A New World (1950s): Repentance (Pt.1)
As the Cold War developed into maturity, the Eastern Bloc was profoundly transformed by the death of the tyrannical dictator who held two continents at his mercy. Josef Vissarionovich Stalin's iron-fisted reign ended in 1953, when a stroke and associated hemorrhaging took his life. Recently declassified Soviet documents of the period (and renewed inspection of medical records and modern toxicological knowledge) suggest that Stalin was poisoned with a strong dose of warfarin, most likely by Lavrentiy Beria, chief of the security apparatus [46]. The death of Stalin led to a dramatic change in life in Eastern Europe, driven by the De-stalinisation policies of Nikita Khrushchev, who climbed to power atop the carcass of Beria in 1955. But to fully understand the De-stalinisation process, we have to understand the developments in Eastern Europe immediately prior, in the time of High Stalinism.
In Poland, the High Stalinist period was characterised by an unprecedented level of surveillance and oppression. Upon Stalin's death, the Polish Secret Police had swelled to 32,000 agents. At the peak of the repression, there was one Urząd Bezpieczeństwa (Office of Public Security) agent for every 800 Poles. Although an official amnesty was extended to anti-Communist resistance fighters, unofficially they were persecuted, subject to unjustified arrest and harassment. In October 1950, a mass arrest was conducted, "Operation K", where 5,000 people were arrested in one night. In the year of 1952, over 21,000 civilians were arrested. In the second half of 1952, there were 49,500 political prisoners in Polish prisons.
Whilst the high levels of adherence to the Catholic church in Poland necessitated a somewhat lenient attitude to religion by the Communist authorities, the intellectual sphere was exempt from such mercy. By contrast, the peasantry avoided wholesale collectivisation and the existence of some private enterprise at the village level was preserved, thanks to the efforts of anti-Stalinists within the ranks of the PZPR.
The death of Stalin saw a period of relative liberalisation in Poland. The defections of Jozef Swiatlo and Anatol Fejgin led to revelations on the true extent of abuses by the UB, forcing the Communist government to abolish the office in December of 1954 to contain public outrage. Władysław Gomułka and his associates were released from confinement, censorship was slightly relaxed and political discussion groups formed all over the country.
Emboldened by political liberalisation, metalworkers in the Polish city of Poznań demonstrated against the raising of taxes on 'udarniki', or "most productive workers". These mass uprisings were suppressed by Polish Army forces led by General Stanisław Popławski, which violently dispersed the crowd under authorisation of Marshal of Poland Konstanty Rokossowski. Although successful in stopping the immediate protest, the death of Bolesław Bierut, the Stalinist leader of Poland, in suspicious circumstances in Moscow allowed public disaffection to manifest itself in the Polish October of 1956, where monuments to the Red Army and portraits of Rokossowski were attacked and defaced. Mass public demonstrations created a crisis for the Polish leadership. Unlike in Poznań, the protesters were relatively moderate with their demands, which several Polish social historians have noted was likely the reason that the October protests were not dispersed by force. Instead, Edward Ochab (Bierut's successor) appointed Gomułka for First Secretary of the Party (he soon after became Chairman of the Central Committee, the new collective Head of State after Bierut's death). Whilst Gomułka enjoyed widespread popularity in Poland, he was viewed with suspicion by the Soviets. A high-level delegation led by Khrushchev, and including Kaganovich, Molotov and other high-ranking Soviet politicians travelled to Poland and entered into negotiations with the Poles. Although initially fairly hardline, the Soviet delegation proved open to compromise, and the Polish Communists' negotiation of terms (which essentially amounted to autonomy and full self-governance) legitimised the ideology and party in the eyes of many ordinary Poles. Gomułka's Communists ensured the Soviets that all treaties between Poland and the Soviet Union would remain, and that they would stay loyal to the Warsaw Pact. Unsuccessful in convincing Khrushchev to invade Poland, Rokossowski left Poland and lived in the USSR for the rest of his life. By peaceful protest, Poland had transformed itself from a puppet state to a client state, becoming an assertive and self-respecting member of the brotherhood of socialist nations.[47]
