A Bavarian Daughter in the House of Bonaparte
Makes perfect sense but nonetheless ironic that, without Russia or Britain likely to become involved and with Austria as a millstone around a different (French) neck, TTL France is subject to the same calculations of relative power and warmaking capacity as OTL Germany was when looking at Russia.

And responding with the same blind panic.
 
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I think the French situation ITTL reminds me a lot of the German position from OTL (and quite purposefully, I believe).

French paranoia means that I think that regime is currently blind to a lot of its weaknesses, sees its primary ally teetering and willing to dissolve the alliance, and really, really want to get the war going before it position gets worse, while Germany and Austria are a lot more level-headed. Italy, I'm not really sure how belligerent they are. But, IMO, you'd just need to get the French going to set off the whole chain reaction that drags Europe into war.
Very purposefully, though I wanted to avoid a direct 1:1 with Wilhelmine Germany.
It isn't going to be the French that are going to drag Europe into war, it will be Belgium (or at least that's what I expect)
Sorta… got some help from @Curtain Jerker yesterday and think I have a decent hook, now.
Italy will be probably in a position that she don't fell very safe, from her pov she is surrounded by enemies (France and A-H) and one of them had just started to heavy rearming, plus there is all the irrendenta.
Basically she want the land but know perfectely that she is not in a great position, her more probable plan will be not search or clamoring actively war but be very ready for one and wait for the right circumstance and looking with a lot of worries her neighbourgh
Yeah, Italy is definitely not as much an instigator as just highly reactive
Which gives me the feeling that there isn't going to be a Belgium by the end, especially if the Dutch get involved (Flanders goes to the Netherlands and a German prince ends up rulling Wallonia).
You’re on the right track, just a bit early
Which is what they were during the period of their OTL mid-century supremacy.

What began shattering that supremacy was a major, near-revolutionary reform in the form of the Civil Rights Act, which simply couldn’t be portrayed as an extension of existing practice to roughly 40% of the then-existing electorate.

ITTL that entire set of obstacles will not exist in any meaningful form north of Kentucky. GAW-era Refugees will become residents, their kids will become second-class citizens, and they’ll tread a path of assimilation and integration much more similar to willing immigrants (including recent ones from West Africa and the Caribbean) than OTL’s path, characterized by vigorous internal disputes between “integrationists” and “minoritarian nationalists” in the African-American community and hindered by blatant white racism.

In a nation with much stronger ethnic, patronage, and machine politics, Confederate-descended black folks will be a power bloc analogous to Polish or Italian immigrants, their relative position and opportunities for integration shored up gradually by the federal government out of a need for a narrative about how the US is better than the Confederates.

So there will be no point at which basic morality compels the Democrats to do something “radical” and shatter their urban labor-rural populist coalition.
You’ll still see some sharp drop off for rural Dems for the same reasons that center-left parties in Canada, Australia, really everywhere have, but it won’t be quite as extreme as OTL
A predominantly French speaking area with a German Prince, that should make it a running sore in Europe for a generation or two...

The question is whether the role of Brussels iTTL will be played by OTL Sarajevo, OTL Beirut, OTL Belfast or OTL Mogadishu...
Sarajevo and Belfast seem most apropos
Makes perfect sense but nonetheless ironic that, without Russia or Britain likely to become involved and with Austria as a millstone around a different (French) neck, TTL France is subject to the same calculations of relative power and warmaking capacity as OTL Germany was when looking at Russia.

And responding with the same blind panic.
Thank you! Exactly what I was aiming for haha
 
Might just be me, but I suspect France might look akin to a young independent Syria post war though obviously changes cause of history and geography.

By that, rough agreement among it's elites that the state needs a revolutionary/temporary dictatorship to both protect and revitalize the nation, a very militant atmosphere infecting it's populace and state of emergency lasting for decades as well as perhaps some minorities coming to the fore. Question though how it evolves/devolves though is a different matter.

For example, could see France both because of who's running it as well a desperate need for funding be involved in the drug cartels that are being set in Indochina akin to Syria's own involvement in the drug trade that began in the Lebanese civil war.
 
Might just be me, but I suspect France might look akin to a young independent Syria post war though obviously changes cause of history and geography.

By that, rough agreement among it's elites that the state needs a revolutionary/temporary dictatorship to both protect and revitalize the nation, a very militant atmosphere infecting it's populace and state of emergency lasting for decades as well as perhaps some minorities coming to the fore. Question though how it evolves/devolves though is a different matter.

