Question: Molotov-Ribbentrop without Stalin?

[nagachate]

First i'd like to say the inner workings of the USSR, and more indepth parts of WWII in general, are not areas i would consider myself very informed on. Had Stalin never risen to lead the USSR, or died some time before the Great Purge, would this different, and possibly more collective, set of Soviet leaders be likely to reach a pragmatic deal with Nazi Germany over the fate of Eastern Europe if the circumstancws up to 1939 remained the same?

A way of rephrasing this question would be, how much of Molotov-Ribbentrop could be considered a product of Stalin's leadership?

 

[Dorknought]

It's always been up to the Russians and the Germans if they actually want a Poland regardless of who is running the show.

 

[Fries]

how much of Molotov-Ribbentrop could be considered a product of Stalin's leadership?

Not much.

Molotov-Ribbentrop was signed for two reasons: because the USSR wanted back the land that Poland had annexed in the aftermath of the Russo-Polish War and because the USSR simply wasn't prepared to fight the Germans. Their offer to France and the UK to form an alliance against Germany in 1938 fell through, and it was actually Germany that began reaching out to the USSR in April to July of 1939. The Germans didn't want to fight a two front war and had to prepare for their own invasion of the USSR: they signed the pact for very similar reasons the USSR did.

Molotov-Ribbentrop was ultimately a pact of convenience and a similar agreement probably would've been made with any Soviet leader save for Trotsky (which is ASB in its own right), because nobody likes Trotsky and Trotsky likes nobody.

 

[Cudymcar]

A way of rephrasing this question would be, how much of Molotov-Ribbentrop could be considered a product of Stalin's leadership?

The way it was done was very much a product of Stalin's leadership. To ensure the turnover of his European policy, Stalin had just replaced the whole staff of the Soviet foreign office. And then he reversed what Soviet propaganda was saying for 5 years about "evil Nazis" to "peaceloving Germany". This kind of a coup would be impossible without previous purges.
On the other hand, without Stalin's forced industrialization any alternate Soviet leadership would be even more prone to pragmatic solutions concerning military threats.

 

[Salvador79]

The way it was done was very much a product of Stalin's leadership. To ensure the turnover of his European policy, Stalin had just replaced the whole staff of the Soviet foreign office. And then he reversed what Soviet propaganda was saying for 5 years about "evil Nazis" to "peaceloving Germany". This kind of a coup would be impossible without previous purges.
On the other hand, without Stalin's forced industrialization any alternate Soviet leadership would be even more prone to pragmatic solutions concerning military threats.

Hits the nail on the head IMHO.
Except: Purges like Stalin's are not a given with other leaders (the state was a totalitarian dictatorship by the time of Lenin's death already, but that doesn't necessarily imply paranoid political cannibalidm), while forced industrialisation was very much what communist opinion tended towards, so except for a very Bukharinist alternative, industrialisation would have been pushed forward fast as it was in most later communist countries, too.

The question is whether Soviet pragmatism could have successfully meant forging an alliance with Western powers. What would the Soviets had to give (up) for that, If it is plausible at all (maybe also considering butterflies in Western governments)?

 

[Crueldwarf]

What would the Soviets had to give (up) for that, If it is plausible at all (maybe also considering butterflies in Western governments)?

Stalin was already willing to give up pretty much everything to secure alliance with the Britain and France OTL. The problem was not in the Soviet demands, the problem was in unwillingness of Britain and France to commit themselves into a military alliance with USSR.

 

[Fleurs de Merde]

Hits the nail on the head IMHO.
Except: Purges like Stalin's are not a given with other leaders (the state was a totalitarian dictatorship by the time of Lenin's death already, but that doesn't necessarily imply paranoid political cannibalidm), while forced industrialisation was very much what communist opinion tended towards, so except for a very Bukharinist alternative, industrialisation would have been pushed forward fast as it was in most later communist countries, too.

Even Bukharin was increasingly in line with Preobrazhensky by the late 20s. It's hard to see a USSR that doesn't embrace forced industrialization as a path forwards by the early 30s even without Stalin, but it's definitely not as harsh or as arguably overambitious.

As I understood M-R, it's the kind of thing you can only actually get when there is no party democracy remaining and no public debate. The Soviet public did not at all understand or appreciate it, and even within the Party it was unpopular. I can't see any leader being able to force it through without Stalin's full powers, and I don't know if absent Stalin it would even be on the table. Assuming Trotsky still takes the L, would likely alternate leaders - Bukharin most likely, but possibly Kamenev, Rykov, or Zinoviev - take Stalin's particular foreign policy stances and have to deal with his particular kinds of opprobrium if they didn't run a great purge and a mass famine? I suspect they'd have at least a bit of room to maneouvre and a moderately more straightforward/less opportunist policy. Stalin took that line because of total isolation - he felt like he had to, and it made sense. Would anyone else have let themselves be cornered that way, or have the balls to break encirclement with that particular tactic?

Alternate and more fun - and also not unlikely - M-R equivalent is Molotov-Ciano, given how chummy Mussolini and the 20s USSR were.

