Leningrad 1943 Instead of Kursk

[pattersonautobody]

Obviously, Kursk 1943 was an immense failure. The Germans attacked into the teeth of the dragon, their new heavy armor was not built for distances, and they by failing so spectacularly experienced a general collapse that ended up giving up all ground up to the Dnieper river for no gain. The Germans lost what was remaining of their initiative and better-trained men.

What if investments were made to essentially give up what was east of the Dniepr and Smolensk in a defense-in depth, and otherwise attempt to resume cutting off Leningrad? I presume the air assets and such would transition fine, but the ground assets would not benefit from as heavy of an investment simply because logisitically Leningrad does not lend itself over to permitting as many men on an offensive. Wouldn't this favor the "quality over quantity" that was the only card the Germans had remaining in the East come 1943? It would also permit the transfer of soldiers to the Mediterranean, and to defensive operations that occurred OTL--perhaps even permitting a slightly better outcome from Model and Manstein in some local victories against over-extended Soviet pincers.

While this is not a war winning move, it's a relatively strong move considering that the Baltics were the only theater of the war in 1944 where the Germans did not get absolutely creamed. Further, it is politically feasible. Hitler was keen on having some sort of victory to sell to his public and minor allies. So, is there any chance Leningrad falls by winter 44? And if so, how does this effect Soviet planning in 1944? And even if it still fails, isn't it a better throw of the dice than Kursk?

 

[Ana Luciana II]

I’m no expert on the Soviet-German War but IMO the biggest issue here is that Kursk was the target of a German attack because, if successful, it would have tangibly reversed Soviet advances on the Eastern Front. The Soviet troops in Leningrad were penned up and not going anywhere. I agree that Leningrad falling would have freed up troops for other fronts and be a major propaganda victory but those troops needed for the breakthrough would be better used elsewhere.

 

[GarethC]

I’m no expert on the Soviet-German War but IMO the biggest issue here is that Kursk was the target of a German attack because, if successful, it would have tangibly reversed Soviet advances on the Eastern Front. The Soviet troops in Leningrad were penned up and not going anywhere. I agree that Leningrad falling would have freed up troops for other fronts and be a major propaganda victory but those the troops needed for the breakthrough would be better used elsewhere.

I think the argument is that, with the benefit of hindsight, troops offensively at Kursk will achieve nothing, so that with the crystal ball of foreknowledge you only reinforce the Kursk front to the degree necessary to end the fighting retreat at the Dniepr anyway. All your other reinforcements can get spent in the north.

The question I see is that OTL Zitadelle and the Soviet counteroffensive ended up costing the USSR about a million casualties and 8000 AFVs knocked out (many repairably so), to be rather inacccurate.
If instead of an offensive operation, the Germans have got to do a fighting retreat over a defense in depth, will they inflict the same losses? Will a higher proportion of Soviet AFV losses be recoverable, and a lower proportion of German ones?

Will taking Leningrad leave a Soviet front on the Dniepr that is actually more capable of continuing offensive operations than OTL Kursk did?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I think the argument is that, with the benefit of hindsight, troops offensively at Kursk will achieve nothing, so that with the crystal ball of foreknowledge you only reinforce the Kursk front to the degree necessary to end the fighting retreat at the Dniepr anyway. All your other reinforcements can get spent in the north.

The question I see is that OTL Zitadelle and the Soviet counteroffensive ended up costing the USSR about a million casualties and 8000 AFVs knocked out (many repairably so), to be rather inacccurate.
If instead of an offensive operation, the Germans have got to do a fighting retreat over a defense in depth, will they inflict the same losses? Will a higher proportion of Soviet AFV losses be recoverable, and a lower proportion of German ones?

Will taking Leningrad leave a Soviet front on the Dniepr that is actually more capable of continuing offensive operations than OTL Kursk did?

Not to mention diverting German forces that historically participated in the defense of against the Soviet offensives, which would make them weaker.

Attacking Leningrad also poses some greater tactical challenges compared to attacking Kursk: while the distances are shorter, the terrain is vastly more rugged and most Soviet positions have been fortified for almost two years instead of just 4 months.

