A New Beginning - Our 1992 Russian Federation
- Thread starter panpiotr
- Start date
-
- Tags
- russia russian federation
India - Russia relations
Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationship between Russia and India remains one of considerable importance to both countries. The many
forecasts of an imminent end to the Russo-Indian strategic partnership after the Cold War have proven to be wrong or at least premature. First, the Cold War legacy has not been fully eliminated in the world, and South Asia perhaps suffers from it more than any other region. Second, the U.S.-India rapprochement is uneven and controversial which requires New Delhi to maintain close ties to traditional partners such as Russia particularly when China continues to be a strategic rival or at least an unknown. Russian arms supplies remain a key factor in Indian military modernization. The rise of Islamic radicalism particularly through the Talibanization of Afghanistan and its spillover into Kashmir and Chechnya became an additional motivator for bilateral strategic partnership. Last and not least, Russia and India entered almost simultaneously into a process of economic reform and liberalization, which offers new opportunities for their bilateral relationship.
(The Great Game in the XIX and early XX century dominated relations between the British-ruled India
and the Russian Empire)
Historical context
Goods uncovered from archaeological site such as Pazyryk indicates that nomads inhabiting the area conducted trading activities with India during 4th-3rd century BCE. In 1468, Russian traveller Afanasy Nikitin began his journey to India. Between 1468 and 1472, he travelled through Persia, India and the Ottoman Empire. The documentation of his experiences during this journey is compiled in the book The Journey Beyond Three Seas (Khozheniye za tri morya). In the 18th century the Russian cities Astrakhan, Moscow and St. Petersburg were frequently visited by Indian merchants. Russia and Iran was used as a transit trade between Western Europe and India, especially after Peter the Great requested from Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb the commencement of trade relations in 1696. Decades later, the Russian czar personally granted Anbu-Ram Mulin's Indian trading company the right to resolve property rights issues in Astrakhan, thus allowing Indians to bring in caravans with their linen fabrics, cottons, silks, and Indian, Persian and Uzbek cloth. The Astrakhan governor was ordered to show "kindness and goodwill" to the Indian merchants in Russia, who cherished their religious freedom and special trade privileges that they never had in other Eastern countries; until the middle of the 18th century, members of the community only paid 12 rubles a year as rent for a shop in the Indian Trading Compound, and were exempted from taxes and duties by the Russian authorities. The value of goods exported by them from Astrakhan into the interior cities of Russia in 1724 exceeded 104,000 rubles, amounting to nearly a quarter of all Astrakhan trade, until British occupation stopped independent Indian trade with Russia altogether.
In 1801, Tsar Paul ordered plans made for the invasion of British India by 22,000 Cossacks, which never actually occurred due to poor handling of preparations. The intention was that Russia would form an alliance with France, and attack the British Empire and its weak point using a French corps of 35,000 men and a Russian corps of 25,000 infantry and 10,000 mounted Cossacks. Some Cossacks had approached Orenburg when the tsar was assassinated. His successor Alexander I immediately cancelled the plans. The Embassy of India in Moscow was built in 1821, remodeled in 1896, and transferred to the Indian government in 1952 to become an embassy building. The embassy consists of several buildings, including an aristocratic style "Chancery Building", a rational-modern style ambassador's residence, and a French style building known as "Napoleon's Dacha". The Chancery building was previously owned by an arts patron, a textile magnate, and the Soviet government, before being transferred to the Indian government in 1952 to become the embassy it is today. Embassy of Russia in New Delhi is the official diplomatic mission of the Russia in the Republic of India. The Russian consulate in India was opened in Mumbai in 1900 and moved to Kolkata in 1910. Initially it was housed in the Travancore House located at Curzon Street, now Kasturba Gandhi Marg. In several years India allocated previously undeveloped land to create a district of Chanakyapuri for diplomatic missions. The Soviet Union was assigned two lots of total acres of 22 acres, and in February 1956 a lease agreement was concluded between the two countries. A declassified 1985 CIA report states that the Press Section of the Soviet Embassy "is a KGB operation that specializes in fast-breaking disinformation campaigns, principally targeted against the United States." It particular, the efforts of this operation were directed at the implication of the United States in the assassination of Indira Gandhi and at linking Jeane Kirkpatrick with a Soviet-invented plan to Balkanize India.
(Indo - Soviet Friendship)
Relations between India and the USSR
India's official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established in April 1947, shortly before it declared its independence from Great Britain. As Izvestia reported on April 15, 1947, “as a result of an exchange of letters between the Indian Ambassador to China, Mr. K. P. S. Menon and the Soviet Ambassador to China Apollon Petrov, it was established that the Government of the USSR and the Government of India will publish simultaneously in Moscow and New Delhi the following official statement: “In an effort to preserve and further strengthen the friendly relations existing between the USSR and India, the Government of the USSR and the Government of India have decided to exchange diplomatic representations at the rank of Embassies”. Stalin had a negative view of Gandhi and the Congress Party, and of Nehru, as tools of the British and monopoly capitalism. Before his death in 1953 relations were cold. Russia had wanted to strengthen commercial, cultural and literary ties with India, and had wanted to open a diplomatic office in India at least since 1860, but the then British government in India was against it. The first consulate of Russia was opened in Mumbai in November 1900. Mumbai at the time was also a comfortable stopover for Haj pilgrims from the Asian republics under Russian rule. In 1910, the consulate was moved to Kolkata. On April 12, 1947, Russia opened its Embassy in New Delhi. A cordial relationship began in 1955 and represented the more successful of the Soviet attempts to foster closer relations with Third World countries. The relationship began with a visit by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955, and First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over the disputed territory of the Kashmir region and over Portuguese coastal enclaves such as Goa.