For example, could see France both because of who's running it as well a desperate need for funding be involved in the drug cartels that are being set in Indochina akin to Syria's own involvement in the drug trade that began in the Lebanese civil war.
A comp I certainly hadn’t thought of.

But, the idea of the French State having deep drug cartel ties… *chefs kiss*
So the Dutch are not getting involved and will snipe Flanders after revolution breaks out?
🤐🤐🤐
 
Unrelated but has the Confederate Supreme Court done anything important since disqualifying Breckinridge from seeking a full term? I'd assume in the end that the CSA would be much less like the US in the level of judicial supremacy and influence
 
So, what's happening on the fringes of China meanwhile?
The last update on Manchuria has been in 1915 I believe, and I'm curious to see what has been happening there since then.
Also, I don't think we had much specific on Mongolia, East Turkestan and Tibet, or even Afghanistan.

With the Russians' energies focused in Asia since the 1880s, I wonder how the Great Game has been going lately.
the British having their hands full in Ireland and India, I'm not seeing the Russians sitting idle and not trying something, in Tibet for example, or Afghanistan.
Anything like the OTL Third Anglo-Afghan War in sight? The Ghadar mutiny would have been a good moment for the Afghans to try something as well, perhaps with some Russian encouragement.
Did the OTL second happen ? I don't remember quite.
 
Unrelated but has the Confederate Supreme Court done anything important since disqualifying Breckinridge from seeking a full term? I'd assume in the end that the CSA would be much less like the US in the level of judicial supremacy and influence
It is established that the CS Supreme Court is toothless so...
This is the answer. Essentially a rubber stamp, and much more of a revolving door, tenure-wise
So, what's happening on the fringes of China meanwhile?
The last update on Manchuria has been in 1915 I believe, and I'm curious to see what has been happening there since then.
Also, I don't think we had much specific on Mongolia, East Turkestan and Tibet, or even Afghanistan.

With the Russians' energies focused in Asia since the 1880s, I wonder how the Great Game has been going lately.
the British having their hands full in Ireland and India, I'm not seeing the Russians sitting idle and not trying something, in Tibet for example, or Afghanistan.
Anything like the OTL Third Anglo-Afghan War in sight? The Ghadar mutiny would have been a good moment for the Afghans to try something as well, perhaps with some Russian encouragement.
Did the OTL second happen ? I don't remember quite.
Incidentally a Manchuria update is on the docket for early 1918, I just have to refresh myself a bit on the various players

As for Afghanistan, I believe both Anglo-Afghan Wars did occur. The Great Game is… tenser, what with Russia’s position in Turkestan and Manchuria
Does give "The French Connection" a slightly different meaning - would be interesting to see French organized crime going truly international.
That’s sort of the idea. Marseille would be even more important for the global drug trade in such a scenario
 
As for Afghanistan, I believe both Anglo-Afghan Wars did occur. The Great Game is… tenser, what with Russia’s position in Turkestan and Manchuria
Then, how did they react to the Ghadar mutiny ? I don't remember if you wrote on it.
If the Second Anglo-Afghan war happened like OTL, I'd very much find it odd the Afghans would not try to use that moment of weakness of the British to break free of their tutelage.

And did the Tibet Expedition happen as well? Tibet's position on the Raj doorstep and Russian TTL expanding influence and control into China would make it even more critical to the Raj security, together with Afghanistan.
 
Then, how did they react to the Ghadar mutiny ? I don't remember if you wrote on it.
If the Second Anglo-Afghan war happened like OTL, I'd very much find it odd the Afghans would not try to use that moment of weakness of the British to break free of their tutelage.

And did the Tibet Expedition happen as well? Tibet's position on the Raj doorstep and Russian TTL expanding influence and control into China would make it even more critical to the Raj security, together with Afghanistan.
Weapons definitely flowed through Afghanistan to the Ghadarites holed up in Peshawar and western Punjab, Russian weapons specifically, but Britain has no real way to prove it.