 

[Polish Eagle]

Alternate and more fun - and also not unlikely - M-R equivalent is Molotov-Ciano, given how chummy Mussolini and the 20s USSR were.

That's a really interesting suggestion. I presume this would be directed against the Little Entente, giving Italy a free hand in Yugoslavia while the USSR moves in on Romania? A Soviet invasion of Romania would bring them very close to the border with Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia was also chummy with the USSR--though hostile to Austria, which was Italy's ally.

 

[Bellacinos]

Stalin was already willing to give up pretty much everything to secure alliance with the Britain and France OTL. The problem was not in the Soviet demands, the problem was in unwillingness of Britain and France to commit themselves into a military alliance with USSR.

This honestly doesn’t get covered enough. I didn’t even know about this till I listened to Thomas Childers WW2 class on the great courses on audible. While it doesn’t excuse Stalin from signing the MR pact, Britain and France also share a large part of blame for not working with the Soviets to destroy the Wehrmacht right after the sudentenland crisis.

 

[The Link]

Stalin was already willing to give up pretty much everything to secure alliance with the Britain and France OTL. The problem was not in the Soviet demands, the problem was in unwillingness of Britain and France to commit themselves into a military alliance with USSR.

The Soviets straightwardly demanded the cancellation of the defensive pact Poland and Romania had with each other in case of "a threat from the east", so it was clear that the Soviets want to devour the territories they would have to enter to reach Czechoslovakia.

 

[The Link]

Not much.

Molotov-Ribbentrop was signed for two reasons: because the USSR wanted back the land that Poland had annexed in the aftermath of the Russo-Polish War and because the USSR simply wasn't prepared to fight the Germans. Their offer to France and the UK to form an alliance against Germany in 1938 fell through, and it was actually Germany that began reaching out to the USSR in April to July of 1939. The Germans didn't want to fight a two front war and had to prepare for their own invasion of the USSR: they signed the pact for very similar reasons the USSR did.

Molotov-Ribbentrop was ultimately a pact of convenience and a similar agreement probably would've been made with any Soviet leader save for Trotsky (which is ASB in its own right), because nobody likes Trotsky and Trotsky likes nobody.

 

[Fleurs de Merde]

That's a really interesting suggestion. I presume this would be directed against the Little Entente, giving Italy a free hand in Yugoslavia while the USSR moves in on Romania? A Soviet invasion of Romania would bring them very close to the border with Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia was also chummy with the USSR--though hostile to Austria, which was Italy's ally.

That's an excellent suggestion. Also - considering Mussolini's foreign policy regarding the Germans for a while - as a front against the Nazis, and as a potential bridge towards France. Italy was the first country to open trade relations and normalize with the USSR, and they were both revisionist powers. Austria might just have to eat this as the Italians would be their only guarantee against Germany.

If this successfully keeps Mussolini directed into the Balkans, you might even see a very odd version of the Stresa Front being contemplated with Mussolini trying to be the middleman for the French and Soviets and having fallbacks if the English sign a new Anglo-German Naval Agreement and fuck their allies as IOTL.

Hard to say, but both the Soviets and the Italians gain advantage from cooperation in the Balkans and a policy of German containment, and the Italians could try for a lot of concessions in their area of interest by working the democracies and Soviets as either partners or against each other. Could be an odd but interesting pairing.

 

[how]

It is also worth remembering the Stalinist policy of Socialism in One Country as world revolution did not appeal to Stalin, it was his idea and without Stalin it is tough to say how foreign relations would pan out except for the no compromise Trotskyists.

 

[Polish Eagle]

That's an excellent suggestion. Also - considering Mussolini's foreign policy regarding the Germans for a while - as a front against the Nazis, and as a potential bridge towards France. Italy was the first country to open trade relations and normalize with the USSR, and they were both revisionist powers. Austria might just have to eat this as the Italians would be their only guarantee against Germany.

If this successfully keeps Mussolini directed into the Balkans, you might even see a very odd version of the Stresa Front being contemplated with Mussolini trying to be the middleman for the French and Soviets and having fallbacks if the English sign a new Anglo-German Naval Agreement and fuck their allies as IOTL.

Hard to say, but both the Soviets and the Italians gain advantage from cooperation in the Balkans and a policy of German containment, and the Italians could try for a lot of concessions in their area of interest by working the democracies and Soviets as either partners or against each other. Could be an odd but interesting pairing.

France might pursue this as a modification of the Little Entente--preferring Italy to Yugoslavia as an ally (sacrificing Yugoslavia so that the Italo-Austrian alliance takes its place).

Curious as to what an Italo-Soviet alliance means for Spain.

 

[Crueldwarf]

The Soviets straightwardly demanded the cancellation of the defensive pact Poland and Romania had with each other in case of "a threat from the east", so it was clear that the Soviets want to devour the territories they would have to enter to reach Czechoslovakia.

No, they did not. It is what Soviet proposals looked like during Moscow talks in the summer of 1941.

Spoiler: Mine translation of the document

Considerations of the Soviet side in negotiations with the military missions of Great Britain and France.
August 4, 1939

In negotiations with England and France, several OPTIONS may arise when an armed intervention by our forces is possible.