The Soviet Union's strong relations with India had a negative impact upon both Soviet relations with the People's Republic of China and Indian relations with the PRC during the Khrushchev period. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the Sino-Indian War of October 1962, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960, India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962 the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which the Soviet Union had earlier denied to China. In 1965, the Soviet Union successfully served as a peace broker between India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, literally Premier of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, met with representatives of India and Pakistan and helped them negotiate an end to the military conflict over Kashmir. In 1971, the former East Pakistan region initiated an effort to secede from its political union with West Pakistan. India supported the secession, and the U.S. considered the possible entrance of China to further destabilize India in its taking up a moral leadership in the area. However, China, after the Sino-Indian War, did not want to participate in the United States' bid in supporting Yahya Khan's atrocities in present-day Bangladesh. Meanwhile, India's relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically and resulted in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971. In December, it helped India halt American adventurism by using military power and end the conflict which ensured the victory of the secessionists in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh.
Relations between the Soviet Union and India did not suffer much during the right-wing Janata Party's coalition government in the late 1970s, although India did move to establish better economic and military relations with Western countries. To counter these efforts by India to diversify its relations, the Soviet Union proffered additional weaponry and economic assistance. During the 1980s, despite the 1984 assassination by Sikh separatists of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the mainstay of cordial Indian-Soviet relations, India maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indicating the high priority of relations with the Soviet Union in Indian foreign policy, the new Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited the Soviet Union on his first state visit abroad in May 1985 and signed two long-term economic agreements with the Soviet Union. According to Rejaul Karim Laskar, a scholar of Indian foreign policy, during this visit, Rajiv Gandhi developed a personal rapport with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In turn, Gorbachev's first visit to a Third World state was his meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in late 1986. General Secretary Gorbachev unsuccessfully urged Rajiv Gandhi to help the Soviet Union set up an Asian collective security system. Gorbachev's advocacy of this proposal, which had also been made by Leonid Brezhnev, was an indication of continuing Soviet interest in using close relations with India as a means of containing China. With the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980s, containing China had less of a priority, but close relations with India remained important as an example of Gorbachev's new Third World policy.
Relations between India and the Russian Federation/the Union State
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about a fundamental transformation in the geopolitical map of the world. The most prominent among the successor states of the Soviet Union, Russia, in spite of inheriting the formidable military might of its predecessor, suddenly found itself reduced to the position of a second ranking regional power. Its predicament was further compounded by economic chaos and political uncertainty at the domestic level. It was clearly caught between a declining nostalgia for past relations with countries like India and growing proclivity towards cultivating relations with the West. As a result, the first couple of years of India’s relations with post-Soviet Russia were marked by a good deal of uncertainty, inconsistency and lack of clarity. India did take early steps, though they did not yield any significant results. The two-track approach that India adopted was on the one hand aimed at resurrecting the vital elements of its economic and military relations with Russia and on the other searching out alternatives in the West, as the unipolar international order had emerged. Independent Russia’s first government made relations with the United States and the West in general its priority, and it expressed diminished interest in Asia and a strong will to distance itself from the legacy of Soviet foreign policy. Special relations with India were seen as one of those legacies. There was considerable pressure during that period to normalize relations with Pakistan and even supply arms to Islamabad. In November 1991, Moscow voted for a Pakistani sponsored United Nations (UN) resolution calling for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-free zone. Russia urged India to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and decided in March 1992 to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future nuclear supply agreements.
Russia’s foreign policy, however, soon reverted from the idealism of the early 1990s to traditional realpolitik, which prompted an urgent effort to repair the damage in relations with India. President Svyatoslav Fyodorov’s visit to India in January 1994 laid the foundation for the reinvigoration of bilateral relations. Moscow pledged to deliver cryogenic engines and space technology for India's space program under a $750 million deal between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Russian space agency Glavkosmos despite the imposition of sanctions on both organizations by the United States. In addition, Svyatoslav Fyodorov expressed strong support for India's stand on Kashmir and promised that Russia would not give arms to Pakistan. A defense cooperation accord aimed at ensuring the continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the requirements of India's military and promoting the joint production of defense equipment was signed. Bilateral trading, which fell drastically during the 1990-92 period, was expected to revive following the resolution of the dispute over New Delhi's debt to Moscow and the decision to abandon the 1978 rupee-ruble trade agreement in favor of hard currency. The 1971 treaty was replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which dropped security clauses that in the Cold War were directed against the United States and China. Russia-India relations have been evolving successfully since then and in many directions. Political contacts are regular and at the highest level with annual summits convened in Moscow or New Delhi. Foreign policy coordination is notable both on global and regional issues, and cooperation in the military sphere is acquiring a higher level of sophistication, trust, and interdependence. Most importantly, the strategic uncertainty about the post–terrorist phase in international relations, if there is one, and its impact on regional interests of the great powers prompt Russia and India to closely interact for an indefinite period. While at the strategic level the relations are stable, both have to deal with some tactical challenges emanating mostly from pragmatic requirements of their domestic reforms and developments.
