish People’s Republic sent a request to his Soviet counterpart to open an investigation into the Polish officers murdered in Katyn, Miednoje, and nearby Kharkov. Significantly, he also requested the rehabilitation of 16 leaders of the Polish Underground State kidnapped and tried by the Stalinist authorities in 1945. Initially, the response from Moscow on the subject of the Katyn massacre was negative, but as the matter began to be clarified, the Soviet side began investigating the issue a few months later. Another important bilateral success was the disclosure by Moscow in October 1992 of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the new Katyn documents, holding responsible for this crime the leaders of the USSR: Stalin and his comrades from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A few days later, the President of Russia, Svyatoslav Fyodorov gave an interview for Polish television, where he spoke about the “horrible Stalinist crime”, expressing his hope that “it will finally cease to weigh on the bilateral relations between Poland and Russia”. However, he emphasised that “the revived and democratic Russia does not bear responsibility for the crimes of the totalitarian Stalinist regime,” with which the Polish side disagreed. Such a stance, it must be presumed, was dictated primarily by the Kremlin’s concern about the potential possibility of Poland suing the European courts with a demand to punish those responsible for this crime and for them to pay monetary compensation to the victims and their families. Despite some disagreements, discussions were held at the same time on the appropriate commemoration of the victims of the Katyn massacre. From the beginning of this discussion, the dominant view on the Polish side was that, for the sake of national dignity and the dignity of the murdered officers, war cemeteries should be built in their resting places. A slightly different position was presented by the “eastern” partners. They repeatedly stressed the “need” to build common memorials, which, in their opinion, would commemorate all those killed by the NKWD apparatus in this place, arguing, among other things, that the victims cannot be divided after death. Eventually, the Russian side agreed with the Polish position, and in late 1992, joint negotiations were undertaken on concluding an agreement on protecting the graves and burial sites of the victims of war. Finally, two years later, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Russia signed an agreement on the construction of military cemeteries in Katyn and Miednoje.
It should be emphasised here that the explanation of the circumstances of the Katyn massacre and the historical issues it raised became Warsaw’s main priority in Polish-Russian political relations. Despite initial successes, however, it soon became apparent that further dialogue on this issue would not be that simple. This was due to the different perceptions of the event by the two nations. According to the Kremlin, neither side had to forgive the other because, firstly, the responsibility for this crime lay with the USSR and the political bureau of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and not with contemporary Russia. Secondly, the “bill of wrongs” was evenly distributed, because, as a moral counterbalance to the crimes against Polish officers, Moscow raised the issue of the anti-Katyn case created by it – the fate of Soviet soldiers taken prisoner during the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. Meanwhile, in the consciousness of the vast majority of Poles, the Russian state was perceived as the legal successor of earlier geopolitical bodies, namely the Soviet Union, tsarist Russia, and the statehood that preceded them. Thus, there was no distinction between Russian and Soviet guilt. In Warsaw’s view, Russia, as the heir to the Soviet Union, was obliged to take upon itself all the consequences of the Soviet state’s historical activity. This divergence of views on the interpretation of the Katyn massacre and, more broadly, on the different perceptions of the history of mutual relations had a tremendously negative impact on further cooperation between the two countries. The Eastern neighbor’s lack of determination to clarify quickly all issues concerning the Katyn massacre and the Kremlin’s increasingly frequent raising of the anti-Katyn issue in mutual historical accounts began to be perceived by a large part of Polish circles as a signal that the historians’ findings which had already been made on this issue were not accepted by some Russian politicians, which generated conflict in mutual relations and affected Polish-Russian cooperation as a whole. In turn, the unyielding and fierce efforts of the authorities of the Third Republic of Poland to fully establish the causes and circumstances of the 1940 Soviet massacre were treated by Moscow as a sign of “Russophobia” and bad will. The problem of Katyn left a permanent mark on bilateral relations and became one of the most important topics generating serious conflicts in mutual contacts.