Option I is when the attack of the aggressors will be directly against FRANCE and ENGLAND.

In this case, France and England should immediately deploy most of their armed forces on the eastern borders of France and Belgium, and from the 16th day of mobilization begin decisive action against primary of the aggressors.

The primary adversary is considered the chief of the aggressors, against which the main forces of France and England should be directed.

Actions against a minor of aggressors should also be of a secondary nature. The theory of first defeating a weak adversary - a secondary aggressor - is not shared by us. The defeat of the primary of the aggressors will remove the secondary of the aggressors out of the war, while initial focus on the secondary aggressor can lead to a decisive attack by the primary aggressor on Paris and the capture of Belgium and Holland, which creates a crisis in the western theater of operations from the very first days of the war giving superiority to the primary aggressor.

Based on this situation, France and England should deploy and put forward at least the following force against the primary aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization on the eastern borders of France and Belgium:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft.

With the force of up to 10 infantry divsions remaining on the Maginot line from Belfort to Metz, France, England and Belgium should

with 70 infantry divisions
13,000 medium and heavy guns
3500 tanks
5000 aircraft

to lead a decisive offensive north of Metz and from Belgium against the Ruhr and Cologne industrial region in the general direction of Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must strike at the most important industrial areas of the primary aggressor in the west, at the bases of its navy, along the railways, freeways, as well as at the capital and other major administrative centers of the primary aggressor.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should pursue following goals: 1) to close the English Channel and break through by strong squadron into the Baltic Sea to act against the fleet of the primary aggressor in the Baltic and against its shores; 2) to obtain consent from the Baltic countries for the temporary occupation by the Anglo-French fleet of the Åland Islands, the Moonsund Archipelago with its islands [Crueldwarf: there is a funny detail in the original document: words 'by the Anglo-French fleet' are inserted into the sentence in Stalin's handwriting], the ports of the Gange, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava {{* Hanko, Pärnu, Haapsalu, Ainazi, Liepaja.}} for the purposes safeguarding the neutrality and independence of these countries from attacks by Germany; 3) to interdict the supply of ore and other raw materials from Sweden through the Baltic; 4) blockade of the coast of the primary aggressor in the North Sea; 5) dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and the closure of the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles; 6) cruising operations off the coast of Norway, Finland, outside their territorial waters, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk against submarines and cruisers of the aggressor fleet off these coasts.

Poland must obligatory participate in the war by virtue of its agreement with England and France and to strike against East Prussia and Pomerania by forces of at least 40 infantry divisions. Poland must commit itself to let our ground forces north of Minsk through the Vilensky corridor and, if possible, through Lithuania to the borders of East Prussia. It is necessary to ensure that Lithuania renders assistance to the bloc of peace-loving powers.

Our assistance to France and England can be expressed in the joint action of our land, air forces, the Baltic and Northern fleets against the primary of the aggressors.

In this case, we would have directed against East Prussia, north of Minsk, 70% of the infantry forces allocated by England and France against the primary of the aggressors of the, as well as the cavalry, in particular:

56 infantry divisions
6 cavalry divisions
8500-9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
and a total of 2,053,000 people.

Our air forces undertake operations against East Prussia and the primary aggressor's concentrated air and ground forces, against its fleet and bases in the Baltic, and operate in coordination with our ground units.

Our Northern Navy is cruising off the coast of Finland and Norway outside their territorial waters, together with the Anglo-French squadrons.

As for our Baltic Fleet, in the case of a favorable resolution of the issue, it will be based together with the combined fleet of France and England on the Gange, Åland and Moonsund archipelagos, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava in order to protect the independence of the Baltic countries.

Under these conditions, the Baltic Fleet can develop its cruising operations, the actions of submarines and the laying of mines off the coast of East Prussia, Danzig and Pomerania. Baltic Fleet submarines impede the supply of industrial raw materials from Sweden to the primary aggressor.

The command of all our armed forces remains with us, and the coordination of military operations with England and France is achieved by a special agreement during the war.

Our forces operate compactly and do not allocate any units to other armies.

Option II of the possible outbreak of hostilities is when POLAND is the object of the attack.

If France and England also declare war on the aggressors by virtue of their treaty with Poland and immediately oppose them, the USSR will have to oppose the aggressors by virtue of its treaty with England and France.

Poland can be attacked not only by the main aggressor, but, in all likelihood, Hungary will take part in the war against Poland.

It must be assumed that in this case, Romania will enter the war on the side of Poland. True, her assistance will be limited, since Romania itself will be constrained by Bulgaria and Hungary, but still Romania should be obliged to put up at least

20 infantry divisions
3 cavalry divisions
2276 medium and heavy guns
240 tanks
440 aircraft.

France and England must deploy with their armed forces, as indicated in Option I, and deliver the main blow against the primary of the aggressors.

The development of operations of the armed forces of France and England should be carried out, as indicated in Option I.

Our participation in the war can only happen when France and England agree with Poland and, if possible, also with Lithuania on the passage of our troops north of Minsk through the Vilnius corridor and on providing our Baltic Fleet with a joint base with the combined Anglo-French fleet, as indicated in option I.

In this case, we allocate forces, as indicated in option I, and direct them against East Prussia.