Yes, Tibet Expedition happene concurrently with the Boxer War, so Tibet is within the British sphere of influence
 
A Time of Atrocity: An Accounting of Crimes Committed in the Great American War
"...Bliss had been deeply, personally offended by the massacres, reprisal killings, and organized sanctioned rapes as a tool of intimidation carried out in Maryland and Central Pennsylvania in the first year of the war, and one of his last acts as Chief of Staff in February of 1917 as the contours of Mount Vernon were debated had been to submit an order to organize tribunals to cry Confederate war criminals at the conclusion of the conflict. Peyton C. March, Bliss' more professorial and managerial successor, continued with this work and appointed chief signals officer George Squier to pursue this mission.

Squier was picked in part because his role as signals officer was no longer crucial in peacetime, and in party because he was regarded as a brilliant organizational mind, but he was no jurist, and that quickly became apparent. Squier attempted to recruit justices of the Supreme Court to lead such tribunals and was politely rebuffed; he instead found a future Supreme Court Justice in Roscoe Pound, then the dean of the Harvard School of Law, to put these tribunals on instead, with Justice William Morrow providing pro bono advice. Pound is regarded as a titan of the Court and of legal scholarship today, but his brief time in 1917-18 attempting to put Confederate war criminals on trial was not his finest hour, through little fault of his own. It is true that many of the military judges he recruited to join him in chairing the tribunals had little legal experience, with the tribunals intended to have a hybrid civilian-military function that simply served to blur the lines; it is also true that Pound's knowledge of military law was weak compared to his deep knowledge of sociological law, constitutional history and appellate procedure.

Nonetheless, he put his best into it, but the bigger issue was creating genuine proof of crimes. Confederate soldiers rarely if ever willingly testified against each other, often having to be dragged in as prisoners by American GIs, and it was more than once revealed on the stand that their testimony was suborned by promises of rations or threats of violence. Pound was adamant that his proceedings would not become a kangaroo court and he was quick to drop any case which he was not confident he could win a unanimous conviction from as he settled into his role of prosecutor rather than judge; less than one in five cases he initially took up along with his growing team ever made it to the tribunals, and less than half of those won convictions.

By early 1918, military brass had begun expressing skepticism over Pound's endeavor, and indeed he would be relieved of his duties at the end of the year. Confederate General Alexander Dade, held responsible for the atrocities in Maryland, was in the wind, later revealed to have fled to Cuba in a time before extradition between the United States and Spain. Nobody from Company R identified themselves or their comrades, at least not with evidence firm enough for Pound, and thus prosecuting what had gone on at the systematic level quickly fell apart. The Pound Commission, as the prosecutorial team was known, was relegated to prosecuting small-bore, one-off war crimes, hardly the splashy trials of senior Confederate officials like Dade or Hugh Scott that Bliss had envisioned.

It was also the case that many in the Army brass had, by the spring of 1918, grown supremely frustrated by the legalism in the face of a grim and extended occupation and had essentially taken the leash off of their own men, most prominently James Harbord, whose occupation zone of Alabama, Georgia and Florida quickly became infamous for the brutality that Yankee troops began operating under towards the local population, using freedmen militias as auxiliaries and deploying interrogation techniques that would be charitably classified as torture. As assassinations and ambushes roiled Dixie, Yankee infantry became increasingly unwilling to stand by as they were aggressively targeted, and men like Harbord turned a blind eye to their behavior in an act of tacit approval. [1]

Pound's mutually-beneficial resignation in December 1918 saw the efforts for tribunals wound down quickly; the attempt to bring Confederate war criminals to justice was, in most respects, a failure, and left both sides deeply embittered as extrajudicial punishment surged in its place..."

- A Time of Atrocity: An Accounting of Crimes Committed in the Great American War

[1] I'm willing to indulge a bit of character assassination of James Harbord mostly because he was allegedly (as was Admiral William Sims) involved in the "Business Plot" as accused by Smedley Butler. I personally am unconvinced that the conspiracy Butler alleged was as vast as he claimed, but for literary and fictional purposes having some military officers who OTL had a bit of an ugly postwar reputation serves my purposes just fine.
 
"...Bliss had been deeply, personally offended by the massacres, reprisal killings, and organized sanctioned rapes as a tool of intimidation carried out in Maryland and Central Pennsylvania in the first year of the war, and one of his last acts as Chief of Staff in February of 1917 as the contours of Mount Vernon were debated had been to submit an order to organize tribunals to cry Confederate war criminals at the conclusion of the conflict. Peyton C. March, Bliss' more professorial and managerial successor, continued with this work and appointed chief signals officer George Squier to pursue this mission.

