After 1870 : Second Empire Vignettes

[galileo-034]

" ... was the first of a series of Anglo-French agreements and treaties that would collectively come to be known as the "Entente Cordiale". The convention of 1875 formally delineated the respective limits of British and French spheres of influence in the Red Sea and in South-East Asia, but it essentially confirmed and established alignment and cooperation with Great Britain as a dogma of French foreign and colonial policy, begun under Napoléon III and continued under Napoléon IV.

The convention was negotiated on France's behalf by Foreign Minister Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, but informally driven through by Dowager Empress Eugénie and in effective continuation of Franco-British negotiations of Napoléon IV's betrothal to Princess Beatrice during the Regency.

Pursuant to the Egyptian debt crisis, the convention established equal ownership of the Suez Canal between France and the United Kingdom, with Egypt's share in the canal to be split in two between them. Though the question their respective spheres of influence within Egypt itself would not be formalized until after the Expedition of 1882, but the tacit understanding would arise from the talks surrounding the convention, and in time lay out the framework for the common intervention. In its wake, it also set to delineate the limits between the recent French protectorate of Asir and the British aligned Zaidi Imamate of Sanaa, effectively shutting down Ottoman attempts at expanding in the region.

Pursuant to the Bangkok Incident, or Front Palace Incident, the convention officially neutralized Siam, but officiously presented British acceptation of France's "privileged", ie exclusive, influence, affirming the victory of French aligned reformist King Rama V over conservative and informally pro-British Vice King Prince Vichaian. Only in the Lao Highlands would London aknowledge a more direct control by Paris in the cadre of the informal Franco-Siamese condomnium that would emerge from the Haw Wars. In return, the French would forego any ambition in Upper Burma and assent to its annexation the year after, as well as understanding it to carry over the Shan States.

In the context of the still ongoing Sino-French War, the British veto of an expedition against Pekin came with the concession to French designs on Korea, implied as ending the Qinq protectorate in the peninsula and opening it to foreign trade and missionaries, and their continued control of Keelung in northern Formosa ... "

 

[galileo-034]

Not a proper TL, rather me throwing a few ideas on what road the Second Empire could have gone along if the War of 1870 had not been the unmitigated disaster it was IOTL.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Not a proper TL, rather me throwing a few ideas on what road the Second Empire could have gone along if the War of 1870 had not been the unmitigated disaster it was IOTL.

So France loses but doesn't get destroyed and the Second French Empire therefore survives?

 

[galileo-034]

So France loses but doesn't get destroyed and the Second French Empire therefore survives?

Basically, yes. Bazaine is killed at Mars-la-Tour, the Army of the Rhine is not trapped in Metz and links with McMahon's Army of Châlons and fight the Germans to a stalemate right on Paris' doorstep instead of getting trapped at Sedan, and Napoléon III is not captured.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Basically, yes. Bazaine is killed at Mars-la-Tour, the Army of the Rhine is not trapped in Metz and links with McMahon's Army of Châlons and fight the Germans to a stalemate right on Paris' doorstep instead of getting trapped at Sedan, and Napoléon III is not captured.

You could also make Nap III not go with his army, he wasn't commanding the army and as he was very sick his presence demoralized the troops, him remaining in Paris means that attempts to overthrow his government would be unsuccessful

 

[galileo-034]

You could also make Nap III not go with his army, he wasn't commanding the army and as he was very sick his presence demoralized the troops, him remaining in Paris means that attempts to overthrow his government would be unsuccessful

Well, here, Napoléon III has gone back to Paris... as did the army.

IOTL, that was the course MacMahon favored before being overruled. Without the Army of the Rhine trapped in Metz, there is no motive to overrule it.

 

[A Random Man]

Interesting story, does France still lose Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans?

 

[galileo-034]

Interesting story, does France still lose Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans?

No they don't. Unlike OTL, the war ends in a stalemate, not a thorough victory, and the Germans' position is less strong.
As far as Bismarck is concerned, his political objectives have been met. This is more like Austria-Hungary post 1866.
Still huge indemnities to pay on top of the humiliation and the diplomatic fallout; France was technically the aggressor in this war, even if it tricked into it.

 

[Whiteshore]

So, how strong are Republican and Bourbonist sentiments in France ITTL?