In Czechoslovakia, the local Communists essentially ignored the post-Stalin social thaw which characterised the rest of the Eastern European states. The Stalinist-era regime had persecuted "dissident" elements of society, including the Catholic Church, as well as taking total control of education and economic activity. Even low-level private enterprise was outlawed. In March 1953, Klement Gottwald, Stalin's lackey in Czechoslovakia, died of a burst artery (although his poor health had been aggravated by syphilis and alcoholism). Antonín Zápotocký, a delegate of the party's left wing, replaced him, although he was forced to concede more and more authority to neo-Stalinist Antonín Novotný, who politically outflanked him. Nevertheless, Zápotocký remained in office until his death in 1957, where Novotný officially gained control over Czechoslovakia. In 1958, the XI KSČ Party Congress formalised the continuation of Stalinist policies. The only notable exception to the economic and innovative stagnation in Czechoslovakia in this period was the development of the Škorpion, a cheap submachine gun which was to become one of Czechoslovakia's main exports, establishing Czechoslovakia's tradition of arms sales in the developing world. Whilst historians have debated in recent years Khrushchev's apparent double-standard in regards to Stalinism, the current prevailing thought is that Khrushchev tolerated stricter social controls by Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and East Germany due to their physical proximity to the West. As Czech historian Jan Mačarek pointed out, "the other nations of the Eastern Bloc had the luxury of a degree of separation from the West. It was necessary in those times that the Czechs and Socialist Germans be the immovable brick-wall of the Socialist Sphere, a march of sorts, which we fortunately are exempt from given the fundamental change in the geography of modern power dynamics". [48]
The Finnish situation was essentially the inverse of the Czechoslovakian. Khrushchev had little to no qualms with the moderate and competent Finnish Communists, who had gotten through the High Stalinist period through lip service. Kuusinen's presence in Finland had always been comforting for Stalin, and his comparative liberalism (and enthusiasm for criticisms of Stalinist oppression, calling it "a blight on the Red flag") satisfied Khrushchev. Both Aaltonen and Kuusinen stayed in power through the 1950s.
Perhaps the most notable success story of De-Stalinisation was the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Upon Georgi Dimitrov's death in 1949, Bulgaria entered into a short period of collective leadership, with Vulko Chervenkov as General Secretary of the Communist Party and Vasil Kolarov as Prime Minister. Kolarov's death in 1950 allowed Chervenkov to fuse the two most powerful offices in Bulgaria with full Soviet approval. As unchallenged master of Bulgaria, Chervenkov instituted a policy of rapid and intensive collectivisation, along with his own series of purges. This "little Stalin" of Bulgaria crushed peasant rebellions by force and set up labour camps. At their peak, these camps housed 100,000 Bulgarians. Chervenkov's purges of the party (in the name of party "discipline") expelled a fifth of all members. Intimidation and supply discrimination began to be utilised by the government to enforce collectivisation. Trade with the West became virtually non-existent, with 90% of Bulgarian trade involving partnership with the USSR. Collectivisation was comparatively more successful in Bulgaria than many other Eastern European nations, and there was no decrease (nor significant increase) in agricultural production, although Chervenkov's Stalinist policies greatly increased industrial output (which unfortunately wasn't reflected in living standards).
After the death of Stalin, Chervenkov had little in the way of a domestic powerbase to ensure his power.Reliant on Stalin's patronage for his position, Chervenkov was little more than the "Sofia Satrap". In 1954, Chervenkov was deposed as Party Secretary (with Moscow's approval) by 43-year-old Todor Zhivkov. Two years later, Chervenkov was replaced as Prime Minister by Anton Yugov. Under Zhivkov's guidance, Bulgaria developed from a backwater to one of the most extensive welfare states in the Eastern Bloc. Within a few years, real wages increased by 75%, co-inciding with a better, more varied diet (from stable crops to vegetables, fruits and meat as well) for Bulgarians, universal access to healthcare and the introduction of Eastern Europe's first agricultural pension and welfare scheme.