Squier was picked in part because his role as signals officer was no longer crucial in peacetime, and in party because he was regarded as a brilliant organizational mind, but he was no jurist, and that quickly became apparent. Squier attempted to recruit justices of the Supreme Court to lead such tribunals and was politely rebuffed; he instead found a future Supreme Court Justice in Roscoe Pound, then the dean of the Harvard School of Law, to put these tribunals on instead, with Justice William Morrow providing pro bono advice. Pound is regarded as a titan of the Court and of legal scholarship today, but his brief time in 1917-18 attempting to put Confederate war criminals on trial was not his finest hour, through little fault of his own. It is true that many of the military judges he recruited to join him in chairing the tribunals had little legal experience, with the tribunals intended to have a hybrid civilian-military function that simply served to blur the lines; it is also true that Pound's knowledge of military law was weak compared to his deep knowledge of sociological law, constitutional history and appellate procedure.

Nonetheless, he put his best into it, but the bigger issue was creating genuine proof of crimes. Confederate soldiers rarely if ever willingly testified against each other, often having to be dragged in as prisoners by American GIs, and it was more than once revealed on the stand that their testimony was suborned by promises of rations or threats of violence. Pound was adamant that his proceedings would not become a kangaroo court and he was quick to drop any case which he was not confident he could win a unanimous conviction from as he settled into his role of prosecutor rather than judge; less than one in five cases he initially took up along with his growing team ever made it to the tribunals, and less than half of those won convictions.

By early 1918, military brass had begun expressing skepticism over Pound's endeavor, and indeed he would be relieved of his duties at the end of the year. Confederate General Alexander Dade, held responsible for the atrocities in Maryland, was in the wind, later revealed to have fled to Cuba in a time before extradition between the United States and Spain. Nobody from Company R identified themselves or their comrades, at least not with evidence firm enough for Pound, and thus prosecuting what had gone on at the systematic level quickly fell apart. The Pound Commission, as the prosecutorial team was known, was relegated to prosecuting small-bore, one-off war crimes, hardly the splashy trials of senior Confederate officials like Dade or Hugh Scott that Bliss had envisioned.

It was also the case that many in the Army brass had, by the spring of 1918, grown supremely frustrated by the legalism in the face of a grim and extended occupation and had essentially taken the leash off of their own men, most prominently James Harbord, whose occupation zone of Alabama, Georgia and Florida quickly became infamous for the brutality that Yankee troops began operating under towards the local population, using freedmen militias as auxiliaries and deploying interrogation techniques that would be charitably classified as torture. As assassinations and ambushes roiled Dixie, Yankee infantry became increasingly unwilling to stand by as they were aggressively targeted, and men like Harbord turned a blind eye to their behavior in an act of tacit approval. [1]

Pound's mutually-beneficial resignation in December 1918 saw the efforts for tribunals wound down quickly; the attempt to bring Confederate war criminals to justice was, in most respects, a failure, and left both sides deeply embittered as extrajudicial punishment surged in its place..."

- A Time of Atrocity: An Accounting of Crimes Committed in the Great American War

[1] I'm willing to indulge a bit of character assassination of James Harbord mostly because he was allegedly (as was Admiral William Sims) involved in the "Business Plot" as accused by Smedley Butler. I personally am unconvinced that the conspiracy Butler alleged was as vast as he claimed, but for literary and fictional purposes having some military officers who OTL had a bit of an ugly postwar reputation serves my purposes just fine.
Now that’s just tragic. Expected, given what the author has indicated in previous posts, but still depressing nonetheless.
 
"...Bliss had been deeply, personally offended by the massacres, reprisal killings, and organized sanctioned rapes as a tool of intimidation carried out in Maryland and Central Pennsylvania in the first year of the war, and one of his last acts as Chief of Staff in February of 1917 as the contours of Mount Vernon were debated had been to submit an order to organize tribunals to cry Confederate war criminals at the conclusion of the conflict. Peyton C. March, Bliss' more professorial and managerial successor, continued with this work and appointed chief signals officer George Squier to pursue this mission.