The static front and presence of the Baltic Fleet also means that Leningrad itself has built up the largest Soviet concentration of super-heavy artillery on the Eastern Front, so they’d have tons of firepower to throw at the Germans of a type that the defenders of Kursk were relatively short on. And since the Soviets both had intelligence superiority and were actively investigating where the Germans would strike instead of just assuming like they had in the earlier years, they’ll still be able to see the attack coming and plan accordingly.

Not to mention - as 1943 was to show - the German “quality over quantity” was built on the assumption they still retained the quality advantage of 1941-42, which was not true tactically and CERTAINLY not true operationally. The Soviet improvements in the former may not have yet precisely equalled the Germans, but it had come far enough that their superiority in the latter was able to offset it.

 

[pattersonautobody]

I think the argument is that, with the benefit of hindsight, troops offensively at Kursk will achieve nothing, so that with the crystal ball of foreknowledge you only reinforce the Kursk front to the degree necessary to end the fighting retreat at the Dniepr anyway. All your other reinforcements can get spent in the north.

The question I see is that OTL Zitadelle and the Soviet counteroffensive ended up costing the USSR about a million casualties and 8000 AFVs knocked out (many repairably so), to be rather inacccurate.
If instead of an offensive operation, the Germans have got to do a fighting retreat over a defense in depth, will they inflict the same losses? Will a higher proportion of Soviet AFV losses be recoverable, and a lower proportion of German ones?

Will taking Leningrad leave a Soviet front on the Dniepr that is actually more capable of continuing offensive operations than OTL Kursk did?

Because losses are inaccurate this at least lends more credence to "going offense in Kursk was unsuccessful."

Not to mention diverting German forces that historically participated in the defense of against the Soviet offensives, which would make them weaker.

Attacking Leningrad also poses some greater tactical challenges compared to attacking Kursk: while the distances are shorter, the terrain is vastly more rugged and most Soviet positions have been fortified for almost two years instead of just 4 months.

The static front and presence of the Baltic Fleet also means that Leningrad itself has built up the largest Soviet concentration of super-heavy artillery on the Eastern Front, so they’d have tons of firepower to throw at the Germans of a type that the defenders of Kursk were relatively short on. And since the Soviets both had intelligence superiority and were actively investigating where the Germans would strike instead of just assuming like they had in the earlier years, they’ll still be able to see the attack coming and plan accordingly.

Not to mention - as 1943 was to show - the German “quality over quantity” was built on the assumption they still retained the quality advantage of 1941-42, which was not true tactically and CERTAINLY not true operationally. The Soviet improvements in the former may not have yet precisely equalled the Germans, but it had come far enough that their superiority in the latter was able to offset it.

Tactically, not exactly. Germany did break through in the south of Kursk. Being that the Leningrad front, as the OP stated, does not lend itself to many more numbers on either side, this scenario leads to only a tiny incremental change in the number of forces in central Russia and Ukraine. In reality, the Germans didn't fight the ussr to a stop OTL, the Russians outran their supply. So the Germans can pretty much have the same outcome with less losses by avoiding Kursk, perhaps not be on the back foot so bad and get a fourth Kharkov or hold Smolensk.

But this begs the question, what can the armored spear and the top engineers and such do concentrated south of Leningrad instead of North and South of Kursk? Not a rhetorical question. I don't think brand new Elefant tank destroyers do well in the woods. However, is it possible for Germany to have local superiority in this sector when the USSR eyes the bulge as per OTL?

 

[Post]

Looking at Stalingrad, fighting in a city wouldn't be easier than fighting on the plaids naar Kursk.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Tactically, not exactly. Germany did break through in the south of Kursk.

No, they didn't. They never penetrated into the rear area of the defending Soviet armies, never mind the front-level defenses. They were still stuck in the Soviet defensive lines and had not penetrated into their operational depths when the whole thing was called off.

Being that the Leningrad front, as the OP stated, does not lend itself to many more numbers on either side, this scenario leads to only a tiny incremental change in the number of forces in central Russia and Ukraine.

