USSR survives: what happens to East Germany?

Suppose we have a USSR that successfully pulls a China in the 1970s. The PoD for this could be the assassination attempt on Brezhnev and Kosygin winning the succession struggle instead of another hardliner. What would be the fate of the GDR?

I imagine that, just as they opposed Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, they'd refuse to follow Kosygin in his reforms. After all, strict statist socialism was their raison d'etre and if they assumed capitalist modes of production they might as well join West Germany, which the GDR leadership doesn't want. On the other hand, it's probably what many Ossies want.

That leads to a second question: would the USSR ever allow any kind of reunification or at least rapprochement between the two Germanies? If so, what would it look like?
 
The USSR is not China, it does not have the gigantic population, large numbers of willing investors from the west and the complete destruction of the left wing of the party that were necessary for making China such a success.
 
The USSR is not China, it does not have the gigantic population, large numbers of willing investors from the west and the complete destruction of the left wing of the party that were necessary for making China such a success.

I would assume that "pulling a China" he meant reformed itself away from the model it used in otl. The USSR actually doesn't need China's gigantic population in order to become a major manufacturer of goods for the West. After all Japan, South Korea and Vietnam do so and they have nowhere near the population that the USSR had. What is needed is a fairly large workforce (in the millions should do) which is well educated (and for that we know the USSR has that box ticked) and which works for wages that are generally lower than in the West.

The large number of willing investors will follow once the USSR opens itself up for business. After all it isn't as if in the 1960s large numbers of investors from the West were just waiting for the arrival of Deng. In the 1960s China was just as much shunned by Western investors (if not more so during the Cultural Revolution) as the USSR.

And his POD would have to imply that the orthodox/left wing of the CPSU was marginalized/not in power otherwise Kosygin wouldn't be there in place of Brezhnev now would he?
 
Suppose we have a USSR that successfully pulls a China in the 1970s. The PoD for this could be the assassination attempt on Brezhnev and Kosygin winning the succession struggle instead of another hardliner. What would be the fate of the GDR?

I imagine that, just as they opposed Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, they'd refuse to follow Kosygin in his reforms. After all, strict statist socialism was their raison d'etre and if they assumed capitalist modes of production they might as well join West Germany, which the GDR leadership doesn't want. On the other hand, it's probably what many Ossies want.

That leads to a second question: would the USSR ever allow any kind of reunification or at least rapprochement between the two Germanies? If so, what would it look like?
If Kosygin were ascendant in the party, the outcome would not look like Deng Xiaoping's China. It would have radically restructured the system of bureaucratic and state control, but it would have meant something more like Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union might conceivably solved its intense internal corruption issues and inefficient planning that faith in the system could be retained. But that would mean a radical reduction in military spending, and a tightening of the belt on both agriculture and heavy industry, which suffered from endemic overinvestment and underutilization. It'll be rough, and ultimately, the Soviets will lack what the Chinese had: large export markets.

Unless Soviet reformers force the East Bloc states to reform similarly, and intensify trade and economic cooperation, the gains in efficiency from restructuring the system would be sabotaged by enforced autarky.
 
I would assume that "pulling a China" he meant reformed itself away from the model it used in otl. The USSR actually doesn't need China's gigantic population in order to become a major manufacturer of goods for the West. After all Japan, South Korea and Vietnam do so and they have nowhere near the population that the USSR had. What is needed is a fairly large workforce (in the millions should do) which is well educated (and for that we know the USSR has that box ticked) and which works for wages that are generally lower than in the West.

The large number of willing investors will follow once the USSR opens itself up for business. After all it isn't as if in the 1960s large numbers of investors from the West were just waiting for the arrival of Deng. In the 1960s China was just as much shunned by Western investors (if not more so during the Cultural Revolution) as the USSR.