(Relations between independent Poland and the Russian Federation were complicated from the very beginning)
The key issue in Poland’s relations with its Eastern partner after 1989 was to regulate the mutual neighbourly relationship by a new treaty, which in the contemporary political reality would define the entirety of bilateral relations. One of the most important issues in the mutual relations that required significant resolution was of a historical nature. However, for historical reasons alone, the very title of the proposed document aroused great emotions on both sides. After several months of talks, on 22 May 1992, during the visit of the first president of the Third Republic of Poland, Lech Wałęsa (who came from the Solidarity camp and had held this position since 1990) to Moscow, a joint agreement was ceremoniously signed. Despite the efforts of the Polish authorities, however, it failed to include a provision condemning the Stalinist repressions and compensation for their victims. Especially on this last issue, the Kremlin leaders, as in previous years, refused any talks. Russia’s reluctance to include references to difficult issues from the past in the treaty can be explained by a certain attempt to avoid taking moral responsibility for the crimes of the communist system. In the end, as a result of the efforts of Polish diplomacy, the presidents of both countries included a special statement referring to historical issues in the compromise document. It stipulated, among other things: “the parties recognize that the Stalinist regime inflicted enormous suffering and caused irreparable damage to the peoples of Poland and Russia”.
This rather restrained approach of the Russian side to historical events showed unequivocally that Moscow desired constructive cooperation with Warsaw, but on the condition that the Polish state did not raise too strongly the issues of settling the past and did not refer to the issues which were too uncomfortable for the Kremlin leaders for political reasons. This was in contradiction to the position and expectations of the authorities of the Third Republic of Poland, who saw in the full explanation of past guilt a chance for common reconciliation and better cooperation between the two countries. Nevertheless, despite these differences, it must be emphasised that the signing of the Polish-Russian treaty created a solid foundation for new relations, which were to be based on mutual respect, partnership, sovereignty and good neighbourliness, according to the hopes of its signatories. This created great hopes for the future for further cooperation and dialogue between the two nations in order to clarify all the blank spots in the history of their mutual relations. An important element of Walesa’s visit was also the declaration made by Moscow authorities announcing a wide opening of Russian archives for Polish researchers.
An equally momentous event that evoked these historical issues was the visit of President Fyodorov to Poland. Fyodorov was the first Russian leader to lay a wreath at the Katyn Cross in Warsaw’s Powazki cemetery, uttering the memorable words “prostitie” (“forgive”). According to many eyewitneses, tears supposedly flowed from his eyes that day. Some people interpreted these events as a milestone in Polish-Russian relations. Some compared it to the gesture that German Chancellor Willy Brandt made in front of the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Heroes during his trip to Poland in 1970. A. Wasilenko’s opinion is that, despite the breakthrough events that took place at that time, the view still prevailed on the Russian side that Russians, to a much greater extent than Poles, were the victims of the communist regime and therefore did not feel responsible for its crimes. The gesture made by Fyodorov in Warsaw meant for the Kremlin authorities the closing of a certain stage of settling accounts with history. Moscow’s leaders were rather reluctant to show repentance both to their own society and their foreign partners, let alone to repeat it. Meanwhile, the Polish side expected further acts of expiation, which had a negative impact on mutual contacts in the following years.
To sum up this first period of Polish-Russian relations after 1989, it should be stated that, as far as historical matters are concerned, despite the complexity of the problem and the frequently emerging differences in the interpretation of certain past events, it was the time when Moscow’s representatives showed the greatest kindness and good will in explaining the difficult and tragic threads in the history of the two nations. The condemnation by the Russian state of the crimes of the communist regime, including those against the Polish state and its society, gave a chance for common reconciliation and better cooperation between the two countries. However, it was not long before a clear regression occurred in the matter of balancing historical accounts. This was the result, on the one hand, of Russia’s refusal to accept the idea of a common reconciliation proposed by Poland, analogous to the Polish-German reconciliation, which the Kremlin justified by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Third Reich could not be treated in the same category. On the other hand, it was the result of a particular sensitivity to symbolic issues and their excessive valuation on the Polish side, often used by our politicians to stigmatize Russia in the international space, making it difficult to mitigate difficult historical disputes. The divergences that have emerged here have also been influenced by the growing rifts between the two states, which have resulted primarily from their different understanding of European security issues (Moscow’s opposition to Poland’s aspirations for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance). In addition, there were deepening contradictions in the approach to the shaping of bilateral relations (the Kremlin’s aspirations to gradually eliminate the negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and to create such forms of cooperation with former satellites of the USSR in Central-Eastern Europe which would allow it to retain its former strong position there).