That's an unproven assumption. The Soviets certainly didn't have problems reinforcing that front and building it up either in for their offensive in the winter of '42/'43 - when they broke the encirclement of the city - nor for the offensive in early-'44. The Germans had planned to ship in an additional army in late-'42, before Stalingrad derailed those plans. The claim that neither side could not build up their numbers is thus ahistoric. But even that aside,

In reality, the Germans didn't fight the ussr to a stop OTL, the Russians outran their supply.

Yes, and that was with the Germans doing so with the air and land forces historically allocated to Citadel. Even the OP proposes stripping out at least the former.

So the Germans can pretty much have the same outcome with less losses by avoiding Kursk, perhaps not be on the back foot so bad

We've been over this before. German losses at Citadel were trivial and they easily recovered. The real killer was simply that German infantry divisions still retained their crippling weakness against massed Soviet armour, and so what really mattered in stopping a Soviet attack was how many Panzer divisions there were, and where they were. Throughout1943, the Soviets repeatedly demonstrated the ability to overrun defending German infantry who lacked armour support.

This problem with the German infantry being too weak also only worsened as the year wore on, because even unsuccessful Soviet attacks often penetrated to their artillery lines and shot them up before any panzers could arrive and then stall them out and repulse them, meaning the Germans invariably lost tons of tube artillery regardless of how successful their defense and counter-attack. Since artillery is where any modern army's infantry derives the bulk of their firepower both on the defense and offense, this was a crippling problem.

Writers like von Manstein blame Kursk for squandering the German advantage but in fact it's pretty clear from the colossal Soviet numerical advantage in tanks that they never had that offensive advantage in the first place. In the defensive battles of 1943, the repeated pattern was that Army Group South was forced to rush its armoured reserves from one hot spot to another, and whenever they contained one Soviet attack, another would develop from another direction and in another location, pushing the Germans back again.

All the Soviets have to do is launch more attacks than the Germans panzer divisions could respond to. The Germans, with too few forces to cover the length of their front, would race their formations one way or another to shore up the line against a Soviet attack, only to be hit unexpectedly by the main blow in a location where they were too weak to stop it, forcing them to scramble, improvise, and ultimately withdraw. Just as happened throughout 1943.

and get a fourth Kharkov or hold Smolensk.

The Germans tried to get a fourth Kharkov. They failed not due to the losses at Citadel - because those were small enough they had recovered by then - but because the Soviet tank formations did not fall apart like had happened at 2nd and 3rd Kharkov, but instead viciously counter-counter-attacked and prevented the Germans from gaining any momentum. This cost the Soviet tank armies most of their strength, but also sapped and exhausted the just-recovered German panzers strength... only for the following armies to roll into them, forcing the subsequent retreat from Kharkov, though they at least managed to stabilize the line again shortly to the south...

Only for the Soviets to then switch back to Donets, which the Germans were just barely able to contain a breakthrough. The Soviets then launched another push towards Poltava, and this the Germans again barely contained by rushing the Panzers from Kharkov. Only there did the Panzer divisions - worn out from the defensive fighting - reach the limits of their endurance and the Soviets began to breakthrough. By September the Germans realized that only a withdrawal across the Dneiper river could save them, and the entire Army group was forced to fall back.

But this begs the question, what can the armored spear and the top engineers and such do concentrated south of Leningrad instead of North and South of Kursk? Not a rhetorical question.

Well, the assets - especially the engineering ones - will be useful. The issue with this idea is not that the Germans probably wouldn't succeed in a strategic vacuum where they had no enemy counter-actions to worry about. The problem is that even if the Soviets don't choose to amass local superiority, it'll take the Germans long enough to fight through the defenses around Leningrad for the Soviets and WAllies to launch offensives elsewhere even if the Soviets choose, and the Germans will have to call off the offensives in order to divert forces to fight them off. Fighting through competently held, prepared defenses - even if successful - takes a long time.

However, is it possible for Germany to have local superiority in this sector when the USSR eyes the bulge as per OTL?

No. Because the Soviets might glance at the bulge ATL, but they won't keep at it once they look at the intelligence picture. They made a concerted and well thought out effort to determine the intent of the enemy and they had the assets to succeed, so they succeeded.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Looking at Stalingrad, fighting in a city wouldn't be easier than fighting on the plaids naar Kursk.