And his POD would have to imply that the orthodox/left wing of the CPSU was marginalized/not in power otherwise Kosygin wouldn't be there in place of Brezhnev now would he?
But here's the problem: the Soviet Union is a superpower. It's in the opposite camp. No one will trade with them on fair terms. In fact, the only reason why China was able to adapt to the global capitalist market was precisely because they were a valuable ally against the Soviets.
 
China almost went down in 1989. IIRC, parts of the army were not exactly on board with the crackdown. So, using China as the template is perhaps not the best idea.
 
But here's the problem: the Soviet Union is a superpower. It's in the opposite camp. No one will trade with them on fair terms. In fact, the only reason why China was able to adapt to the global capitalist market was precisely because they were a valuable ally against the Soviets.

Actually there would be trade as in the 1970s we had detente. And if the USSR went capitalist it would no longer really be in the opposite camp now would it? Detente would probably become permanent instead of ending in 1980.
 
I would assume that "pulling a China" he meant reformed itself away from the model it used in otl. The USSR actually doesn't need China's gigantic population in order to become a major manufacturer of goods for the West. After all Japan, South Korea and Vietnam do so and they have nowhere near the population that the USSR had. What is needed is a fairly large workforce (in the millions should do) which is well educated (and for that we know the USSR has that box ticked) and which works for wages that are generally lower than in the West.

The large number of willing investors will follow once the USSR opens itself up for business. After all it isn't as if in the 1960s large numbers of investors from the West were just waiting for the arrival of Deng. In the 1960s China was just as much shunned by Western investors (if not more so during the Cultural Revolution) as the USSR.

And his POD would have to imply that the orthodox/left wing of the CPSU was marginalized/not in power otherwise Kosygin wouldn't be there in place of Brezhnev now would he?

You mean like western investors flooded there in the 1990's?

In this situation, education is overrated. You need uneducated people willing to do simple labor for a very cheap wage - borderline slave labor. This is not Russia. Will they be cheaper than the west? Yes but not cheap enough to account for other costs. Also, transporation is an issue. China's major manufacturing hubs are all either on the coast or very close. It makes it easy to fill a container, load it on a boat, and send it to Japan, Europe, or US. Russia's not so much. You first need to load it on a truck or a train, then you need it to send it to a port where it sits before it can get loaded on a boat. Too long. Plus, everything that Russia has to offer so does Poland, E. Germany, Hungary, and the rest of the Eastern Bloc. And they are closer to Western Europe and have more good ports. Russia wasnt going to follow the path of China. Their best hope was their oil and natural gas. And we have seen how that played out.
 
Actually there would be trade as in the 1970s we had detente. And if the USSR went capitalist it would no longer really be in the opposite camp now would it? Detente would probably become permanent instead of ending in 1980.

I would really like to know how this "go capitalist" transition was going to occur. Very difficult transition. Didnt work so well in the 1990s - and they had the best and brightest from the west advising them. It is very, very hard to change from an organized command and control economy to a chaotic market driven economy. So many established people lose in that transition. Its not like they are just going to give up their privilages. High level bureaucrat with an apartment in Moscow, car and summer home on the black sea one day, imitating laverne and shirly at a coke bottler the next.

This idea of the USSR reforming itself enough to survive or remain a superpower ranks along side French Naval supremecy in the 18th century, Japan winning the Pacific, and fuzzy sea creatures landing on the shores of England in 1940. If you are going to go there, you really need to lay out some concrete parameters as to how it happens.
 

RousseauX

Donor
I would assume that "pulling a China" he meant reformed itself away from the model it used in otl. The USSR actually doesn't need China's gigantic population in order to become a major manufacturer of goods for the West. After all Japan, South Korea and Vietnam do so and they have nowhere near the population that the USSR had. What is needed is a fairly large workforce (in the millions should do) which is well educated (and for that we know the USSR has that box ticked) and which works for wages that are generally lower than in the West.
The difference between the USSR and S.Korea and Taiwan is basically GDP/capita. When you are South Korea and are at GDP/capita of $1000 or so it provides a vast pool of cheap labour for export driven growth. When you are USSR and basically a middle income country (so no dirty cheap labour) with a large, entrenched state sector taking all the resources and has the political teeth to fight against liberalization and reform it's order of a magnitude more difficult to emulate the Asian tigers.