France and England must require Poland to deploy at least 40 infantry divisions with the appropriate artillery against East Prussia and Pomerania. At the same time, Poland is obliged to ensure the maneuver of our troops in the north-east of Poland by providing us with railways and rolling stock for the transportation of military supplies and food.

The simultaneous invasion of aggressors in southern Poland (Galicia) by Slovakia and Hungary will require us to deploy additional forces on the borders with Poland and Romania, but in conjunction with the forces allocated for action against East Prussia it will be equal toh the forces deployed by England and France against the primary aggressor, i.e., 80 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry divisions, 9,500-10,000 medium and heavy guns, 3,500-4,000 tanks, 3,000-3,500 aircraft.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of hostilities with England and France is achieved by special agreement during the war.

Option III for the beginning of hostilities is when Hungary, Bulgaria, with the help of the primary aggressor, attack ROMANIA.

If England and France declare war on the aggressors and deploy forces against the main aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization, as indicated in option I:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft

and launch a decisive attack on the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor, they can turn to us for military cooperation.

Our proposals of France and England in this version should be summarized: 1) in the mandatory Polish participation in the war; 2) in the passage of our forces, as indicated in option I, through the Vilnius corridor and Lithuania, as well as in the joint deployment of the Baltic Fleet with the British and English in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) in Poland's obligation to deploy and forward to the front 40 infantry divisions against East Prussia and Pomerania; and 4) in Poland's obligation to allow passage of our troops through Galicia south of Lvov.

In this case, we also set 70% of the infantry forces sent by France and England against the main aggressor, not counting 12 cavalry divisions, namely:

56 infantry divisions
12 cavalry divisions
8500 - 9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
2,075,000 people in total.

Forces deployed to north of Minsk for action against East Prussia:

26 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
4000 medium and heavy guns
1300 tanks
1,500 aircraft
and a total of 926,000 people.

For actions south of Polesie, for direct support to Romania (France and England must achieve the passage of our troops through the Romanian territory and the southern part of Galicia), we will be sent:

30 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
5000 medium and heavy guns
2000 tanks
1,500 aircraft
a total of 1,149,000 people.

These our forces are deployed on the border of the USSR with Romania and in the southern part of Galicia and operate south of the Carpathians, receiving an independent sector of the front.

The command of our troops remains with us. In this option, the actions of our Northern and Baltic fleets are carried out, as set out in option I, therefore, the tasks for the combined Anglo-French fleet remain the same as indicated in option I.

Bulgaria may be involved in the attack on Romania, so France and England must commit themselves to making Turkey and Greece to join the war.

If both of these states take part in the war, then our Black Sea Fleet, having barred the mouth of the Danube from the inflitration of aggressor submarines into the Black Sea and blocking Varna (the Bulgarian military port), together with the Turkish fleet carry out cruising and submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean. However, under all circumstances, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be firmly closed from the penetration of surface squadrons of opponents and their submarines into the Marmara and Black Seas.

IV. A possible variant of the outbreak of hostilities, when aggression will be directed against Turkey, and, perhaps, in this case, Bulgaria will join the war on the side of the aggressors.

France and England, by virtue of an agreement with Turkey, declare war on the aggressors.

If France and England turn to us for military cooperation, this cooperation can be provided if:

1) Poland's participate in the war against the primay aggressor and the passage of our troops is allowed through the Vilnius corridor and by agreement with Lithuania through its territory for actions against East Prussia;

2) joint operations of combined Anglo-French fleet and our Baltic Fleet in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) the participation of Romania in the war and the passage of our troops through Romania for operations in the south of Romania.

In this case, we expose and deploy forces as indicated in option III.

The tasks of our Black Sea Fleet will be the same as indicated in the previous version (III).

The actions of the armies of France and England should amount to an attack against the primary aggressor as the main target, as set out in Option I.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should be amended against what is stated in Option I - to act towards decisive defeat of the combined fleet of aggressors in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in its eastern part.

V. A possible variant of military operations is when the aggression of the primary aggressor is directed against the USSR through the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia,

In this case, France and England, according to the agreement, must immediately enter the war with the aggressors. Poland, bound by a treaty with England and France and having our guarantee, must act on option I.

Our demand for the deployment of 40 Polish infantry divisions against East Prussia and in Poznan remains.

If in the Option I we alone deployed 70% of the armed forces that England and France directed against the primary aggressor attacking one of these powers, then in the event of the primary aggressor attacking us, we must demand from France and England to deploy forces on the 15th day of mobilization equal to 70% of what we deploy against the primary aggressor according to this option.

We can deploy 120 infantry divisions. Therefore, we must demand the deployment of the following English and French forces against the primary aggressor north of Belfort and to Belgium:

84 infantry divisions
13,000 to 13,500 medium and heavy guns
from 3,000 to 3,500 tanks
from 5,000 to 5,500 aircraft.

From the 16th day of mobilization, these forces must launch a decisive attack against the primary aggressor north of Metz and from Belgium with the general direction of the main attack toward Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must inflict a powerful blow on the industrial areas of the primary aggressor, on the bases of his navy, on railways, highways, as well as on the capital and major administrative centers.