Looking at Stalingrad, fighting in a city wouldn't be easier than fighting on the plaids naar Kursk.

The idea would be to fight to lake ladoga.

No, they didn't. They never penetrated into the rear area of the defending Soviet armies, never mind the front-level defenses. They were still stuck in the Soviet defensive lines and had not penetrated into their operational depths when the whole thing was called off.

That's an unproven assumption. The Soviets certainly didn't have problems reinforcing that front and building it up either in for their offensive in the winter of '42/'43 - when they broke the encirclement of the city - nor for the offensive in early-'44. The Germans had planned to ship in an additional army in late-'42, before Stalingrad derailed those plans. The claim that neither side could not build up their numbers is thus ahistoric. But even that aside,

Yes, and that was with the Germans doing so with the air and land forces historically allocated to Citadel. Even the OP proposes stripping out at least the former.

We've been over this before. German losses at Citadel were trivial and they easily recovered. The real killer was simply that German infantry divisions still retained their crippling weakness against massed Soviet armour, and so what really mattered in stopping a Soviet attack was how many Panzer divisions there were, and where they were. Throughout1943, the Soviets repeatedly demonstrated the ability to overrun defending German infantry who lacked armour support.

This problem with the German infantry being too weak also only worsened as the year wore on, because even unsuccessful Soviet attacks often penetrated to their artillery lines and shot them up before any panzers could arrive and then stall them out and repulse them, meaning the Germans invariably lost tons of tube artillery regardless of how successful their defense and counter-attack. Since artillery is where any modern army's infantry derives the bulk of their firepower both on the defense and offense, this was a crippling problem.

Writers like von Manstein blame Kursk for squandering the German advantage but in fact it's pretty clear from the colossal Soviet numerical advantage in tanks that they never had that offensive advantage in the first place. In the defensive battles of 1943, the repeated pattern was that Army Group South was forced to rush its armoured reserves from one hot spot to another, and whenever they contained one Soviet attack, another would develop from another direction and in another location, pushing the Germans back again.

All the Soviets have to do is launch more attacks than the Germans panzer divisions could respond to. The Germans, with too few forces to cover the length of their front, would race their formations one way or another to shore up the line against a Soviet attack, only to be hit unexpectedly by the main blow in a location where they were too weak to stop it, forcing them to scramble, improvise, and ultimately withdraw. Just as happened throughout 1943.


The Germans tried to get a fourth Kharkov. They failed not due to the losses at Citadel - because those were small enough they had recovered by then - but because the Soviet tank formations did not fall apart like had happened at 2nd and 3rd Kharkov, but instead viciously counter-counter-attacked and prevented the Germans from gaining any momentum. This cost the Soviet tank armies most of their strength, but also sapped and exhausted the just-recovered German panzers strength... only for the following armies to roll into them, forcing the subsequent retreat from Kharkov, though they at least managed to stabilize the line again shortly to the south...

Only for the Soviets to then switch back to Donets, which the Germans were just barely able to contain a breakthrough. The Soviets then launched another push towards Poltava, and this the Germans again barely contained by rushing the Panzers from Kharkov. Only there did the Panzer divisions - worn out from the defensive fighting - reach the limits of their endurance and the Soviets began to breakthrough. By September the Germans realized that only a withdrawal across the Dneiper river could save them, and the entire Army group was forced to fall back.

Well, the assets - especially the engineering ones - will be useful. The issue with this idea is not that the Germans probably wouldn't succeed in a strategic vacuum where they had no enemy counter-actions to worry about. The problem is that even if the Soviets don't choose to amass local superiority, it'll take the Germans long enough to fight through the defenses around Leningrad for the Soviets and WAllies to launch offensives elsewhere even if the Soviets choose, and the Germans will have to call off the offensives in order to divert forces to fight them off. Fighting through competently held, prepared defenses - even if successful - takes a long time.

No. Because the Soviets might glance at the bulge ATL, but they won't keep at it once they look at the intelligence picture. They made a concerted and well thought out effort to determine the intent of the enemy and they had the assets to succeed, so they succeeded.