The 1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the January 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership serve as the two guiding documents of the post–Cold War Russo-Indian partnership. They state that the partnership between Russia and India is founded on the complementarity of national interests and geopolitical priorities. One factor of such complementarity is seen in “Russia's high standing as a world power” and India's leading role in the “immediate neighborhood, in Asia and beyond.” Moscow continues to treat South Asia as largely an Indian domain and openly supports India’s bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council while India backs Russia’s preeminent role in the former Soviet states, particularly in Central Asia. This complementarity is however constrained by Russia’s increasing dependence on China and India’s evolving partnership with the United States. Despite being interested in Russia’s strong geopolitical influence, New Delhi is unlikely to take Moscow’s side in the event of a U.S.-Russia stand off, which could occur, for example, in the Balkans. Russia, in turn, though generally interested in the rise of India’s regional influence, would be unwilling to support any Indian attempt to openly challenge China or resolve the Kashmir problem by force. At the same time, the uncertainty about future U.S.-China relations ensures continuing mutual interest between Russia and India. As New Delhi continues to distrust Washington’s regional agenda and particularly the United States’ renewed alliance with Pakistan, a strong partnership with Russia remains viable though not as valuable as during the Cold War. Similarly, Moscow harbors suspicions about China while India presents no challenges and mostly opportunities for Russia’s foreign policy. This may explain why Russia supplies more sophisticated weaponry to India than China. On the economic front, however, Russia and India are becoming less interdependent, while India and the United States are developing substantial economic ties. Similarly, a Chinese trade and economic partnership is much more promising to Russia.
Afghanistan and Central Asia
The situation in the common neighborhood–Afghanistan and Central Asia–is of vital security interest to both Russia and India. Their cooperation on Afghanistan has been quite durable. Even during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India was very restrained about the Soviet action, risking its reputation in the nonaligned and Islamic worlds. Moscow and New Delhi were supportive of the Northern Alliance and hostile to the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Russia and India cooperate closely in the construction efforts in Afghanistan and insist that these should be driven by “Afghan priorities.” They underscore the need for the international community to remain engaged in the efforts to ensure the revival of Afghanistan as a sovereign and independent state, free from terrorism, drugs, and external interference. Russia and India are trying to minimize Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and ensure that the Pushtu majority will not dominate Afghanistan at the expense of the traditionally more loyal Northern Alliance, which is made up of ethnic minorities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks. At the same time, Russia seems to be less “obsessed” than India with Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and focuses instead on Afghanistan’s influence on the Central Asian region. Russia and India have a vital interest in maintaining security, stability, and a secular order in the Central Asian region. With the exception of Tajikistan with whom India has been steadily developing military ties including a training base, India is much less ambitious in Central Asia than Russia, which has engaged with the Central Asian states in a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) along with China. However, Moscow–wary of Beijing’s increasing influence on Central Asian states–welcomes more Indian participation in regional politics and has been promoting India’s membership in the SCO.
(Indian T-72S tanks)
Military cooperation
India relies heavily on Russia for its arms and Moscow enjoys the rewards of being New Delhi's largest supplier. New Delhi has bought $33 billion worth of weapons from Moscow since the 1960s, and Russian weapons account for nearly three quarters of India's arsenal. For instance, the former Soviet Union and then Russia have built a total of sixty seven naval vessels for India. Russia has provided India with more than 300 T-72S tanks, and more are being sent for assembly in India. Russia has also been delivering Su-30MKI jet fighters to India since 1994. More than 15,000 Indian officers have been educated and trained in the Soviet Union and Russia. Indo-Russian cooperation in the area of defence supplies is gaining momentum in contemporary times. Indo-Russian defence supplies are in the range of 70 per cent of total defence imports of India. Agreements on scientific collaboration between India-Russia in the area of biotechnology have begun a new phase. Agreements have been signed for the Mig 29 K fighter, Kamov 31 helicopters, T-72S tanks and other defence equipment. Nearly $ 3 billion defence contracts have been finalized. Indian Navy has acquired three submarines and five frigates from Russia, which costs around $ 300 million each. The Navy is also acquiring three Krivak-class frigates or project 1135.6 from Russia. There are some indicators, which suggest that Indo-Russian cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, related particularly to nuclear energy have already taken concrete shape. In the oil and gas sector, Gas Authority of India Ltd.(GAIL) and Russia’s Gazprom have signed a contract in the field of oil exploration. Indo- Russian politico-strategic defence cooperation is an important element of strategic partnership between the two countries.
Economic cooperation
Making the economic partnership a strong pillar of the bilateral partnership like other areas of cooperation between India and Russia is a key priority for both governments. Major items of export from India include pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee and tobacco, machinery and mechanical appliances, organic chemicals, and electrical machinery and equipment. Major items of import from Russia include pearls, precious and semi-precious stones & metals, nuclear power equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, mineral oil & products, iron & steels, and optical, precision and surgical equipment, as well as cars, machinery and vehicle parts. India and Russia are exploring various ways for enhancing bilateral trade. A few important steps/projects that could provide a major boost to bilateral trade are: Operationalization of the „Green Corridor‟ project between the two countries which has already reached an advanced stage; implementation of the International NorthSouth Transport Corridor, and the signing of a free trade agreement between Indian and the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU).