 

[galileo-034]

So, how strong are Republican and Bourbonist sentiments in France ITTL?

Well, that's for a future post... Suffice to say, the imperial regime would not escape such a humiliation unscathed and the tensions are running high on the domestic front.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Well, here, Napoléon III has gone back to Paris... as did the army.

IOTL, that was the course MacMahon favored before being overruled. Without the Army of the Rhine trapped in Metz, there is no motive to overrule it.

It's kind of difficult to stalemate a conflict if enemy troops are on the doorstep of your capital; except maybe if the Germans overextend and you manage to defeat them in battle

So, how strong are Republican and Bourbonist sentiments in France ITTL?

Bourbonism has long been dead

 

[Whiteshore]

Bourbonism has long been dead

I’m using it to refer to support for both the Orleanists and Legitimists combined within this context as a “catch-all” term.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

I’m using it to refer to support for both the Orleanists and Legitimists combined within this context as a “catch-all” term.

Nobody desired a King, you either were Bonapartist or Republican

 

[KaiserKatze]

It provides for some interesting ripples if the war goes differently. I will admit that it is a bit difficult for me to believe that the war comes out as a true stalemate, and I would expect France to still lose Alsace (which even the French somewhat recognised as being fairly claimed by Germany, and for which many Germans were rabid) if not Lorraine (which was a bigger sticking point since it also was mostly French-speaking and therefore undercut Germany's claim of linguistic union). If it was truly a stalemate, does the German Empire still unite? Does the crowning still happen in Versailles? If the victory is not as total, does Bavaria still join?

Though if indeed the war ended as neutrally as you are saying, it is a good sign for Franco-German relations. Bismarck did not want any annexations because he wanted to establish Germany as a permanent concept in Europe so that attempting to "undo" Germany would become impossible. Without that revanchism, I do not see an incredibly hostile rivalry between the two like IRL--at least, no more than any other European neighbours. It makes me wonder about the Entente Cordial coming about, and who it will be directed against.

 

[galileo-034]

It's kind of difficult to stalemate a conflict if enemy troops are on the doorstep of your capital; except maybe if the Germans overextend and you manage to defeat them in battle

Said capital was with the Thiers Wall one of the best defended places in Europe, and the naval guns equipping its forts kept the Germans far beyond the range of their own artillery. Add to that something to the tune of 230,000 regulars retreating from Metz and Chalons (including the naval infantry from the scrapped project of landing in North Germany), likely to rise to above 300,000, plus the sailors manning the naval artillery in the forts of the Thiers Wall. Add to that 200 to 400 thousands mobile and national guards (only glorified militia though, but useful in support of fixed defenses) - I'd have to check the numbers to be more precise, but those were the OTL defenders of Paris.

Meanwhile, the Germans in September only have the III. and IV. Armies available in front of Paris, so barely 200k; because they still got plenty of fortresses and cities to besiege in Alsace and Lorraine, sitting right on the lines of communications with Germany: Metz, not hosting and feeding 130,000 men helps lasting longer, Strasbourg where the news of Sedan demoralized the town into surrender, Nancy, Toul, Bitche, Belfort... All these places to besiege immobilized the I. Army (in Alsace) and the II. Army (Lorraine).
So, yes, the Germans were overextended at this point, and are even more vulnerable than OTL.
They don't have the numbers to besiege Paris, and just crossing the Seine river to encircle it with the French having interior lines of communications (lot of railroads to transfer troops from one point to another). That they were able to do it IOTL had much to do with the French losing these 230k regulars at Sedan and Metz, along with its cadre of experienced officers, and the faster reduction of the French fortresses in Lorraine and Alsace; ITTL, they'd be in a less comfortable position.
No Metz and Sedan, a better situation at Paris too, means the French get more resources and capable officers available to, say, launch a successfull offensive to relieve Belfort and threaten German lines in Alsace and Lorraine, instead of ending up interned in Switzerland like Bourbaki's army.

 

[Whiteshore]

Well, that's for a future post... Suffice to say, the imperial regime would not escape such a humiliation unscathed and the tensions are running high on the domestic front.