A lot of addition by subtraction here. Germans lost tons of aircraft, heavy equipment, forces got routed. A prepared defense by default is going to do better. If fourth Kharkov was attempted after a route, in ATL or would potentially have more teeth.

I understand this is deck chairs on Titanic. But lurks is a nog go

 

[ObssesedNuker]

A lot of addition by subtraction here. Germans lost tons of aircraft, heavy equipment, forces got routed.

Not really. German losses during Citadel were quite modest and eminently within their replacement capacity, especially when compared to the bloodletting they suffered in the subsequent Soviet offensives. On the flip-side, they hardly "got routed" either, like they would a year later: sure, they constantly lost ground, but they generally were able to withdraw in good order and keep the formations intact, even as they were eroded. They also still managed to thwart Stavka's most ambitious desires. For all the expenditures eroding of German strength for no gain and plenty of losses that occurred throughout 1943, it still wasn't a patch on the fuck-ups that had occurred (Stalingrad) or would occur (far, FAR more 1944/45 Soviet offensives than I care to count).

Plus, if we want to talk addition by subtraction, we gotta consider how Citadel fixed a large proportion of Soviet combat power in place and inflicted massive damage on them. ATL, these forces are released to potentially attack anywhere along a line that the Germans were badly over-extended with too few troops to cover and they will not be so obliging as to all do so right where and when the Germans want them too.

Also, it's not like having to run CAS in the face of the massive Soviet AA batteries concentrated around Leningrad and tangling with the VVS/PVO in general it is going to decrease German air losses.

A prepared defense by default is going to do better.

Not necessarily. First, there's the assumption the defense will be... well, prepared. Which if the Soviets are attacking at a time and place (as they consistently did throughout 1943), they won't be. There's more to a prepared defense than fortifications: take the Orel salient, where in a mirror image of Kursk, the Germans had fortified the fuck out of it but didn't actually have nearly as many troops as the Germans did to hold it. The opening Red Army offensive smashed a good-sized hole in it and only an emergency rerouting of panzer reserves from Army Group South prevented them from cutting the rail-line into Orel and enacting an operative encirclement of the whole thing. Despite that, the Soviets proceeded to just bull through it in a month of brutal head-to-head fighting, having already undermined the overall defensive scheme and forcing Army Group Center to withdraw. And even after all that bloodletting, the Germans failed to drain Soviet offensive power enough to prevent them from then launching another two offensives on this axis in August and September that eventually ground their way to take Smolensk, simultaneous with the series of Soviet offensives further south I already mentioned that broke out from the positions around Kharkov and the Mius.

Additionally, while the loss rate for both the Germans and the Soviets in the subsequent offensives was higher, they both rose by the same amount and so the RATIO remained the same. There were also a number of counter intuitive. For example, as a rule, an attacker gaining ground is in a better position to maintain their armored strength in the long-haul than a defender constantly losing it due to being able to recover, repair, and put back into the field damaged tanks. Army Group South in the aftermath of Citadel was involved in repulsing Soviet attacks against Orel, Donets and Mius, which by August 1st left them with 421 of their AFVs still in the repair depots. Most of these were subsequently lost when the initial blow from Operation Kutuzov came.

From that, one can conclude that if the Soviets had been the ones attacking from the start, it's conceivable the Germans could very well have been losing more tanks, because they would inevitably have been falling back sooner, and would have been forced to abandon more of them to the enemy advance. Only if the Germans could have stopped the Soviet attacks dead would this have been otherwise, and this not at all likely given the scale of forces the Soviets possessed by the summer of 1943, and the German's consistent failure to correctly anticipate where the Soviets would employ them.

I cannot overstate how important a factor the repeated German failure to predict the time and place of Soviet offensives to be. You can attack successfully without decent intelligence on the enemy, because you just force your will upon him, and make him deal with your moves. But you cannot defend successfully with poor intelligence, particularly against a stronger foe. In the historical context of poor German intelligence. their defensive failures were inevitable and postulating scenarios where the Germans consistently have their forces positioned perfectly to block the Soviets, which at that point is really just wanking them. They got very lucky at Kursk as it was, with Hitler making the right decision that possibly saved Army Group South's armored core, if for the wrong reasons.