The actions of the Anglo-French Navy should occur according to option I.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of the military action is achieved by special agreement during the war.

It is hard to imagine that the primary aggressor would send part of his forces against us through Romania. However, this option is not excluded, and therefore in this case, Poland, Turkey and Greece should be involved in providing assistance to Romania by England and France, and some of our troops are provided with a passage through Galicia and Romania.

The actions of our Black Sea Fleet should be coordinated with the actions of the Turkish Fleet, as set out in version IV.

When the primary aggressor attacks us, we must demand the deployment of the above forces by France, England and Belgium, their decisive offensive from the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor and the most active Polish participation in the war, as well as the unhindered passage of our troops through the territory of the Vilnius corridor and Galicia with the provision of rolling stock.

The foregoing is a prerequisite for negotiations, during which the positions of France and England will be clarified in a sincere desire to conclude an agreement.

Signed by B. Shaposhnikov

Note that there are no proposals about cancelations of defensive pacts with anyone and even offers to joint operations in the Baltics and Poland.

 

[Fleurs de Merde]

It is also worth remembering the Stalinist policy of Socialism in One Country as world revolution did not appeal to Stalin, it was his idea and without Stalin it is tough to say how foreign relations would pan out except for the no compromise Trotskyists.

Socialism in One Country and world revolution are both badly abused terms. While Stalin seemed to suggest after a certain point that it was possible to achieve socialism through Russia's own resources, he never suggested that this would be desirable or practical. And Trotsky's "permanent revolution" thesis was formulated when he was already in exile - when he was an actual economic administrator in the mid-20s he was consistently in favour of economic concessions to and trade with Europe, believing that Russia's need for capital goods and the postwar European depression were natural complements.

This was, funnily enough, sort of Lenin's position too - Socialism in One Country was sort of just putting glitter on a fundamentally pessimistic but possibly correct notion that Europe would not trade with the USSR even in its own self-interest. Stalin just alchemized pessimism about the capitalist world into really bizarre and unfounded optimism about the possibilities of Soviet administrative structures.

Without Stalin, you likely just have an increasingly pessimistic line about trade and an increasingly autarkic policy, but this notably was never something that even super-industrializers like Preobrazhensky or late-period Bukharin saw as a virtue. They didn't really like isolationist crash industrialism any more than they liked the NEP. They were just practical necessities that they would have to accept.

Your foreign relations would probably be a lot more consistent, somewhat more restrained, accommodationist towards the capitalists, and cognizant of Soviet weakness. Definitely no Third Period, which was a pure product of classic Stalinist enthusiasm.

Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation and Red Globalization are really good reads on the issue. All Soviet foreign policy was fundamentally trade and industrial policy.

France might pursue this as a modification of the Little Entente--preferring Italy to Yugoslavia as an ally (sacrificing Yugoslavia so that the Italo-Austrian alliance takes its place).

Curious as to what an Italo-Soviet alliance means for Spain.

And yeah agreed. The key members for restraining Germany were Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland - the Romanian elite was highly francophile but the country was in a bad spot by the 30s and you can probably expect German outreach to Carol II anyways, so the French could write it off. As for Yugoslavia, again a mess given French historic commitments t Serbia but they might possibly write it off as an anti-German measure if the British continued to be high-handed and fundamentally unreliable. It'd take serious French desperation to countenance this mess, but if the British keep up their standard diplomacy and Hitler his existing pace you could end up with some interesting alignments - especially if the USSR and Italy were the only way the French could see to seriously hem the Germans in and buy France time to rearm.

 

[DrakonFin]

No, they did not. It is what Soviet proposals looked like during Moscow talks in the summer of 1941.

Spoiler: Mine translation of the document

Considerations of the Soviet side in negotiations with the military missions of Great Britain and France.
August 4, 1939

In negotiations with England and France, several OPTIONS may arise when an armed intervention by our forces is possible.

Option I is when the attack of the aggressors will be directly against FRANCE and ENGLAND.

In this case, France and England should immediately deploy most of their armed forces on the eastern borders of France and Belgium, and from the 16th day of mobilization begin decisive action against primary of the aggressors.

The primary adversary is considered the chief of the aggressors, against which the main forces of France and England should be directed.

Actions against a minor of aggressors should also be of a secondary nature. The theory of first defeating a weak adversary - a secondary aggressor - is not shared by us. The defeat of the primary of the aggressors will remove the secondary of the aggressors out of the war, while initial focus on the secondary aggressor can lead to a decisive attack by the primary aggressor on Paris and the capture of Belgium and Holland, which creates a crisis in the western theater of operations from the very first days of the war giving superiority to the primary aggressor.

Based on this situation, France and England should deploy and put forward at least the following force against the primary aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization on the eastern borders of France and Belgium:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft.