Squier was picked in part because his role as signals officer was no longer crucial in peacetime, and in party because he was regarded as a brilliant organizational mind, but he was no jurist, and that quickly became apparent. Squier attempted to recruit justices of the Supreme Court to lead such tribunals and was politely rebuffed; he instead found a future Supreme Court Justice in Roscoe Pound, then the dean of the Harvard School of Law, to put these tribunals on instead, with Justice William Morrow providing pro bono advice. Pound is regarded as a titan of the Court and of legal scholarship today, but his brief time in 1917-18 attempting to put Confederate war criminals on trial was not his finest hour, through little fault of his own. It is true that many of the military judges he recruited to join him in chairing the tribunals had little legal experience, with the tribunals intended to have a hybrid civilian-military function that simply served to blur the lines; it is also true that Pound's knowledge of military law was weak compared to his deep knowledge of sociological law, constitutional history and appellate procedure.

Nonetheless, he put his best into it, but the bigger issue was creating genuine proof of crimes. Confederate soldiers rarely if ever willingly testified against each other, often having to be dragged in as prisoners by American GIs, and it was more than once revealed on the stand that their testimony was suborned by promises of rations or threats of violence. Pound was adamant that his proceedings would not become a kangaroo court and he was quick to drop any case which he was not confident he could win a unanimous conviction from as he settled into his role of prosecutor rather than judge; less than one in five cases he initially took up along with his growing team ever made it to the tribunals, and less than half of those won convictions.

By early 1918, military brass had begun expressing skepticism over Pound's endeavor, and indeed he would be relieved of his duties at the end of the year. Confederate General Alexander Dade, held responsible for the atrocities in Maryland, was in the wind, later revealed to have fled to Cuba in a time before extradition between the United States and Spain. Nobody from Company R identified themselves or their comrades, at least not with evidence firm enough for Pound, and thus prosecuting what had gone on at the systematic level quickly fell apart. The Pound Commission, as the prosecutorial team was known, was relegated to prosecuting small-bore, one-off war crimes, hardly the splashy trials of senior Confederate officials like Dade or Hugh Scott that Bliss had envisioned.

It was also the case that many in the Army brass had, by the spring of 1918, grown supremely frustrated by the legalism in the face of a grim and extended occupation and had essentially taken the leash off of their own men, most prominently James Harbord, whose occupation zone of Alabama, Georgia and Florida quickly became infamous for the brutality that Yankee troops began operating under towards the local population, using freedmen militias as auxiliaries and deploying interrogation techniques that would be charitably classified as torture. As assassinations and ambushes roiled Dixie, Yankee infantry became increasingly unwilling to stand by as they were aggressively targeted, and men like Harbord turned a blind eye to their behavior in an act of tacit approval. [1]

Pound's mutually-beneficial resignation in December 1918 saw the efforts for tribunals wound down quickly; the attempt to bring Confederate war criminals to justice was, in most respects, a failure, and left both sides deeply embittered as extrajudicial punishment surged in its place..."

- A Time of Atrocity: An Accounting of Crimes Committed in the Great American War

[1] I'm willing to indulge a bit of character assassination of James Harbord mostly because he was allegedly (as was Admiral William Sims) involved in the "Business Plot" as accused by Smedley Butler. I personally am unconvinced that the conspiracy Butler alleged was as vast as he claimed, but for literary and fictional purposes having some military officers who OTL had a bit of an ugly postwar reputation serves my purposes just fine.
Pure tragedy, hope there's a silver lining.
 
The occupation of the confederacy is quickly beginning to look untenable. I would love an update showing how the civilian side of the new US-imposed government is going
 
The occupation of the confederacy is quickly beginning to look untenable. I would love an update showing how the civilian side of the new US-imposed government is going
Same!

We know of the Hillboys, but how are they operating? Partisans need support from a local population to operated, so how are they getting that, and who are their enemies (because not everyone, no matter how patriotic, are going yo support a partisan movement. Especially if the US is starting to carry out reprisals)

And even moving beyond the Hillboys - How's the economy effexting your every day Confederate citizen and thsts their relationship to the state and national government. What's the popular culture like? The war and the occupation are certainly going to leave Marks on that!

And how are the freedmen doing? We know many have taken up arms, but whata day to day life like in their communities?
 