The India - Russia Forum on Trade and Investment co-chaired by the Commerce and Industry Minister of India and the Russian Minister for Economic Development, and India-Russia CEOs‟ Council are the two primary mechanisms to promote direct bilateral business-to- business contacts between India and Russia. Mechanisms such as India-Russia Business Council (partnership between FICCI of India and CCI of Russia), India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council (partnership between CII of India and RUIE of Russia), IndiaRussia Business Dialogue (partnership between CII of India and Russia‟s Business Council for Cooperation with India) and India-Russia Chamber of Commerce (with focus on SMEs) supplement the efforts to build direct business - to - business ties. To promote smoother and greater movement of businessmen, the two countries signed a protocol on 24 December 2000 to simplify visa procedures for businessmen.
Cultural cooperation and Indian Community in Russia
There is a strong tradition of Indian studies in Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre at the Embassy of India, Moscow (JNCC) maintains close cooperation with leading Russian institutions, including the Institute of Philosophy (Moscow); Russian State University for Humanities (Moscow); Institute of Oriental Studies (Moscow); Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Moscow State University; School of International Relations of the St. Petersburg University; Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (St Petersburg); Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology & Ethnography (Kunstkamera) in St Petersburg; Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok);and Russian Institute for Cultural Research (Krasnodar). There is a Mahatma Gandhi Chair on Indian Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy, Moscow. About 60 Russian Institutions, including leading universities and schools, regularly teach Hindi to about 6000 Russian students. Apart from Hindi, languages such as Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, Urdu, Sanskrit and Pali are taught in Russian Institutions. There is strong interest among Russian people in Indian dance, music, yoga and Ayurveda. JNCC conducts classes in yoga, dance, music and Hindi for approximately 1500 students every month.
Indian Community in the Union State is estimated at about 130,000. In addition, about 10,500 Afghan nationals of Indian origin live in Russia. About 2000 Indian businessmen reside in Russia out of which around 800 work in Moscow. It is estimated that about 500 registered Indian companies operate in Russia. Majority of Indian businessmen/companies in Russia are involved in trading. Some entities also represent Indian banks, pharmaceuticals, hydrocarbon and engineering companies. Tea, coffee, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, rice, spices, leather footwear, granite and garments are amongst the products being imported by these companies from India. There are approximately 20,500 Indian students enrolled in medical and technical institutions in the Union State. About 90% of them pursue medical studies in about 40 universities/institutions across Russia. Hindustani Samaj is the oldest Indian organization in Russia functioning since 1957. Other Indian organizations in Moscow include the Indian Business Alliance, Overseas Bihar Association, AMMA (All Moscow Malayalee Association), DISHA (Indian-Russian Friendship Society), Textile Business Alliance, Bhartiya Sanskritik Samaj, and Ramakrishna Society Vedanta Centre. Embassy of India School in Moscow is affiliated to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan in New Delhi with teachers deputed from India. The School has classes from I to XII with about 900 students.
Links:
en.wikipedia.org
forecasts of an imminent end to the Russo-Indian strategic partnership after the Cold War have proven to be wrong or at least premature. First, the Cold War legacy has not been fully eliminated in the world, and South Asia perhaps suffers from it more than any other region. Second, the U.S.-India rapprochement is uneven and controversial which requires New Delhi to maintain close ties to traditional partners such as Russia particularly when China continues to be a strategic rival or at least an unknown. Russian arms supplies remain a key factor in Indian military modernization. The rise of Islamic radicalism particularly through the Talibanization of Afghanistan and its spillover into Kashmir and Chechnya became an additional motivator for bilateral strategic partnership. Last and not least, Russia and India entered almost simultaneously into a process of economic reform and liberalization, which offers new opportunities for their bilateral relationship.
(The Great Game in the XIX and early XX century dominated relations between the British-ruled India
and the Russian Empire)
Historical context
Goods uncovered from archaeological site such as Pazyryk indicates that nomads inhabiting the area conducted trading activities with India during 4th-3rd century BCE. In 1468, Russian traveller Afanasy Nikitin began his journey to India. Between 1468 and 1472, he travelled through Persia, India and the Ottoman Empire. The documentation of his experiences during this journey is compiled in the book The Journey Beyond Three Seas (Khozheniye za tri morya). In the 18th century the Russian cities Astrakhan, Moscow and St. Petersburg were frequently visited by Indian merchants. Russia and Iran was used as a transit trade between Western Europe and India, especially after Peter the Great requested from Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb the commencement of trade relations in 1696. Decades later, the Russian czar personally granted Anbu-Ram Mulin's Indian trading company the right to resolve property rights issues in Astrakhan, thus allowing Indians to bring in caravans with their linen fabrics, cottons, silks, and Indian, Persian and Uzbek cloth. The Astrakhan governor was ordered to show "kindness and goodwill" to the Indian merchants in Russia, who cherished their religious freedom and special trade privileges that they never had in other Eastern countries; until the middle of the 18th century, members of the community only paid 12 rubles a year as rent for a shop in the Indian Trading Compound, and were exempted from taxes and duties by the Russian authorities. The value of goods exported by them from Astrakhan into the interior cities of Russia in 1724 exceeded 104,000 rubles, amounting to nearly a quarter of all Astrakhan trade, until British occupation stopped independent Indian trade with Russia altogether.