With the force of up to 10 infantry divsions remaining on the Maginot line from Belfort to Metz, France, England and Belgium should

with 70 infantry divisions
13,000 medium and heavy guns
3500 tanks
5000 aircraft

to lead a decisive offensive north of Metz and from Belgium against the Ruhr and Cologne industrial region in the general direction of Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must strike at the most important industrial areas of the primary aggressor in the west, at the bases of its navy, along the railways, freeways, as well as at the capital and other major administrative centers of the primary aggressor.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should pursue following goals: 1) to close the English Channel and break through by strong squadron into the Baltic Sea to act against the fleet of the primary aggressor in the Baltic and against its shores; 2) to obtain consent from the Baltic countries for the temporary occupation by the Anglo-French fleet of the Åland Islands, the Moonsund Archipelago with its islands [Crueldwarf: there is a funny detail in the original document: words 'by the Anglo-French fleet' are inserted into the sentence in Stalin's handwriting], the ports of the Gange, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava {{* Hanko, Pärnu, Haapsalu, Ainazi, Liepaja.}} for the purposes safeguarding the neutrality and independence of these countries from attacks by Germany; 3) to interdict the supply of ore and other raw materials from Sweden through the Baltic; 4) blockade of the coast of the primary aggressor in the North Sea; 5) dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and the closure of the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles; 6) cruising operations off the coast of Norway, Finland, outside their territorial waters, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk against submarines and cruisers of the aggressor fleet off these coasts.

Poland must obligatory participate in the war by virtue of its agreement with England and France and to strike against East Prussia and Pomerania by forces of at least 40 infantry divisions. Poland must commit itself to let our ground forces north of Minsk through the Vilensky corridor and, if possible, through Lithuania to the borders of East Prussia. It is necessary to ensure that Lithuania renders assistance to the bloc of peace-loving powers.

Our assistance to France and England can be expressed in the joint action of our land, air forces, the Baltic and Northern fleets against the primary of the aggressors.

In this case, we would have directed against East Prussia, north of Minsk, 70% of the infantry forces allocated by England and France against the primary of the aggressors of the, as well as the cavalry, in particular:

56 infantry divisions
6 cavalry divisions
8500-9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
and a total of 2,053,000 people.

Our air forces undertake operations against East Prussia and the primary aggressor's concentrated air and ground forces, against its fleet and bases in the Baltic, and operate in coordination with our ground units.

Our Northern Navy is cruising off the coast of Finland and Norway outside their territorial waters, together with the Anglo-French squadrons.

As for our Baltic Fleet, in the case of a favorable resolution of the issue, it will be based together with the combined fleet of France and England on the Gange, Åland and Moonsund archipelagos, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava in order to protect the independence of the Baltic countries.

Under these conditions, the Baltic Fleet can develop its cruising operations, the actions of submarines and the laying of mines off the coast of East Prussia, Danzig and Pomerania. Baltic Fleet submarines impede the supply of industrial raw materials from Sweden to the primary aggressor.

The command of all our armed forces remains with us, and the coordination of military operations with England and France is achieved by a special agreement during the war.

Our forces operate compactly and do not allocate any units to other armies.

Option II of the possible outbreak of hostilities is when POLAND is the object of the attack.

If France and England also declare war on the aggressors by virtue of their treaty with Poland and immediately oppose them, the USSR will have to oppose the aggressors by virtue of its treaty with England and France.

Poland can be attacked not only by the main aggressor, but, in all likelihood, Hungary will take part in the war against Poland.

It must be assumed that in this case, Romania will enter the war on the side of Poland. True, her assistance will be limited, since Romania itself will be constrained by Bulgaria and Hungary, but still Romania should be obliged to put up at least

20 infantry divisions
3 cavalry divisions
2276 medium and heavy guns
240 tanks
440 aircraft.

France and England must deploy with their armed forces, as indicated in Option I, and deliver the main blow against the primary of the aggressors.

The development of operations of the armed forces of France and England should be carried out, as indicated in Option I.

Our participation in the war can only happen when France and England agree with Poland and, if possible, also with Lithuania on the passage of our troops north of Minsk through the Vilnius corridor and on providing our Baltic Fleet with a joint base with the combined Anglo-French fleet, as indicated in option I.

In this case, we allocate forces, as indicated in option I, and direct them against East Prussia.

France and England must require Poland to deploy at least 40 infantry divisions with the appropriate artillery against East Prussia and Pomerania. At the same time, Poland is obliged to ensure the maneuver of our troops in the north-east of Poland by providing us with railways and rolling stock for the transportation of military supplies and food.

The simultaneous invasion of aggressors in southern Poland (Galicia) by Slovakia and Hungary will require us to deploy additional forces on the borders with Poland and Romania, but in conjunction with the forces allocated for action against East Prussia it will be equal toh the forces deployed by England and France against the primary aggressor, i.e., 80 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry divisions, 9,500-10,000 medium and heavy guns, 3,500-4,000 tanks, 3,000-3,500 aircraft.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of hostilities with England and France is achieved by special agreement during the war.

Option III for the beginning of hostilities is when Hungary, Bulgaria, with the help of the primary aggressor, attack ROMANIA.

If England and France declare war on the aggressors and deploy forces against the main aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization, as indicated in option I:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft

and launch a decisive attack on the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor, they can turn to us for military cooperation.