 

[Pocky96]

Obviously, Kursk 1943 was an immense failure. The Germans attacked into the teeth of the dragon, their new heavy armor was not built for distances, and they by failing so spectacularly experienced a general collapse that ended up giving up all ground up to the Dnieper river for no gain. The Germans lost what was remaining of their initiative and better-trained men.

What if investments were made to essentially give up what was east of the Dniepr and Smolensk in a defense-in depth, and otherwise attempt to resume cutting off Leningrad? I presume the air assets and such would transition fine, but the ground assets would not benefit from as heavy of an investment simply because logisitically Leningrad does not lend itself over to permitting as many men on an offensive. Wouldn't this favor the "quality over quantity" that was the only card the Germans had remaining in the East come 1943? It would also permit the transfer of soldiers to the Mediterranean, and to defensive operations that occurred OTL--perhaps even permitting a slightly better outcome from Model and Manstein in some local victories against over-extended Soviet pincers.

While this is not a war winning move, it's a relatively strong move considering that the Baltics were the only theater of the war in 1944 where the Germans did not get absolutely creamed. Further, it is politically feasible. Hitler was keen on having some sort of victory to sell to his public and minor allies. So, is there any chance Leningrad falls by winter 44? And if so, how does this effect Soviet planning in 1944? And even if it still fails, isn't it a better throw of the dice than Kursk?

To be quite honest, I don't think that the Germans could have held any front past Stalingrad.
The Battle of Stalingrad meant that the Germans wouldn't win a war in the east.
But for the sake of this timeline, let's say the Germans manage to take Leningrad in 1943. I could see the lack of the Battle of Kursk meaning that they still have their armour core mostly intact, allowing them to pull this off.
The Soviets would still push the Germans back in Ukraine, and by the time Operation Bagration starts in 1944, the city of Leningrad just becomes another area the German army gets surrounded and liquidated in.
This would be a Soviet moral loss, but I don't consider it a major change thougout the war. If their dogma at holding the city remains then this'll just cause them to get surronded a few months later.

This would (possibly) cause the Soviet Union to push a few miles more west, but I don't see much of a change.

Non-the-less, this is an interesting thought. Thanks for sharing.

 

[cardcarrier]

The timing of Kursk was terrible for the Germans. The landings for operation huskey lead their high command to order emphatic pull backs from battlefields they where holding at provorovka where there were hundreds of damaged but salvageable tanks laying about; including dozens of factory new panthers that had their tracks shorn off with mines

Their best bet was to sit put and do nothing as they lacked the fuel and fresh infantry to exploit any successful attack anyway

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

If Leningrad falls, how many Finnish troops does that free up, and does this prevent the Soviets from invading Finland in 44?

 

[pattersonautobody]

If Leningrad falls, how many Finnish troops does that free up, and does this prevent the Soviets from invading Finland in 44?

Finland probably doesn't do much in any event. They are not looking to escalate so I doubt that they would push on to Murmansk or anything. However it does mean the USSR may make peace on pre 1940 boundaries.

 

[Pocky96]

If Leningrad falls, how many Finnish troops does that free up, and does this prevent the Soviets from invading Finland in 44?

If Leningrad fell I don't see Finland holding out. Once the Soviet Army breaks though to liberate the city, Finland wouldn't get off so light. I could see Finland losing and becoming an SSR, maybe a Warsaw Pact state(?)

 

[thaddeus]

Obviously, Kursk 1943 was an immense failure. The Germans attacked into the teeth of the dragon, their new heavy armor was not built for distances, and they by failing so spectacularly experienced a general collapse that ended up giving up all ground up to the Dnieper river for no gain. The Germans lost what was remaining of their initiative and better-trained men.