Will anything like the Paris Commune be a thing ITTL? At the very least, the people who IOTL formed it would probably still be running around.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Said capital was with the Thiers Wall one of the best defended places in Europe, and the naval guns equipping its forts kept the Germans far beyond the range of their own artillery. Add to that something to the tune of 230,000 regulars retreating from Metz and Chalons (including the naval infantry from the scrapped project of landing in North Germany), likely to rise to above 300,000, plus the sailors manning the naval artillery in the forts of the Thiers Wall. Add to that 200 to 400 thousands mobile and national guards (only glorified militia though, but useful in support of fixed defenses) - I'd have to check the numbers to be more precise, but those were the OTL defenders of Paris.

Meanwhile, the Germans in September only have the III. and IV. Armies available in front of Paris, so barely 200k; because they still got plenty of fortresses and cities to besiege in Alsace and Lorraine, sitting right on the lines of communications with Germany: Metz, not hosting and feeding 130,000 men helps lasting longer, Strasbourg where the news of Sedan demoralized the town into surrender, Nancy, Toul, Bitche, Belfort... All these places to besiege immobilized the I. Army (in Alsace) and the II. Army (Lorraine).
So, yes, the Germans were overextended at this point, and are even more vulnerable than OTL.
They don't have the numbers to besiege Paris, and just crossing the Seine river to encircle it with the French having interior lines of communications (lot of railroads to transfer troops from one point to another). That they were able to do it IOTL had much to do with the French losing these 230k regulars at Sedan and Metz, along with its cadre of experienced officers, and the faster reduction of the French fortresses in Lorraine and Alsace; ITTL, they'd be in a less comfortable position.
No Metz and Sedan, a better situation at Paris too, means the French get more resources and capable officers available to, say, launch a successfull offensive to relieve Belfort and threaten German lines in Alsace and Lorraine, instead of ending up interned in Switzerland like Bourbaki's army.

In that case yes but having your troops retreat all the way to Paris would certainly be a blow to morale and you have just abandoned all of North-Eastern France so justifying the war at this point becomes difficult.

Will anything like the Paris Commune be a thing ITTL? At the very least, the people who IOTL formed it would probably still be running around.

No, Napoleon III was very popular with the people and did many socialist reforms, also the reason why the revolt begun was because the Provisional Government surrendered while the Parisians fought hard to defend Paris and they then stole the cannons the Communards had paid with their money.

 

[galileo-034]

which even the French somewhat recognised as being fairly claimed by Germany, and for which many Germans were rabid

I never heard of that before. Alsace had been French since the 17th century, and Lorraine since the 18th. If anything, Italy had stronger claim to Savoy than Germany had on Alsace.
What I know however is that King Wilhelm wrote a letter to Eugénie, which she gave to Clemenceau in 1919 to support French claims at Versailles, in which he clearly stated that they annexed Alsace and Moselle for defensive purposes essentially, and constitute a buffer.

Will anything like the Paris Commune be a thing ITTL? At the very least, the people who IOTL formed it would probably still be running around.

No, Napoleon III was very popular with the people and did many socialist reforms, also the reason why the revolt begun was because the Provisional Government surrendered while the Parisians fought hard to defend Paris and they then stole the cannons the Communards had paid with their money.

Not sure he was that popular. At the beginning he was sure, but in the end? He was more an established reality of French politics and the embodiement of the status quo, like in "it's me or the chaos". That the regime collapsed when he was captured is testamount to how weak and fragile he was actually; something though I think he was aware of, since he worked through the 1860s to liberalize and expand the regime base, to secure the throne for his son. Other than that, he was a populist at heart, though he might have genuinely cared about the workers' condition, but he had not exactly been enacting socialist reforms; the right to strike in 1864 was a small concession, but the right to organize into trade unions did not really come until the 1880s.

Then the Commune did not simply erupt out of the war. The late 1860s were a time of political turbulence in France and the Ollivier government had barely avoided an uprising in the aftermath of Victor Noir's murder by Prince Pierre Napoléon in early 1870. The siege of Paris and the defeat just made the conditions ripe for a revolution to actually happen.
So, yes those people are still running around...

In that case yes but having your troops retreat all the way to Paris would certainly be a blow to morale and you have just abandoned all of North-Eastern France so justifying the war at this point becomes difficult.