Our proposals of France and England in this version should be summarized: 1) in the mandatory Polish participation in the war; 2) in the passage of our forces, as indicated in option I, through the Vilnius corridor and Lithuania, as well as in the joint deployment of the Baltic Fleet with the British and English in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) in Poland's obligation to deploy and forward to the front 40 infantry divisions against East Prussia and Pomerania; and 4) in Poland's obligation to allow passage of our troops through Galicia south of Lvov.

In this case, we also set 70% of the infantry forces sent by France and England against the main aggressor, not counting 12 cavalry divisions, namely:

56 infantry divisions
12 cavalry divisions
8500 - 9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
2,075,000 people in total.

Forces deployed to north of Minsk for action against East Prussia:

26 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
4000 medium and heavy guns
1300 tanks
1,500 aircraft
and a total of 926,000 people.

For actions south of Polesie, for direct support to Romania (France and England must achieve the passage of our troops through the Romanian territory and the southern part of Galicia), we will be sent:

30 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
5000 medium and heavy guns
2000 tanks
1,500 aircraft
a total of 1,149,000 people.

These our forces are deployed on the border of the USSR with Romania and in the southern part of Galicia and operate south of the Carpathians, receiving an independent sector of the front.

The command of our troops remains with us. In this option, the actions of our Northern and Baltic fleets are carried out, as set out in option I, therefore, the tasks for the combined Anglo-French fleet remain the same as indicated in option I.

Bulgaria may be involved in the attack on Romania, so France and England must commit themselves to making Turkey and Greece to join the war.

If both of these states take part in the war, then our Black Sea Fleet, having barred the mouth of the Danube from the inflitration of aggressor submarines into the Black Sea and blocking Varna (the Bulgarian military port), together with the Turkish fleet carry out cruising and submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean. However, under all circumstances, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be firmly closed from the penetration of surface squadrons of opponents and their submarines into the Marmara and Black Seas.

IV. A possible variant of the outbreak of hostilities, when aggression will be directed against Turkey, and, perhaps, in this case, Bulgaria will join the war on the side of the aggressors.

France and England, by virtue of an agreement with Turkey, declare war on the aggressors.

If France and England turn to us for military cooperation, this cooperation can be provided if:

1) Poland's participate in the war against the primay aggressor and the passage of our troops is allowed through the Vilnius corridor and by agreement with Lithuania through its territory for actions against East Prussia;

2) joint operations of combined Anglo-French fleet and our Baltic Fleet in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) the participation of Romania in the war and the passage of our troops through Romania for operations in the south of Romania.

In this case, we expose and deploy forces as indicated in option III.

The tasks of our Black Sea Fleet will be the same as indicated in the previous version (III).

The actions of the armies of France and England should amount to an attack against the primary aggressor as the main target, as set out in Option I.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should be amended against what is stated in Option I - to act towards decisive defeat of the combined fleet of aggressors in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in its eastern part.

V. A possible variant of military operations is when the aggression of the primary aggressor is directed against the USSR through the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia,

In this case, France and England, according to the agreement, must immediately enter the war with the aggressors. Poland, bound by a treaty with England and France and having our guarantee, must act on option I.

Our demand for the deployment of 40 Polish infantry divisions against East Prussia and in Poznan remains.

If in the Option I we alone deployed 70% of the armed forces that England and France directed against the primary aggressor attacking one of these powers, then in the event of the primary aggressor attacking us, we must demand from France and England to deploy forces on the 15th day of mobilization equal to 70% of what we deploy against the primary aggressor according to this option.

We can deploy 120 infantry divisions. Therefore, we must demand the deployment of the following English and French forces against the primary aggressor north of Belfort and to Belgium:

84 infantry divisions
13,000 to 13,500 medium and heavy guns
from 3,000 to 3,500 tanks
from 5,000 to 5,500 aircraft.

From the 16th day of mobilization, these forces must launch a decisive attack against the primary aggressor north of Metz and from Belgium with the general direction of the main attack toward Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must inflict a powerful blow on the industrial areas of the primary aggressor, on the bases of his navy, on railways, highways, as well as on the capital and major administrative centers.

The actions of the Anglo-French Navy should occur according to option I.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of the military action is achieved by special agreement during the war.

It is hard to imagine that the primary aggressor would send part of his forces against us through Romania. However, this option is not excluded, and therefore in this case, Poland, Turkey and Greece should be involved in providing assistance to Romania by England and France, and some of our troops are provided with a passage through Galicia and Romania.

The actions of our Black Sea Fleet should be coordinated with the actions of the Turkish Fleet, as set out in version IV.

When the primary aggressor attacks us, we must demand the deployment of the above forces by France, England and Belgium, their decisive offensive from the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor and the most active Polish participation in the war, as well as the unhindered passage of our troops through the territory of the Vilnius corridor and Galicia with the provision of rolling stock.

The foregoing is a prerequisite for negotiations, during which the positions of France and England will be clarified in a sincere desire to conclude an agreement.

Signed by B. Shaposhnikov

Note that there are no proposals about cancelations of defensive pacts with anyone and even offers to joint operations in the Baltics and Poland.