A Toast to the Devil: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition Politics
"...for whatever the Prohibition Party had hoped to accomplish, the lack of a full wartime ban as they had hoped for proved there were limits to what they could accomplish, and a powerful cross-partisan alliance of "wets" had formed by the end of the conflict to prevent anything even approximating it. It was true that Liberals were, on general, much more likely to support prohibition east of the Mississippi while support for temperance was fairly bipartisan to its west; it was also the case that most Western states, with the exception of California and Oregon, had entered the Union with constitutional prohibition already built into their governing documents, or in the progressive spirit of the early 1910s drafted new constitutions that did so, such as in Dakota, Colorado, or even Midwestern Indiana. This created an ample block of drys in the Democratic ranks, but also a block who were less worried about passing a nationwide prohibition, as their states were already very prohibitive, and as 1918 came about the sense was increasingly on the Democratic side that the question of drink was one which badly split their party in an age (such as the case of Oregon, where feuding over it had become an internecine bloodbath) where they otherwise agreed on a great many things, in particular their contempt for President Root.

The votes were there for a law against alcohol at the federal level, but not a full constitutional ban, as the Prohibition Party had hoped, and Root, already embattled by the spring of 1918, elected to simply split the difference. The Milwaukee Beer Riots had badly burned his predecessor Hughes, who as a personal teetotaler felt much more strongly about the matter than Root ever did, and with enough on his plate - especially his much stronger opposition to women's suffrage, another parallel issue of the day - Root was unwilling to further damage Liberal prospects in strongly wet states like Wisconsin or his native by expending his political capital on a draconian Prohibition. The Liberal-controlled Congress thus pressed ahead with a bill that suited his views, as well as those of Democratic drys from the West, without offending wet Democrats and Liberal moderates on the question: the Interstate Liquor Control Act, which would govern American alcohol law at the federal level until its repeal in 1946.

The ILCA was composed of two parts, the Interstate Liquor Transport Regulation Policy and the Liquor Import Prohibition Policy, and they worked in tandem. Effectively, the ILCA did not ban the personal possession or consumption of alcohol, nor its production, as many drys had demanded, Rather, it made it a federal felony to transport liquor, wine or beer with an alcohol by unit content in excess of ten percent (modified to twelve percent in 1933) across state lines, regardless of whether the states it was moving between internally regulated or banned liquor. The import rules were even stricter - with the exception of light beer with an alcohol content of five percent or less, all alcohol was banned from being imported into the United States from neighboring countries or from overseas by train and boat or, by the late 1920s, by plane.

Temperance activists had spent decades building to this moment and thus were enormously frustrated; the ILCA did little more than make permanent the interstate commerce controls put in place during the war but relaxed a number of the Grain Board's restrictions on breweries and distilleries, and they were not wrong that the ILCA was a half-loaf compromise that only solved part of the problem. It was a mixed bag for Root; soft drys were generally happy with the Act, which the oft-Protestants viewed as largely targeting Catholics they did not trust or like, and the majority of them already lived in dry states in the West or New England. Midwestern wets were, by and large, fairly unaffected, and vibrant brewing and distilling economies exploded in places like Wisconsin, Illinois, New Jersey and New York where alcohol laws were fairly lax, at least as compared to Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio. But hard drys felt betrayed after years of building grassroots support through the Liberal Party, and many wets were skeptical that the ILCA would be the end of it. Politically, Root considered the ILCA the end of the war; for others, the battle had simply shifted back again to the states, this time with a growing "Liquor Control Agent," or "Lickies," often former veterans eager for work, supporting them to prevent transport across state lines and enforce the law federally..." [1]

- A Toast to the Devil: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition Politics

[1] So this is my long-previewed "split the difference" on Prohibition. Root IOTL was pretty skeptical of Prohibition compared to many of his peers so this seemed to fit his personality well, and without the South, the votes aren't there for Volstead/18A. This is still a pretty strong Prohibition in many ways, but well short of OTL, especially with a number of wet states - especially major ones like Wisconsin, Illinois and New York - redoubts of legal alcohol that can definitely avoid the Lickies as it fans out across the country surreptitiously
 
Same!

We know of the Hillboys, but how are they operating? Partisans need support from a local population to operated, so how are they getting that, and who are their enemies (because not everyone, no matter how patriotic, are going yo support a partisan movement. Especially if the US is starting to carry out reprisals)

And even moving beyond the Hillboys - How's the economy effexting your every day Confederate citizen and thsts their relationship to the state and national government. What's the popular culture like? The war and the occupation are certainly going to leave Marks on that!