It would have been, but it was the lesser of two evils. Northeastern France, except for the fortresses, was lost at Forbach-Spicheren and Wissembourg, from which point the army was in full retreat mode. Paris was the only place they could have stopped their retreat to.
Then the problem is who is going to concede first. Bismarck needed France humbled, he did achieve that under a month of war, but the French were stubborn and not that willing to lose face, so you can understand why the Republicans fought so hard to break the siege of Paris, lest they'd be at Germany's complete mercy.
At least in the scenario where the army retreat to Paris mostly intact, the French government has more bargaining power than it had IOTL, and a victory on Paris' doorstep might be all that's needed to call it a day and go the peace table.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Not sure he was that popular. At the beginning he was sure, but in the end? He was more an established reality of French politics and the embodiement of the status quo, like in "it's me or the chaos". That the regime collapsed when he was captured is testamount to how weak and fragile he was actually; something though I think he was aware of, since he worked through the 1860s to liberalize and expand the regime base, to secure the throne for his son. Other than that, he was a populist at heart, though he might have genuinely cared about the workers' condition, but he had not exactly been enacting socialist reforms; the right to strike in 1864 was a small concession, but the right to organize into trade unions did not really come until the 1880s.

Then the Commune did not simply erupt out of the war. The late 1860s were a time of political turbulence in France and the Ollivier government had barely avoided an uprising in the aftermath of Victor Noir's murder by Prince Pierre Napoléon in early 1870. The siege of Paris and the defeat just made the conditions ripe for a revolution to actually happen.
So, yes those people are still running around...

He was very popular in the countryside, in the cities a little bit less because he outlawed democracy but he still completely destroyed the Republicans in the Referendums, he made democratic reforms because he was worried about his popularity in urban centers.
Hadn't he been destroyed at Sedan he could've certainly controlled the government and the power vacuum that allowed the Paris Commune to create is never achieved.

At least in the scenario where the army retreat to Paris mostly intact, the French government has more bargaining power than it had IOTL, and a victory on Paris' doorstep might be all that's needed to call it a day and go the peace table.

Well they still would have to push the Germans back enough so that they start to doubt about victory and then yes Bismarck could accept a peace deal where he doesn't take Alsace

 

[KaiserKatze]

I never heard of that before. Alsace had been French since the 17th century, and Lorraine since the 18th. If anything, Italy had stronger claim to Savoy than Germany had on Alsace.
What I know however is that King Wilhelm wrote a letter to Eugénie, which she gave to Clemenceau in 1919 to support French claims at Versailles, in which he clearly stated that they annexed Alsace and Moselle for defensive purposes essentially, and constitute a buffer.

I did know about the letter, and it is true that Prussia annexed Alsace-Lorraine on the basis of providing a buffer to the South German states, but it was also something that a lot of Germans advocated for on a historic-linguistic basis even as far back as the 1840's. It is also of note that, while the method of annexation into Germany earned Berlin a lot of emnity in the region, there also were many Alsatians who were not happy about being French, and tended towards independence more than either side by 1914.

The bit about Alsace was on the basis of Germany as a union of German-speaking peoples more than anything, and it showed up after the Franco-Prussian war where there were proposals to partition the region on a linguistic basis. It was a claim for Germany as this union, whereas Savoy, for example, was more claimed by the King of Italy and on a historic basis. (Same as Austria--the King of Prussia had no claim on it, but Germany as a union of Germans had an argument for a claim.) It was much of the same influence which led to Napoleon III proposing a partition of Schleswig-Holstein on the basis of language, though of course it is very different if it is your own country. But in the younger generations of France, there was less emnity towards Germany holding Alsace proper--Lorraine was more complex, even among many Germans. After all, taking the capital and name of Lorraine despite it being majority French in ownership and language, that is just a dick move.

The proposal to partition the region, or hold a plebiscite, comes up in a few texts from the era. It seems to be something that the French government was hostile to (they wanted the whole thing), and the German one under Wilhelm II, but a lot of proponents of a Franco-German detente advocated for it as a way to prevent a future war in Europe.

In the case of Prussia not taking Alsace, I think it would see an interesting development in the region over time. If France continues their centralisation, whereas Germany remains federal, it might cause a movement in Alsace to join Germany as a full federal state, given how much the Alsatians hated the Parisian focus taken by France.