What if investments were made to essentially give up what was east of the Dniepr and Smolensk in a defense-in depth, and otherwise attempt to resume cutting off Leningrad? I presume the air assets and such would transition fine, but the ground assets would not benefit from as heavy of an investment simply because logisitically Leningrad does not lend itself over to permitting as many men on an offensive.

my view, my speculation places a lot of importance on Leningrad in 1941 for control over the Baltic, and then again in 1942 to finally close out one of their three fronts. in 1943? it seems they would have to decide on a defensive strategy, a defensive line, as they did after Kursk to accept such a reversal of their fortunes?

in this context, another effort against Leningrad makes some sense, a siege would be lifted under any armistice, the Finnish position in Karelia (and further) could melt away, and the Soviets could even threaten Norway?

it seems to me this could/would end up the opposite of historical, that Army Group South would be drained to bolster AGN & AGC? or that would be the net result?

we gotta consider how Citadel fixed a large proportion of Soviet combat power in place and inflicted massive damage on them. ATL, these forces are released to potentially attack anywhere along a line that the Germans were badly over-extended with too few troops to cover and they will not be so obliging as to all do so right where and when the Germans want them too.

I've always wondered about using this situation to damage (at least temporarily) the Soviet air forces. of course the LW has suffered grievous losses in the preceding year so there would have to be numerous changes.

*am seeing various estimates of the Soviet aircraft losses during just Citadel (which is what I am speculating upon)

 

[DrakonFin]

If Leningrad falls, how many Finnish troops does that free up, and does this prevent the Soviets from invading Finland in 44?

It depends. If Germany demands Finland's participation in the occupation of Leningrad, then Finnish resources would not be freed up, rather to the contrary.

And even if Finnish troops are freed up, there are only very limited ways they would be realistically used offensively. An attack towards the White Sea and cutting the Murmansk railway "for good" is a theoretically possible (but politically very unlikely) option. Even if it happened, after that Finland would not be sending troops to any other fronts.

We have to also realize that it is, well, 1943. The Finnish leadership has already seen the writing on the wall that Germany will lose the war. Thus, they would stay away from the attack on Leningrad as much as possible, and might also refrain from committing to major future operations even if the city falls (even the kind I mentioned above). In IOTL, by 1943 the Finnish leadership was really just waiting the clock to run out on German control around the northern Baltic Sea so that they could extricate the country from the war with as few losses as possible.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Yes, if Finland IOTL laid back in 1941, in 1943 they're doing nothing more than holding their present positions. If Germany succeeds, Finland mainly stays on defense and that's it. Like I said, it just leads to a better peace for Finland. The real knock on effects are SS conscriptions in the Baltic states and an earlier-collapsing Ukraine leading to the Balkans collapsing sooner, or with butterflies a more-Carpathiancentric approach to defense which can help Romania hold on longer.

In response to Nuker, the Soviets having their airforce on offense in Ukraine means they lose aircraft and pilots over enemy territory, that their tank losses are less likely to make it back to depots for repair (as they would on defense), that the Germans' collapse in AGS is roughly on exactly the same schedule without losing their best quality units on offense there (as they would be lost in an attempt to take Leningrad, without the armor losses to the same degree as they would be less useful in the same amount in the northern forests). It exposes the USSR to a serious Fourth Kharkov potential, and so while I no way claim any of this works, it is with hindsight the better option with political feasibility for Hitler (which is a must).

 

[TDM]

Obviously, Kursk 1943 was an immense failure. The Germans attacked into the teeth of the dragon, their new heavy armor was not built for distances, and they by failing so spectacularly experienced a general collapse that ended up giving up all ground up to the Dnieper river for no gain. The Germans lost what was remaining of their initiative and better-trained men.

What if investments were made to essentially give up what was east of the Dniepr and Smolensk in a defense-in depth, and otherwise attempt to resume cutting off Leningrad? I presume the air assets and such would transition fine, but the ground assets would not benefit from as heavy of an investment simply because logisitically Leningrad does not lend itself over to permitting as many men on an offensive. Wouldn't this favor the "quality over quantity" that was the only card the Germans had remaining in the East come 1943? It would also permit the transfer of soldiers to the Mediterranean, and to defensive operations that occurred OTL--perhaps even permitting a slightly better outcome from Model and Manstein in some local victories against over-extended Soviet pincers.