In 1801, Tsar Paul ordered plans made for the invasion of British India by 22,000 Cossacks, which never actually occurred due to poor handling of preparations. The intention was that Russia would form an alliance with France, and attack the British Empire and its weak point using a French corps of 35,000 men and a Russian corps of 25,000 infantry and 10,000 mounted Cossacks. Some Cossacks had approached Orenburg when the tsar was assassinated. His successor Alexander I immediately cancelled the plans. The Embassy of India in Moscow was built in 1821, remodeled in 1896, and transferred to the Indian government in 1952 to become an embassy building. The embassy consists of several buildings, including an aristocratic style "Chancery Building", a rational-modern style ambassador's residence, and a French style building known as "Napoleon's Dacha". The Chancery building was previously owned by an arts patron, a textile magnate, and the Soviet government, before being transferred to the Indian government in 1952 to become the embassy it is today. Embassy of Russia in New Delhi is the official diplomatic mission of the Russia in the Republic of India. The Russian consulate in India was opened in Mumbai in 1900 and moved to Kolkata in 1910. Initially it was housed in the Travancore House located at Curzon Street, now Kasturba Gandhi Marg. In several years India allocated previously undeveloped land to create a district of Chanakyapuri for diplomatic missions. The Soviet Union was assigned two lots of total acres of 22 acres, and in February 1956 a lease agreement was concluded between the two countries. A declassified 1985 CIA report states that the Press Section of the Soviet Embassy "is a KGB operation that specializes in fast-breaking disinformation campaigns, principally targeted against the United States." It particular, the efforts of this operation were directed at the implication of the United States in the assassination of Indira Gandhi and at linking Jeane Kirkpatrick with a Soviet-invented plan to Balkanize India.
(Indo - Soviet Friendship)
Relations between India and the USSR
India's official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established in April 1947, shortly before it declared its independence from Great Britain. As Izvestia reported on April 15, 1947, “as a result of an exchange of letters between the Indian Ambassador to China, Mr. K. P. S. Menon and the Soviet Ambassador to China Apollon Petrov, it was established that the Government of the USSR and the Government of India will publish simultaneously in Moscow and New Delhi the following official statement: “In an effort to preserve and further strengthen the friendly relations existing between the USSR and India, the Government of the USSR and the Government of India have decided to exchange diplomatic representations at the rank of Embassies”. Stalin had a negative view of Gandhi and the Congress Party, and of Nehru, as tools of the British and monopoly capitalism. Before his death in 1953 relations were cold. Russia had wanted to strengthen commercial, cultural and literary ties with India, and had wanted to open a diplomatic office in India at least since 1860, but the then British government in India was against it. The first consulate of Russia was opened in Mumbai in November 1900. Mumbai at the time was also a comfortable stopover for Haj pilgrims from the Asian republics under Russian rule. In 1910, the consulate was moved to Kolkata. On April 12, 1947, Russia opened its Embassy in New Delhi. A cordial relationship began in 1955 and represented the more successful of the Soviet attempts to foster closer relations with Third World countries. The relationship began with a visit by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955, and First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over the disputed territory of the Kashmir region and over Portuguese coastal enclaves such as Goa.
The Soviet Union's strong relations with India had a negative impact upon both Soviet relations with the People's Republic of China and Indian relations with the PRC during the Khrushchev period. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the Sino-Indian War of October 1962, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960, India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962 the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which the Soviet Union had earlier denied to China. In 1965, the Soviet Union successfully served as a peace broker between India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, literally Premier of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, met with representatives of India and Pakistan and helped them negotiate an end to the military conflict over Kashmir. In 1971, the former East Pakistan region initiated an effort to secede from its political union with West Pakistan. India supported the secession, and the U.S. considered the possible entrance of China to further destabilize India in its taking up a moral leadership in the area. However, China, after the Sino-Indian War, did not want to participate in the United States' bid in supporting Yahya Khan's atrocities in present-day Bangladesh. Meanwhile, India's relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically and resulted in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971. In December, it helped India halt American adventurism by using military power and end the conflict which ensured the victory of the secessionists in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh.
Relations between the Soviet Union and India did not suffer much during the right-wing Janata Party's coalition government in the late 1970s, although India did move to establish better economic and military relations with Western countries. To counter these efforts by India to diversify its relations, the Soviet Union proffered additional weaponry and economic assistance. During the 1980s, despite the 1984 assassination by Sikh separatists of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the mainstay of cordial Indian-Soviet relations, India maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indicating the high priority of relations with the Soviet Union in Indian foreign policy, the new Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited the Soviet Union on his first state visit abroad in May 1985 and signed two long-term economic agreements with the Soviet Union. According to Rejaul Karim Laskar, a scholar of Indian foreign policy, during this visit, Rajiv Gandhi developed a personal rapport with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In turn, Gorbachev's first visit to a Third World state was his meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in late 1986. General Secretary Gorbachev unsuccessfully urged Rajiv Gandhi to help the Soviet Union set up an Asian collective security system. Gorbachev's advocacy of this proposal, which had also been made by Leonid Brezhnev, was an indication of continuing Soviet interest in using close relations with India as a means of containing China. With the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980s, containing China had less of a priority, but close relations with India remained important as an example of Gorbachev's new Third World policy.