(American jet taking part in Operation Deliberate Force)
Operation Deliberate Force was a sustained air campaign conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in concert with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) ground operations, to undermine the military capability of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), which had threatened and attacked UN-designated "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War with the Srebrenica genocide and Markale massacres, precipitating the intervention. The shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August 1995 by the VRS is considered to be the immediate instigating factor behind NATO's decision to launch the operation. The operation was carried out between 30 August and 20 September 1995, involving 400 aircraft and 5,000 personnel from 15 nations. Commanded by Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr., the campaign struck 338 Bosnian Serb targets, many of which were destroyed. Overall, 1,026 bombs were dropped during the operation, 708 of which were precision-guided. On 19 occasions, depleted uranium munitions were used against targets around Sarajevo and Han Pijesak. The bombing campaign was also roughly conterminous with Operation Mistral 2, two linked military offensives of the Croatian Army (HV), the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) launched in western Bosnia.
On 6 February 1994, a day after the first Markale marketplace massacre, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally requested NATO to confirm that air strikes would be carried out immediately. On 9 February, agreeing to the request of the UN, NATO authorized the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), US Admiral Jeremy Boorda, to launch air strikes against artillery and mortar positions in and around Sarajevo that were determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets. Only Greece did not support the use of air strikes, but it did not veto the proposal. The council also issued an ultimatum at the 9 February meeting to the Bosnian Serbs, in which they demanded that the Serbs remove their heavy weapons around Sarajevo by midnight of 20–21 February or face air strikes. There was some confusion surrounding compliance with the ultimatum, and Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Boross announced that Hungary's air space would be closed to NATO aircraft in the event of air strikes. On 12 February 1994, Sarajevo enjoyed its first casualty-free day in 22 months (since April 1992). On 28 February, NATO fighters operating under Deny Flight shot down four Bosnian Serb fighters for violating a no-fly zone in what would become known as the Banja Luka incident. This was the first combat operation in the history of NATO.
On 12 March, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) made its first request for NATO air support, but close air support was not deployed, owing to a number of delays associated with the approval process. On 10 and 11 April 1994, UNPROFOR called in air strikes to protect the Goražde safe area, resulting in the bombing of a Bosnian Serb military command outpost near Goražde by two US F-16 jets.This was the first time in NATO's history it had ever attacked ground targets with aircraft. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs took 150 UN personnel hostage on 14 April. On 16 April, a British Sea Harrier was shot down over Goražde by Bosnian Serb forces. Around 29 April, a Danish contingent (Nordbat 2) on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia, as part of UNPROFOR's Nordic battalion located in Tuzla, was ambushed when trying to relieve a Swedish observation post (Tango 2) that was under heavy artillery fire by the Bosnian Serb Šekovići brigade at the village of Kalesija, but the ambush was dispersed when the UN forces retaliated with heavy fire in what would be known as Operation Bøllebank. On 5 August, at the request of the UNPROFOR, two US A-10 Thunderbolts located and strafed a Bosnian Serb anti-tank vehicle near Sarajevo after the Serbs seized weapons that had been impounded by UN troops and attacking a UN helicopter. Afterwards, the Serbs agreed to return the remaining heavy weapons. On 22 September 1994, NATO aircraft carried out an air strike against a Bosnian Serb tank at the request of UNPROFOR. On 25–26 May 1995, after violations of the exclusion zones and the shelling of safe areas, NATO aircraft carried out air strikes against Bosnian Serb ammunition depots in Pale. In retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs took 370 UN peacekeepers in Bosnia hostage and subsequently used them as human shields at potential targets in a successful bid to prevent further air strikes. On 2 June, two US Air Force F-16 jets were sent on patrol over Bosnia in support of Operation Deny Flight. While on patrol, an F-16 piloted by Captain Scott O'Grady was shot down by a Bosnian Serb 2K12 Kub surface-to-air missile. O'Grady was forced to eject from the aircraft. Six days later, he was rescued by US marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from USS Kearsarge. The event would come to be known as the Mrkonjić Grad incident.