The large number of willing investors will follow once the USSR opens itself up for business. After all it isn't as if in the 1960s large numbers of investors from the West were just waiting for the arrival of Deng. In the 1960s China was just as much shunned by Western investors (if not more so during the Cultural Revolution) as the USSR.
The difference between China and the USSR is that China has the advantage of large ethnic Diasporas to contribute FDI in the early years. A lion's share of incoming capital into China during the 80s-90s were from Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese overseas community. There really isn't anything equivalent for the USSR.
 
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You mean like western investors flooded there in the 1990's?

In this situation, education is overrated. You need uneducated people willing to do simple labor for a very cheap wage - borderline slave labor.

Depends on what you are making. If you are making cheap plastic toys then sure. But electronics? You might want workers who know a thing or two.....

This is not Russia. Will they be cheaper than the west? Yes but not cheap enough to account for other costs. Also, transporation is an issue.

Transportation costs? Are you forgetting that Moscow is a train ride away from Paris? It would probably be cheaper to ship goods to Western Europe from the USSR than China. It might even be cheaper to ship to the US east coast from the Baltic and Black Sea coasts of the USSR than between China's coast and the US west coast.

China's major manufacturing hubs are all either on the coast or very close. It makes it easy to fill a container, load it on a boat, and send it to Japan, Europe, or US. Russia's not so much. You first need to load it on a truck or a train, then you need it to send it to a port where it sits before it can get loaded on a boat.

Actually that's not right. It would go by train to Western Europe, but Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, even Volgagrad all have access to the sea either directly or via major rivers and canals. So to the US it would be loaded onto a ship directly.

Too long. Plus, everything that Russia has to offer so does Poland, E. Germany, Hungary, and the rest of the Eastern Bloc. And they are closer to Western Europe and have more good ports.

Ummmmm? What? :confused: and Poland, east Germany and the rest of the eastern blocs are soviet puppets no? So why would they pose a problem for the USSR? To be honest they would become an asset as the USSR could then make use of the Comecon's provisions to prefab goods in the USSR and assemble them in Eastern Europe before sending them on.
 
The difference between the USSR and S.Korea and Taiwan is basically GDP/capita. When you are South Korea and are at GDP/capita of $1000 or so it provides a vast pool of cheap labour for export driven growth. When you are USSR and basically a middle income country (so no dirty cheap labour)

Why does everyone assume that one needs dirt cheap labour? What is needed is cheaper labour. Japan's labour was more expensive than China's but still cheaper than Europe or the United States. Are we saying that in the 1970s the average wages in the USSR were higher than in the USA, Canada, W. Germany and France?


with a large, entrenched state sector taking all the resources and has the political teeth to fight against liberalization and reform it's order of a magnitude more difficult to emulate the Asian tigers.

And this would pretty much describe the PRC before the end of the Cultural Revolution.

The difference between China and the USSR is that China has the advantage of large ethnic Diasporas to contribute FDI in the early years. A lion's share of incoming capital into China during the 80s-90s were from Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese overseas community. There really isn't anything equivalent for the USSR.

And in an era of Detente where we have according to the OP Soviet leaders who want to do the reforms that basically make the USSR capitalist are we saying that there would be zero FDI?

In any event according to the following two links, the great surge in total FDI didn't occur until 1992, so even the FDI from the Chinese overseas community would be neglible in comparison:

http://www.chinaglobaltrade.com/fact/net-foreign-direct-investment-china-1982-2015

http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengin...6631-f2c9-457b-911c-3aded46d5c7d/en/18[1].pdf
 
Depends on what you are making. If you are making cheap plastic toys then sure. But electronics? You might want workers who know a thing or two.....