Relations between India and the Russian Federation/the Union State
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about a fundamental transformation in the geopolitical map of the world. The most prominent among the successor states of the Soviet Union, Russia, in spite of inheriting the formidable military might of its predecessor, suddenly found itself reduced to the position of a second ranking regional power. Its predicament was further compounded by economic chaos and political uncertainty at the domestic level. It was clearly caught between a declining nostalgia for past relations with countries like India and growing proclivity towards cultivating relations with the West. As a result, the first couple of years of India’s relations with post-Soviet Russia were marked by a good deal of uncertainty, inconsistency and lack of clarity. India did take early steps, though they did not yield any significant results. The two-track approach that India adopted was on the one hand aimed at resurrecting the vital elements of its economic and military relations with Russia and on the other searching out alternatives in the West, as the unipolar international order had emerged. Independent Russia’s first government made relations with the United States and the West in general its priority, and it expressed diminished interest in Asia and a strong will to distance itself from the legacy of Soviet foreign policy. Special relations with India were seen as one of those legacies. There was considerable pressure during that period to normalize relations with Pakistan and even supply arms to Islamabad. In November 1991, Moscow voted for a Pakistani sponsored United Nations (UN) resolution calling for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-free zone. Russia urged India to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and decided in March 1992 to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future nuclear supply agreements.
Russia’s foreign policy, however, soon reverted from the idealism of the early 1990s to traditional realpolitik, which prompted an urgent effort to repair the damage in relations with India. President Svyatoslav Fyodorov’s visit to India in January 1994 laid the foundation for the reinvigoration of bilateral relations. Moscow pledged to deliver cryogenic engines and space technology for India's space program under a $750 million deal between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Russian space agency Glavkosmos despite the imposition of sanctions on both organizations by the United States. In addition, Svyatoslav Fyodorov expressed strong support for India's stand on Kashmir and promised that Russia would not give arms to Pakistan. A defense cooperation accord aimed at ensuring the continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the requirements of India's military and promoting the joint production of defense equipment was signed. Bilateral trading, which fell drastically during the 1990-92 period, was expected to revive following the resolution of the dispute over New Delhi's debt to Moscow and the decision to abandon the 1978 rupee-ruble trade agreement in favor of hard currency. The 1971 treaty was replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which dropped security clauses that in the Cold War were directed against the United States and China. Russia-India relations have been evolving successfully since then and in many directions. Political contacts are regular and at the highest level with annual summits convened in Moscow or New Delhi. Foreign policy coordination is notable both on global and regional issues, and cooperation in the military sphere is acquiring a higher level of sophistication, trust, and interdependence. Most importantly, the strategic uncertainty about the post–terrorist phase in international relations, if there is one, and its impact on regional interests of the great powers prompt Russia and India to closely interact for an indefinite period. While at the strategic level the relations are stable, both have to deal with some tactical challenges emanating mostly from pragmatic requirements of their domestic reforms and developments.
The 1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the January 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership serve as the two guiding documents of the post–Cold War Russo-Indian partnership. They state that the partnership between Russia and India is founded on the complementarity of national interests and geopolitical priorities. One factor of such complementarity is seen in “Russia's high standing as a world power” and India's leading role in the “immediate neighborhood, in Asia and beyond.” Moscow continues to treat South Asia as largely an Indian domain and openly supports India’s bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council while India backs Russia’s preeminent role in the former Soviet states, particularly in Central Asia. This complementarity is however constrained by Russia’s increasing dependence on China and India’s evolving partnership with the United States. Despite being interested in Russia’s strong geopolitical influence, New Delhi is unlikely to take Moscow’s side in the event of a U.S.-Russia stand off, which could occur, for example, in the Balkans. Russia, in turn, though generally interested in the rise of India’s regional influence, would be unwilling to support any Indian attempt to openly challenge China or resolve the Kashmir problem by force. At the same time, the uncertainty about future U.S.-China relations ensures continuing mutual interest between Russia and India. As New Delhi continues to distrust Washington’s regional agenda and particularly the United States’ renewed alliance with Pakistan, a strong partnership with Russia remains viable though not as valuable as during the Cold War. Similarly, Moscow harbors suspicions about China while India presents no challenges and mostly opportunities for Russia’s foreign policy. This may explain why Russia supplies more sophisticated weaponry to India than China. On the economic front, however, Russia and India are becoming less interdependent, while India and the United States are developing substantial economic ties. Similarly, a Chinese trade and economic partnership is much more promising to Russia.
Afghanistan and Central Asia
The situation in the common neighborhood–Afghanistan and Central Asia–is of vital security interest to both Russia and India. Their cooperation on Afghanistan has been quite durable. Even during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India was very restrained about the Soviet action, risking its reputation in the nonaligned and Islamic worlds. Moscow and New Delhi were supportive of the Northern Alliance and hostile to the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Russia and India cooperate closely in the construction efforts in Afghanistan and insist that these should be driven by “Afghan priorities.” They underscore the need for the international community to remain engaged in the efforts to ensure the revival of Afghanistan as a sovereign and independent state, free from terrorism, drugs, and external interference. Russia and India are trying to minimize Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and ensure that the Pushtu majority will not dominate Afghanistan at the expense of the traditionally more loyal Northern Alliance, which is made up of ethnic minorities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks. At the same time, Russia seems to be less “obsessed” than India with Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and focuses instead on Afghanistan’s influence on the Central Asian region. Russia and India have a vital interest in maintaining security, stability, and a secular order in the Central Asian region. With the exception of Tajikistan with whom India has been steadily developing military ties including a training base, India is much less ambitious in Central Asia than Russia, which has engaged with the Central Asian states in a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) along with China. However, Moscow–wary of Beijing’s increasing influence on Central Asian states–welcomes more Indian participation in regional politics and has been promoting India’s membership in the SCO.