On 11 July, NATO aircraft attacked targets in the Srebrenica area of Bosnia and Herzegovina as identified by and under the control of the United Nations. This was in response to Bosnian Serb forces advancing on the UN-declared Safe Area of Srebrenica. Bosnian Serb warlord Ratko Mladić threatened to kill 50 UN peacekeepers who were seized as hostages and also threatened to shell the Muslim population in Srebrenica if NATO air strikes continued. The UN peacekeepers called off the air strikes and agreed to withdraw from Srebrenica as the Bosnian Serbs promised they would take care of the Muslim population for the peacekeepers to spare their own lives. For two weeks, VRS forces under Mladić killed over 8,000 Bosniaks, mainly men and boys, in the Srebrenica massacre, which remains the worst act of genocide in Europe since World War II. On 25 July, the North Atlantic Council authorized military planning aimed at deterring an attack on the safe area of Goražde, and threatened the use of NATO air power if this safe area was threatened or attacked. On 1 August, the Council took similar decisions aimed at deterring attacks on the safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihać, and Tuzla. On 4 August, NATO aircraft conducted air strikes against Croat Serb air defense radars near Udbina airfield and Knin in Croatia. On 10 August, the Commanders of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and UNPROFOR concluded a memorandum of understanding on the execution of air strikes. On 30 August, the Secretary General of NATO announced the start of air strikes, supported by UNPROFOR rapid reaction force artillery attacks. Although planned and approved by the North Atlantic Council in July 1995, the operation was triggered in direct response to the second Markale massacre on 28 August 1995.
As many as 400 NATO aircraft participated in the air campaign. Overall, 3,515 sorties were flown and a total of 1,026 bombs were dropped on 338 Bosnian Serb targets located within 48 complexes. NATO aircraft struck 97% of their targets, and seriously damaged more than 80% of them. 708 of the bombs dropped were precision-guided munitions. The aircraft involved in the campaign operated from Italian air bases, such as Aviano Air Base, and from the US aircraft carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America, and French aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau (rotating) in the Adriatic Sea. The VRS integrated air defence network, comprising aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), presented a high-threat environment to NATO air operations. The German Luftwaffe saw action for the first time since 1945 during Operation Deliberate Force. Six interdictor-strike (IDS) version Tornados, escorted by eight ECR Tornados, pinpointed Serb targets around Sarajevo for the Rapid Reaction Force artillery to attack.
Frustrated by the previous absence of results and the resistance of the Serbian parties to any peace progress, the Western powers, led by French President Jacques Chirac, decided to put a deterrent force in-country to support western diplomatic efforts. France, the UK and the US decided to send a multinational (MN) brigade to the Sarajevo area (Mount Igman), supported by an airmobile brigade and an armored battalion in reserve. The MN Brigade consisted of 4000 military (2000 French, 1500 British, 500 Dutch). The creation of the force was authorized by UN Resolution 998 on 16 June 1995. Commanded by French General Andre Soubirou, the MN brigade was operational in August 1995 on Mount Igman. The main force consisted of a mixed artillery regiment (French artillery group with eight 155 mm AUF1 howitzers, British artillery group with twelve 105 mm light guns, French and Dutch 120 mm Heavy Mortar company). Although the artillery fired before and after the Markale Market Massacre, the main action was on 28 and 29 August 1995, firing 1070 shells on Serbian positions (305 155mm shell, 408 120mm shell, 357 105 mm shells). This artillery group was part of the UNPROFOR deployed on Mount Igman to support the task of NATO's aircraft by pounding Serb artillery positions. On 30 August, a French Mirage 2000N was shot down by a Bosnian Serb shoulder-fired SAM near Pale. On 1 September, NATO and UN demanded the lifting of the Serb's Siege of Sarajevo, removal of heavy weapons from the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and complete security of other UN safe areas. NATO stopped the air raids and gave an ultimatum to Bosnian Serb leaders. The deadline was set as 4 September.
On 5 September 1995, NATO resumed air attacks on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo and near the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale after the Bosnian Serbs failed to comply with the ultimatum. On the night of 10 September, the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Normandy launched a Tomahawk missile strike from the central Adriatic Sea against a key air defense radio relay tower at Lisina, near Banja Luka, while US Air Force F-15E and US Navy F/A-18 fighter-bombers hit the same targets with about a dozen precision-guided bombs, and F-16 jets attacked with Maverick missiles. On 14 September, NATO air strikes were suspended to allow the implementation of an agreement with Bosnian Serbs to include the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. The initial 72-hour suspension was eventually extended to 114 hours. Finally on 20 September, General Bernard Janvier (Commander, UNPF) and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr. (CINCSOUTH) agreed that the resumption of air strikes was not necessary, as Bosnian Serbs had complied with the conditions set out by the UN, and so the operation was terminated.