Mystifyingly, despite the upheavals and dramatic change in many of the Eastern European states, Hungary was the only example which spilt over into violence. Under Matyas Rákosi's control, Hungary had been one of the most repressive states in the Bloc. American journalist John Gunther said of Rákosi: "[he is] the most malevolent character I ever met in my political life". Paying lip service to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in reality Rákosi developed a party aristocracy, characterised by the confiscation of wealth from the common people. From 1950-1952, the Hungarian Secret Police (AVH) relocated thousands of Hungarians to vacate their property for party members. In a single year, more than 26,000 were forcibly expelled from Budapest. Deportees were forced onto collective farms. Deaths from malnutrition and exhaustion weren't uncommon. Religious leaders were persecuted to an even harsher extent than in Czechoslovakia. Even without the disruption of collectivisation, Hungary was experiencing economic difficulties. Hungary was required to pay $300 million to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in war reparations, as well as supporting Soviet garrisons in the country. Hungary saw one of the highest rates of hyperinflation in history, surpassing even that of post-WWI Germany. Poorly-implemented Five-Year Plans led to a 18% fall in real industrial wages between 1949 and 1952. Collectivisation caused a significant fall in agricultural output and a consequent increase in food shortages, contributing to the problems of malnutrition in High Stalinist Hungary.
Shortly after the death of Stalin, Imre Nagy replaced Rákosi as Prime Minister. Despite Imre Nagy's surpassing of Rákosi in theoretical power, Rákosi still had strong links in the security services and the army and in 1955 attempted to take power in a coup, with the assistance of the AVH and units of the Hungarian Army. The military was split between the pro-Nagy and pro-Rakosi factions. Whilst Rákosi had the support of several high-ranking army officers, mutinies were widespread, and the slight majority of the newer units (there had been rapid expansion of the Hungarian Army due to the tension between Tito and Stalin) sided with the Nagy government. The Hungarian Air Force also sided with the Nagy government. Whilst at first leaning towards support of Rákosi and concerned by Nagy's intentions, the Soviets entered into Polish-style talks with Nagy. Concerned at the Rákosi forces' disproportionate control of artillery and tanks, Nagy promised the Soviets that he would remain inside the Warsaw Pact if they prevented the Rákosi forces from overthrowing the new anti-Stalinist regime. The Soviet agreed. Whilst Soviet troops had been previously ordered to stay in their barracks and only act in self-defence, Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest only an hour after a column of Rákosi-ist tanks had broken through barricades erected by Nagyist troops and local armed civilians. The Soviet presence proved decisive, with most of Rákosi's forces surrendering immediately to Soviet forces, without offering any resistance. Nevertheless, hundreds of civilians were killed(and between four and six thousand wounded), along with a few dozen Nagyist military casualties in chaotic street-fighting. Rákosi was captured and exiled to Kazakhstan, where he managed a grocery store until his retirement. The Soviet presence in Hungary became significantly more popular, and Soviet support for liberalised Communist and anti-Stalinist movements seemed sincere and altruistic, proving a major public relations coup for the superpower. [49]
[46] Same cause as OTL. Although it hasn't been conclusively proven that Stalin was poisoned, the particular pattern of hemorrhaging experienced by Stalin is unusual for a natural stroke, but are consistent with warfarin. Also, Beria bragged to other Central Committee members of killing Stalin. He could have been talking shit, but poisoning Stalin seems within his capabilities, and I highly doubt Tito did it. Beria would have a far better chance.
[47] All of this Polish stuff essentially happened as OTL.
[48] Jan is a fictional character that I've made up to add convenient historiography into the universe of 'Stars and Sickles'.
[49] So the Soviets are pulled into supporting the Nagy movement, given that it has repudiated the whole "Austria-style neutral" goal that it had for pragmatic purposes. IOTL, Soviet intervention in Hungary ruined the Soviets' reputation with most European Communists, as they appeared to be imposing an unpopular system on a populace. This splintering caused the genesis of movements such as Eurocommunism. Whilst Western Communists will still have a different outlook than Eastern European Communists, this will be more cultural than oppositional/disassociative than in OTL.
ALSO: Wow, its been a month since the last post! I've just started university, so I've been pretty busy, and I had to do a lot of pretty mundane research for this post. I am going to do another post on Greece, the Soviet Union and East Germany. And I already have a detailed outline of a near-future update on Cuba! I'll try to post when I can, but obviously my education has to take precedent. I would like to know if there's anything you readers are really desperate to know about with this TL though!