(Indian T-72S tanks)
Military cooperation
India relies heavily on Russia for its arms and Moscow enjoys the rewards of being New Delhi's largest supplier. New Delhi has bought $33 billion worth of weapons from Moscow since the 1960s, and Russian weapons account for nearly three quarters of India's arsenal. For instance, the former Soviet Union and then Russia have built a total of sixty seven naval vessels for India. Russia has provided India with more than 300 T-72S tanks, and more are being sent for assembly in India. Russia has also been delivering Su-30MKI jet fighters to India since 1994. More than 15,000 Indian officers have been educated and trained in the Soviet Union and Russia. Indo-Russian cooperation in the area of defence supplies is gaining momentum in contemporary times. Indo-Russian defence supplies are in the range of 70 per cent of total defence imports of India. Agreements on scientific collaboration between India-Russia in the area of biotechnology have begun a new phase. Agreements have been signed for the Mig 29 K fighter, Kamov 31 helicopters, T-72S tanks and other defence equipment. Nearly $ 3 billion defence contracts have been finalized. Indian Navy has acquired three submarines and five frigates from Russia, which costs around $ 300 million each. The Navy is also acquiring three Krivak-class frigates or project 1135.6 from Russia. There are some indicators, which suggest that Indo-Russian cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, related particularly to nuclear energy have already taken concrete shape. In the oil and gas sector, Gas Authority of India Ltd.(GAIL) and Russia’s Gazprom have signed a contract in the field of oil exploration. Indo- Russian politico-strategic defence cooperation is an important element of strategic partnership between the two countries.
Economic cooperation
Making the economic partnership a strong pillar of the bilateral partnership like other areas of cooperation between India and Russia is a key priority for both governments. Major items of export from India include pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee and tobacco, machinery and mechanical appliances, organic chemicals, and electrical machinery and equipment. Major items of import from Russia include pearls, precious and semi-precious stones & metals, nuclear power equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, mineral oil & products, iron & steels, and optical, precision and surgical equipment, as well as cars, machinery and vehicle parts. India and Russia are exploring various ways for enhancing bilateral trade. A few important steps/projects that could provide a major boost to bilateral trade are: Operationalization of the „Green Corridor‟ project between the two countries which has already reached an advanced stage; implementation of the International NorthSouth Transport Corridor, and the signing of a free trade agreement between Indian and the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU).
The India - Russia Forum on Trade and Investment co-chaired by the Commerce and Industry Minister of India and the Russian Minister for Economic Development, and India-Russia CEOs‟ Council are the two primary mechanisms to promote direct bilateral business-to- business contacts between India and Russia. Mechanisms such as India-Russia Business Council (partnership between FICCI of India and CCI of Russia), India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council (partnership between CII of India and RUIE of Russia), IndiaRussia Business Dialogue (partnership between CII of India and Russia‟s Business Council for Cooperation with India) and India-Russia Chamber of Commerce (with focus on SMEs) supplement the efforts to build direct business - to - business ties. To promote smoother and greater movement of businessmen, the two countries signed a protocol on 24 December 2000 to simplify visa procedures for businessmen.
Cultural cooperation and Indian Community in Russia
There is a strong tradition of Indian studies in Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre at the Embassy of India, Moscow (JNCC) maintains close cooperation with leading Russian institutions, including the Institute of Philosophy (Moscow); Russian State University for Humanities (Moscow); Institute of Oriental Studies (Moscow); Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Moscow State University; School of International Relations of the St. Petersburg University; Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (St Petersburg); Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology & Ethnography (Kunstkamera) in St Petersburg; Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok);and Russian Institute for Cultural Research (Krasnodar). There is a Mahatma Gandhi Chair on Indian Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy, Moscow. About 60 Russian Institutions, including leading universities and schools, regularly teach Hindi to about 6000 Russian students. Apart from Hindi, languages such as Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, Urdu, Sanskrit and Pali are taught in Russian Institutions. There is strong interest among Russian people in Indian dance, music, yoga and Ayurveda. JNCC conducts classes in yoga, dance, music and Hindi for approximately 1500 students every month.
Indian Community in the Union State is estimated at about 130,000. In addition, about 10,500 Afghan nationals of Indian origin live in Russia. About 2000 Indian businessmen reside in Russia out of which around 800 work in Moscow. It is estimated that about 500 registered Indian companies operate in Russia. Majority of Indian businessmen/companies in Russia are involved in trading. Some entities also represent Indian banks, pharmaceuticals, hydrocarbon and engineering companies. Tea, coffee, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, rice, spices, leather footwear, granite and garments are amongst the products being imported by these companies from India. There are approximately 20,500 Indian students enrolled in medical and technical institutions in the Union State. About 90% of them pursue medical studies in about 40 universities/institutions across Russia. Hindustani Samaj is the oldest Indian organization in Russia functioning since 1957. Other Indian organizations in Moscow include the Indian Business Alliance, Overseas Bihar Association, AMMA (All Moscow Malayalee Association), DISHA (Indian-Russian Friendship Society), Textile Business Alliance, Bhartiya Sanskritik Samaj, and Ramakrishna Society Vedanta Centre. Embassy of India School in Moscow is affiliated to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan in New Delhi with teachers deputed from India. The School has classes from I to XII with about 900 students.