And how are the freedmen doing? We know many have taken up arms, but whata day to day life like in their communities?
I have Huey Long update coming down the pike where I can try to incorporate a bit of this
 
"...for whatever the Prohibition Party had hoped to accomplish, the lack of a full wartime ban as they had hoped for proved there were limits to what they could accomplish, and a powerful cross-partisan alliance of "wets" had formed by the end of the conflict to prevent anything even approximating it. It was true that Liberals were, on general, much more likely to support prohibition east of the Mississippi while support for temperance was fairly bipartisan to its west; it was also the case that most Western states, with the exception of California and Oregon, had entered the Union with constitutional prohibition already built into their governing documents, or in the progressive spirit of the early 1910s drafted new constitutions that did so, such as in Dakota, Colorado, or even Midwestern Indiana. This created an ample block of drys in the Democratic ranks, but also a block who were less worried about passing a nationwide prohibition, as their states were already very prohibitive, and as 1918 came about the sense was increasingly on the Democratic side that the question of drink was one which badly split their party in an age (such as the case of Oregon, where feuding over it had become an internecine bloodbath) where they otherwise agreed on a great many things, in particular their contempt for President Root.

The votes were there for a law against alcohol at the federal level, but not a full constitutional ban, as the Prohibition Party had hoped, and Root, already embattled by the spring of 1918, elected to simply split the difference. The Milwaukee Beer Riots had badly burned his predecessor Hughes, who as a personal teetotaler felt much more strongly about the matter than Root ever did, and with enough on his plate - especially his much stronger opposition to women's suffrage, another parallel issue of the day - Root was unwilling to further damage Liberal prospects in strongly wet states like Wisconsin or his native by expending his political capital on a draconian Prohibition. The Liberal-controlled Congress thus pressed ahead with a bill that suited his views, as well as those of Democratic drys from the West, without offending wet Democrats and Liberal moderates on the question: the Interstate Liquor Control Act, which would govern American alcohol law at the federal level until its repeal in 1946.

The ILCA was composed of two parts, the Interstate Liquor Transport Regulation Policy and the Liquor Import Prohibition Policy, and they worked in tandem. Effectively, the ILCA did not ban the personal possession or consumption of alcohol, nor its production, as many drys had demanded, Rather, it made it a federal felony to transport liquor, wine or beer with an alcohol by unit content in excess of ten percent (modified to twelve percent in 1933) across state lines, regardless of whether the states it was moving between internally regulated or banned liquor. The import rules were even stricter - with the exception of light beer with an alcohol content of five percent or less, all alcohol was banned from being imported into the United States from neighboring countries or from overseas by train and boat or, by the late 1920s, by plane.

Temperance activists had spent decades building to this moment and thus were enormously frustrated; the ILCA did little more than make permanent the interstate commerce controls put in place during the war but relaxed a number of the Grain Board's restrictions on breweries and distilleries, and they were not wrong that the ILCA was a half-loaf compromise that only solved part of the problem. It was a mixed bag for Root; soft drys were generally happy with the Act, which the oft-Protestants viewed as largely targeting Catholics they did not trust or like, and the majority of them already lived in dry states in the West or New England. Midwestern wets were, by and large, fairly unaffected, and vibrant brewing and distilling economies exploded in places like Wisconsin, Illinois, New Jersey and New York where alcohol laws were fairly lax, at least as compared to Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio. But hard drys felt betrayed after years of building grassroots support through the Liberal Party, and many wets were skeptical that the ILCA would be the end of it. Politically, Root considered the ILCA the end of the war; for others, the battle had simply shifted back again to the states, this time with a growing "Liquor Control Agent," or "Lickies," often former veterans eager for work, supporting them to prevent transport across state lines and enforce the law federally..." [1]

- A Toast to the Devil: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition Politics

[1] So this is my long-previewed "split the difference" on Prohibition. Root IOTL was pretty skeptical of Prohibition compared to many of his peers so this seemed to fit his personality well, and without the South, the votes aren't there for Volstead/18A. This is still a pretty strong Prohibition in many ways, but well short of OTL, especially with a number of wet states - especially major ones like Wisconsin, Illinois and New York - redoubts of legal alcohol that can definitely avoid the Lickies as it fans out across the country surreptitiously
And in the Confederacy, while Prohibition would have had a chance without war, it will probably be more than a decade before the Confederate Government will be strong enough to even consider enforcing it.

Oddly enough, I looked at Huey Long's wikipedia page and for someone who was Governor *during* Prohibition, the wikipedia page mentions neither the work alcohol or the word prohibition, any ideas where he was on the issue?
 
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