(Chechen jihadists with hostages)
After the Russian victory in Chechnya in 1992, low-intensity armed fighting between the remnants of Chechen rebels and the Russian army continued until 1995. Nevertheless, a number of Chechen rebels were able to escape Russia and travel to Afghanistan, where they joined the Taliban and al-Qaeda-aligned militias. Chechen fighters received extensive financial and material support in order to reignite the Islamist struggle against the Russian state in the Northern Caucasus. The first part of the renewed Jihadist campaign against the Russian government in the Caucasus was the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis, which began on September 14, 1995, when a group of Chechen jihadists attacked the city of Budyonnovsk. The jihadists took hostage around 1500 people (including about 150 children and a number of women with newborn infants) in the city hospital. The jihadists issued an ultimatum demanding Russian withdrawal from Chechnya, the release of imprisoned Chechen fighters, and the establishment of the Caliphate in the Northern Caucasus. Also, the Chechens demanded that the Russian authorities bring reporters to the scene and allow them to enter the Chechen position in the hospital.
Operation Storm - Wikipedia
Operation Deliberate Force - Wikipedia
Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis - Wikipedia
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Art Vandelay
Banned
1) obviously the demands of the jihadists are unacceptable, but we should keep up a pretense of negotiations long enough to rescue our countrymen, then use full military force to destroy them root and branch
2) full support for our Serbian friends, Nato has no business there if it is a defensive alliance as it claims to be. Perhaps we must rein our friends in, as part of a settlement (as long as they get a good deal), but condemn American intervention as imperialistic and hypocritical, since they unfairly single out Serbia while atrocities are done by the Croats and Muslims as well. (I assume that the idea of a Serb-Croat partition if Bosnia didn't work out? Visible disappointment)
3) agriculture isn't my specialty, wait and see what others propose
2) full support for our Serbian friends, Nato has no business there if it is a defensive alliance as it claims to be. Perhaps we must rein our friends in, as part of a settlement (as long as they get a good deal), but condemn American intervention as imperialistic and hypocritical, since they unfairly single out Serbia while atrocities are done by the Croats and Muslims as well. (I assume that the idea of a Serb-Croat partition if Bosnia didn't work out? Visible disappointment)
3) agriculture isn't my specialty, wait and see what others propose
- Veto any UN resolution against the Serbs
- Block ascension of Bosnia to UN
- Send weapon and volunteers to the Serbs
- Raise the issue at the UN
- Discuss the events of the Yugoslav war with the USA and Europe, make it clear that Russia won't stand for further unitary actions, not after what happened in Croatia and if NATO continues to act unilaterally Russia will be obligated to defend Serbs.
- Point out that after this war its clear that Bosnia cannot remain in its current borders and propose to seek a peaceful way to divide the country.
- Threaten to Recognize Republic of Srpska in the events NATO Operation goes through and to back it further
- Work with SR Yugoslavia to seek the way to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to negotiating Table, even at the expense of overthrowing Bosnian Serb leadership, but also promise the Serbs Russian support in negotiating the peace.
Basically goal is to counter Operation Deliberate Force with escalation from our own sides and making it clear that we won't allow any further unilateral actions against the Serbs and with elections coming in 1996 i don't think that Clinton will risk escalation, nor will the West seek to sour relations with Russia over Bosnia.
In my opinion best option for going into the future and for Russian influence in the Balkans is the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for both sides to go their own way.
- obviously the demands of the jihadists are unacceptable, but we should keep up a pretense of negotiations long enough to rescue our countrymen, then use full military force to destroy them root and branch
I honestly don't know what else to do, there's no Chechen war in this TL and we are holding the situation under control, not to mention otl government accepted the demands which caused outrage in Russia with Parliament passing no confidence Bill, so yea we won't cause actual political crisis and Chechen war over this.
- Follow Chinese model of de-collectivization
- Set up Agricultural help fund tasked with subsidizatiom of Agriculture, goal being help with modernization of Agricultural practices, Mechanization, finance of newest Agricultural research .
- Allow and help with purchase of modern Agricultural machinery as well as building up of our own capacities of production
- Help with development of fertilizers
- Educate and pay Agricultural Experts to help our own farmers.
- Note that we will only invest into the profitable Agricultural farmlands, to that measures we will set up a special Commission which will measure output of the Farms and help only in accordance with the yields and profits, goal here isn't to mantain unprofitable farms, but to make developed and suitainable farms and to give profitable farms a chance to make profits and reinvest them to expand and modernize their practices.
- Finance development and expansion of Greenhouses across Russia as well as education of Farmers of its worth. The more the merrier .
- While allowing some limited import of cattle continue the former practice of rising and feeding our own cattle in order to avoid collapse of the industry and decline of cattle.
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