Transportation costs? Are you forgetting that Moscow is a train ride away from Paris? It would probably be cheaper to ship goods to Western Europe from the USSR than China. It might even be cheaper to ship to the US east coast from the Baltic and Black Sea coasts of the USSR than between China's coast and the US west coast.

Actually that's not right. It would go by train to Western Europe, but Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, even Volgagrad all have access to the sea either directly or via major rivers and canals. So to the US it would be loaded onto a ship directly.

Ummmmm? What? :confused: and Poland, east Germany and the rest of the eastern blocs are soviet puppets no? So why would they pose a problem for the USSR? To be honest they would become an asset as the USSR could then make use of the Comecon's provisions to prefab goods in the USSR and assemble them in Eastern Europe before sending them on.

Depending on the products. Some things are cheaper to ship by rail, some by ship. And to ship via rail from Moscow to Paris you have to clear customs in Poland, Germany, and France. Not exactly efficient. Speaking of efficiency, has anyone ever said the words efficient and Soviet Union in the same sentence without it being ironic?

I doubt Russia was in a place where it could step in and immediately compete with the Japanese on advanced electronics. Simple electronics is just packaging. Not much more difficult than operating a sewing machine.

Have you ever seen a container ship? They are too big for canals and major rivers. You need a deep harbor for those. The more you load and unload at transport hubs the more time you waste and the less cost competitive you are.

Assuming if USSR opens up to the west, then so does the rest of the eastern bloc. East Germans arent exactly going to be happy being excluded from West German markets while the Russians are exporting there.
 
Transportation costs? Are you forgetting that Moscow is a train ride away from Paris? It would probably be cheaper to ship goods to Western Europe from the USSR than China. It might even be cheaper to ship to the US east coast from the Baltic and Black Sea coasts of the USSR than between China's coast and the US west coast.

You misquoted me by saying transportation costs. I said other costs. Other costs include time to transport, quality control issues, cost of holding additional inventory. It is not just the cost of putting it on a train. Those costs add up. Particularly in a country like the Soviet Union where the infrastructure is set up to meet the needs of a communist central government rather than a market driven economy.
 
The USSR Government can begin with "Special Economic Zones" where the normal communist bureaucracy is dispensed with. Places like Kaliningrad, or Kronstadt, or parts of East Germany and Hungary will be ideal. It worked for China.
 
Depending on the products. Some things are cheaper to ship by rail, some by ship. And to ship via rail from Moscow to Paris you have to clear customs in Poland, Germany, and France. Not exactly efficient.

So it must be inefficient to have shipped goods from say....Italy to West Germany via France or Switzerland or Austria in 1949 rather than shipping them straight to West Germany from the USA or China right?

Except why then was the EEC formed instead of individual economic unions between the USA and European countries?


In any case your point here ignores the fact that in the 1970s it might well have been possible that shipping via rail from Moscow to Paris (dependent on the goods in question I imagine) would have seen customs paid only once; at the inner-German border. The EEC had begun a customs union in 1958 and even in the 1970s Comecon had what was effectively a customs union (as seen on the first page of this 1978 paper).

There is also the possibility of shipping directly from say Odessa to Marseilles or from Leningrad to Brest.



I doubt Russia was in a place where it could step in and immediately compete with the Japanese on advanced electronics. Simple electronics is just packaging. Not much more difficult than operating a sewing machine.

It seems here that you are unaware of the strong grounding that the USSR had in physics. So there's not much point discussing this further.


Have you ever seen a container ship?

Hmmm...if you aren't able to discuss a topic maturely, I won't waste my time in the future on your posts.

They are too big for canals and major rivers.

The Panama Canal and Suez Canal regularly take cargo ships and the Volga is Europe's largest river in terms of discharge of water.

Anyways, you have clearly overlooked or don't seem to know about Baku (which has a port from which containers ship do business. How? Well they must pass through the Volga-Don Canal if they don't intend to just make a short hop up the Caspian to Astrakhan to offload cargo onto rail). There are even companies who design ships which are capable of transiting the Volga from the Caspian.