I just love how cavalier the proposal is about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of smaller nations even when explicitly saying that the goal is to protect their independence, like here:

As for our Baltic Fleet, in the case of a favorable resolution of the issue, it will be based together with the combined fleet of France and England on the Gange, Åland and Moonsund archipelagos, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava in order to protect the independence of the Baltic countries.

 

[Crueldwarf]

I just love how cavalier the proposal is about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of smaller nations even when explicitly saying that the goal is to protect their independence, like here:

Yeah, when you fight against Nazi Germany your neutrality is a matter of convenience for both sides really. Soviets had cavalier attitude in their own backyard, British and French were cavalier in theirs. Germany didn't give a fuck in the first place.

And Soviets actually had a very good reason to include language like that. They aimed at preventing another Austrian Anschluss or Munich surrender type of scenarios by affirming that Germany pressuring some country into surrendering its territory is a same kind of aggression as open attack. Which was of course a problem with British and French who were pretty sure that neutral on their side of the Germany were reasonably resilient to such kind of pressure (Netherlands or Belgium caving in was not a realistic threat for them), while Soviets were expecting Baltics to be pretty happy about Germans coming to help. And so wanted the assurances from British and French that they wouldn't allow that kind of strategic readjustment yet again.

 

[DrakonFin]

Yeah, when you fight against Nazi Germany your neutrality is a matter of convenience for both sides really. Soviets had cavalier attitude in their own backyard, British and French were cavalier in theirs. Germany didn't give a fuck in the first place.

To be fair, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania saw WWII end as parts of the USSR. In the same timeframe, Britain and France never annexed any of the smaller countries in their backyard. I think we can argue that there was some difference in how much these countries respected the sovereignty of their neighbours in these years.

And Soviets actually had a very good reason to include language like that. They aimed at preventing another Austrian Anschluss or Munich surrender type of scenarios by affirming that Germany pressuring some country into surrendering its territory is a same kind of aggression as open attack. Which was of course a problem with British and French who were pretty sure that neutral on their side of the Germany were reasonably resilient to such kind of pressure (Netherlands or Belgium caving in was not a realistic threat for them), while Soviets were expecting Baltics to be pretty happy about Germans coming to help. And so wanted the assurances from British and French that they wouldn't allow that kind of strategic readjustment yet again.

I guess the Soviets had valid geostrategic defensive interests in their near abroad, sure. I could just not help my eyes being drawn to the blatant bullshit of Moscow saying that it wanted to protect the independence of the Baltic states when we know the USSR had no such interest or intention, rather vice versa.

Incidentally, the document you quoted can be said to provide some circumstantial evidence for Moscow seeing Finland as a fourth Baltic state in 1939, given how the Soviets list basing their units on Finnish territory in the same sentence they mention Baltic Sea areas south of the Archipelago Sea as needed "to protect... the Baltic states". There is no indication here that Finland would be a special case in comparison to its three southern neighbours.

 

[Crueldwarf]

To be fair, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania saw WWII end as parts of the USSR. In the same timeframe, Britain and France never annexed any of the smaller countries in their backyard. I think we can argue that there was some difference in how much these countries respected the sovereignty of their neighbours in these years.

Not really. The only difference was that Soviet Union was on the rise as the result of the war and Britain and French were in decline. I sincerely doubt that anything that USSR did to the Baltic states was in any way, shape or form worse than what British were doing in India, Iraq or Egypt before or post-war. And what French were doing in their colonies respectively. Of course they were forced out much earlier from all of these places. But they were forced out, so it was definitely not an issue of political virtue.

And in general if we are using morality argument in political discussion, I do not think that length of possession counter-point actually does much.

The only real difference between British, French (or American) behavior and USSR is that former were doing their thing to the predominately brown people, while the latter was operating in the European backyard and was doing nasty things to people who are at the time were welcomed back in the privileged category of white. So they had a disproportionate representation in the public consciousness of Western countries.

I guess the Soviets had valid geostrategic defensive interests in their near abroad, sure. I could just not help my eyes being drawn to the blatant bullshit of Moscow saying that it wanted to protect the independence of the Baltic states when we know the USSR had no such interest or intention, rather vice versa.

Firstly, it is not a specific Soviet thing. Sugar-coating unequal treaties was done by basically everyone.
Secondly, USSR had no definite plans on annexing Baltic states. What happened in 1940 was on the spot decision caused by a combination of fall of France that utterly demolished balance of security in Europe (prior to that Baltics had at least theoretical ability to get their security guarantees from France which was more or less acceptable to the USSR. After June 1940 only Germany remained on that market) and ongoing contacts between Lithuanian and German security services that Soviets became aware of and made a conclusion that in a case of German-Soviet conflict, the Baltics would flip to the Germans in a very short order.

Basically, if we assume a scenario in which French survive the German attack as a part of Anglo-Soviet-French military bloc then Soviets would be much less maximalist in their security goals post-war. Not only because USSR would be much less damaged and traumatized in such scenario, but also because the security architecture of such Europe would be quite different in comparison with OTL. In our post-war world the choice was again limited to either USA or USSR and Soviet Union rather obviously preferred to not have American clients on its borders. But if the Europe remain relatively multi-polar, then the situation would be different and Soviet actions would be different too.