While this is not a war winning move, it's a relatively strong move considering that the Baltics were the only theater of the war in 1944 where the Germans did not get absolutely creamed. Further, it is politically feasible. Hitler was keen on having some sort of victory to sell to his public and minor allies. So, is there any chance Leningrad falls by winter 44? And if so, how does this effect Soviet planning in 1944? And even if it still fails, isn't it a better throw of the dice than Kursk?

Problem is they need a war wining move (or a move that significantly changes the flow of the war), and they need it quick, because given the range of forces and resources arrayed against it in 1943, Germany needs to win quick or it loses slow.

So the problem is on the face of it attacking and defeating the red army at Kursk potentially ticks too many boxes on the German check list for them not to do it, because it is:

1). A decisive engagement that puts the German army back on the front foot which is where it needs to be to achieve any of its war aims.

2). Allows them to utilize the German offensive ability and advantages to carve into an apparently badly positioned more static enemy

2). It's a way out of a war of attrition with the USSR. that is already 18 months behind schedule and showing no other likely routes to victory

3). Ending the threat in the east in 1943 allows them to bolster the west where clearly the wallies are making moves.

4). It's the old Barbarossa plan find and defeat the Red army anyway, and the Red army has apparently obliged.

5). A proper decisive head to head of ideologies made flesh, crank up the Wagner and demonstrate Nazi/Aryan superiority over Judeao-boshevism, now the enemy has stopped lurking behind logistics issues, urban warfare and winter. After all the German army was able to destroy massive Red army formations out in the open in 1941 whenever they met them by being better right?

Of course it's not 1941 it's 1943, the red army isn't the red army of 1941 and neither is the German army it's 1941 self


If you've invaded a country and can't fight it's army, what's your plan?


The point of all of the above is that the Germens didn't look at Kursk and think "oh shit, but we have no choice", they looked at it and said "this is a good thing this is how we get back to winning".


Another point, saying the Baltics is where they got creamed the least is kind of dependent on the fact that OTL there where greater numbers of troops were elsewhere and if the Axis head north well so will the Soviets

 

[yulzari1]

I will not comment on the specifics of the change but only observe that, from 1942 onwards it had become a matter of how slowly Germany can lose the war.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

the Soviets having their airforce on offense in Ukraine means they lose aircraft and pilots over enemy territory

That was the case OTL late-'43 as it was. The Soviets ate the losses and continued to grow the VVS and their pilot quality anyway.

that their tank losses are less likely to make it back to depots for repair (as they would on defense),

That runs against the basic dynamics of mechanized warfare that I described. If anything, MORE Soviet tanks are liable to make it back to the depots as the Sovets are able to control the ground they captured instead of having the Germans deliberately blow them up after overrunning them.

that the Germans' collapse in AGS is roughly on exactly the same schedule without losing their best quality units on offense there

They actually very well might do so ahead of schedule. Without a Kursk offensive to anticipate, the Soviets might hit the Germans in early-May when they are still rebuilding the panzer forces.

It exposes the USSR to a serious Fourth Kharkov potential

Given that Fourth Kharkov resulted in the Soviets taking and holding the city for good and setting themselves up for further offensives, I imagine the Soviets would be quite satisfied with that. :V

Of course, I know you really mean "the potential of another Third Kharkov", which... well, I won't say it's impossible, but that heavily relied on the Soviets already being exhausted after months of previous offensive action against serious German resistance at a time when both the recuperative abilities the Soviets had were lower AND the Soviet tank armies were still not cohesive yet to fight AS a army (though they could still fight as their individual corps and brigades).

And - though I understand you've indicated you do understand this - 3rd Kharkov didn't retake ALL the land the Germans had lost in the Soviet offensives during the winter of '42/'43, just the territory the Soviets gained towards the very end of it. So applying that to 1943, even if a Third Kharkov repeat happened at - for example - Kiev, the Soviets would still have picked up Eastern Ukraine and all it's manpower and resources (both immediately available and potential). If the Germans lose 500 kilometers each time, but only retake 1/3rd of that, then that's still a net gain for the Soviets of approximately 350 kilometers and they've gained all those manpower and resources for those territories seized (even if there may be a delay until they can exploit the latter). But again, you have indicated you get that so it's more of quibble.