Links:
India–Russia relations - Wikipedia
Last edited:
Economic and cultural relations are a must. I would say we should get closer to them in an effort to contain China and Pakistan. China especially since frankly I do not see China increasing its cultural and soft power influence in Russia considering it took until the late 2010s for them to even have said influence grow. So I do not see the average Russian support China over India in the long term especially as China grows and becomes more authoritarian.
That's a little premature to say. But generally we should avoid trying to contain China at this point until they actually show themselves to be a valid threat to us and pursue cooperation with them. We generally have nothing to gain by containment of China as our main problems lie with the collective West, or more accurately USA.
1rst) We should nurture economic ties with India. More accurately we should aim to mantain our military commercial dominance over Indian market while pursuing broader diversification and seek to get a share of civilian market for our civilian products ( for our industry, automotive industry, foodstuffs, fertilizers, technology etc), also we should seek to tap into Indian energy market and see could we steal a share from middle east.
For this goal we should create some otl platforms like the Indo-Russian Forum on Trade and Investment, the India-Russia Business Council, the India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council, the India-Russia CEOs' Council and the India-Russia Chamber of Commerce.
We should also seek a more multilateral oriented relationship and facilitate a trade deal between Euroasian Custom Union (EEU/CIS) and India.
2nd) We should focus on cultural exchange between our two countries. This includes facilitating student exchanges, promoting tourism between our two countries, promoting each others movies , cooperation between our ministries of culture (particularly exchange between our museums and cinema).
We should also work together in Gaming Industry, Animation Industry , Movie Industry based on each other respective cultures.
3rd) In the realm of geopolitics i would say we should pursue our current policy of friendship, but we should avoid directing it against anyone for now, expect working against Pakistan in Afghanistan and Central Asia even more closely and even support some Indian concerns in regard to Pakistans role in Afghanistan. We should also continue to back Indias bid for UN security Council and back it in Kashmir dispute against Pakistan ensuring it of our backing at UNSC.
Not to mention we should still seek to bring India in SCO.
Other point of cooperation should be against terrorism in the region.
Regarding Sino-Indian-Russian relations? We should seek to balance China with India, but as said above we shouldn't make any definitive commitments.
We should also look into Russo Indian trade corridor that goes through Iran once conditions are meet (due to USA sanctions some projects might not be possible until later date).
Last edited:
I agree we should avoid containment for now but if the war on terror or 9/11 still happen the US is going to be massively distracted to actually do much against us. I still say that Chinese soft power/cultural power is going to be near nonexistent in Russia considering the nations difficulty in pushing it in OTL in a much weaker and more dependent Russia. Like I said it took until the late 2010s for any kind of soft power influence to form and most of that was by imitating Japanese/Korean pop culture and overall it does not scream China most of the time.
Matador de Lagartos
Banned
Our main goal is to recover influence towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Our interests in the latter overlap with the Chinese a little bit, but nothing which should tilt our calculus towards wanting to contain China instead of the West.
China is projected towards the Far East/Pacific, Russia is projected towards Europe, we should only build a policy of containing China if the American hegemony collapses. The strenght of the Chinese rise is constantly overstated, China has a ton of strategic deficiencies. We ought to now let our yellow perril prejudices destroy our only chance to undermine Western control over us.
Even if China manages to take back Taiwan, this doesn't mean they would suddenly be stronger than the US and the bigger threat to the Union State.
Last edited:
Not sure how we will manage such a goal since if Chinese power is overblown then so will our own power projection. Really I do not see us expanding outside of maybe the Balkans since eastern Europe has to much bad history to ever return to us and even Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria will be more inclined towards the wests pure economic dominance of the worlds economy and even if they choose not to go to the west it's more likely they will just create their own power block or at least play us and the west to gain the most of the rivalry.
Really the only place we can truly hold is Central Asia and that is a guarantee since the US is going to be too busy with Afghanistan and Iran to care about Central Asia.
Matador de Lagartos
Banned
Exactly. Our own power projection is even less pronounced than the Chinese, so why should we waste our time trying to contain China when the Union State/China are already soo weak in comparison to the West?
When I said Eastern Europe I was mainly thinking about Ukraine and Belarus (the later has already materialized, of course). Maybe you could count Bulgaria in that equation.
Poland and Romania don't want anything to do with us. Maybe Hungary could be swayed in the long term if someone like Orban comes to power. Honestly, I don't even know if Bulgaria wanting to be part of the CSTO is realistic at all, I'm mainly trusting you guys judgement.
Last edited:
I guess it would make just as much sense for China to go against us as the weaker target but I agree in terms of what you say and am pushing to mush of OTL into my thinking. I am also saying that getting to close to China is a bad idea since they might lash out and alienate the rest of the region. Even if China does not directly go against the US pissing off Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and India is not that great either. I guess I am just not that into the current Eurasian theory in Russia.
As for Ukraine and Belarus considering how things are going those areas will most likely return to us so outside of Serbia there's little in ways to confront the US in Europe.
Matador de Lagartos
Banned
We should bid our time and understand that as long as we manage to undermine the ultimate federalization of Europe, chances are the European Union and the American hegemony in Europe (NATO) are going to be weakened in the long term simply by virtue of natural decay or things like migrant crisis and climate change. If we can achieve our main objectives (Ukraine) without major destabilization events which would be interesting to read (Ukraine War) but that would galvanize anti-russian sentiments and potentially centralize the West against us, then it's even better.