You need a deep harbor for those. The more you load and unload at transport hubs the more time you waste and the less cost competitive you are.


So then how do global trans-shipping hubs like Singapore even do business? Surely according to your logic here, it is a waste of time to use a smaller ship to transport goods (destined for Rome) to Singapore for them to be loaded onto a larger ship which just happens to be going to the same destination as those original goods then.

Assuming if USSR opens up to the west, then so does the rest of the eastern bloc. East Germans arent exactly going to be happy being excluded from West German markets while the Russians are exporting there.


You still have me confused. :confused:

Okay, maybe you're confusing 1970s Poland and the USSR with the 1990s Poland and Russia. Because if the USSR opens up to the west economically during Detente (which remember saw the end of American involvement in Vietnam, SALT, The Helsinki Accords and the normalization of relations between the Germanies and their accession to the UN) then you would still have Comecon and massive Soviet influence politically within the Eastern Bloc. In essence the rest of the Eastern Bloc would have been an economic extension of the USSR, not jealous competitors.

Even if Kosygin were to turn the USSR into the economic equivalent of 1970s Yugoslavia (as Jello Biafra indicated) it would essentially put an end to the ideological struggle that was the Cold War. Yugoslavia had cooperation agreements with the EEC going back to 1970 and as this 1980s article demonstrates, economically the West and Yugoslavia in the 1970s were on fairly good terms. If that were applied to the Eastern Bloc as a whole then Comecon as a whole would be seen as a low(er) wage area with a fairly well educated population in the context of thawing political and military tensions.

You misquoted me by saying transportation costs.

My mistake. Though transportation would hardly be an issue.

I said other costs. Other costs include time to transport,

It's quicker to transport goods across the Atlantic than it is across the Pacific. It is also quicker to transport goods from Leningrad to Rotterdam than from Shanghai to Rotterdam. It's even faster to transport goods via rail (22 days) from China to the Netherlands than it is to do it via ship (38 days) - and this is with a fully functioning Suez Canal. In the early 1970s the Suez Canal was still closed (until June 1975). Between Onkel Willie's POD (the 1969 assassination attempt on Brezhnev) and 1975 that would have been 6 years in which it would have taken even longer by sea than by rail.

quality control issues, cost of holding additional inventory. It is not just the cost of putting it on a train. Those costs add up. Particularly in a country like the Soviet Union where the infrastructure is set up to meet the needs of a communist central government rather than a market driven economy.

And here again the OTL system of central government is being transposed onto an ATL situation. The OP refers to "pulling a China" and Jello Biafra refers to "Yugoslavia". In 1970s Yugoslavia you had contract and arbitration law which allowed foreign parties doing business in Yugoslavia to choose (within limits) which nation's laws would apply to their dealings. You also had laws permitting foreign investment in the form of joint ventures. Economically, Yugoslavia and the PRC were quite different from the USSR. And without Yugoslavia's political troubles in finding a single replacement for Tito (which in turn screwed them up and kept them from continuing to make the necessary reforms to keep pace with the changing economic climate - Yugoslavia essentially became politically grid-locked after Tito which helped them to crash and burn economically which in turn helped to fuel the political meltdown in the 1990s), it might even be possible that a Yugoslav type economic system in the USSR might survive and evolve into a full market driven system. And if the USSR did "pull a China" (before China did) then it would have become in essence a market driven economy. That's what this thread is supposed to be discussing. So if you can't differentiate the political system in China from the economic system in China and see how that might have worked (or not) in an alt-USSR then there is little point in any further discussion.
 
"USSR" is just a name. The political entity which that abbreviation refers to might very well be quite different from the OTL entity we knew and loathed.

If "USSR" means any kind of democratic country, the days of East Germany as a separate political entity are numbered. While there might have been a few idealistic supporters of socialism in the GDR's early history, the majority of East Germans at any time either loathed the regime or supported it out of sheer short term selfishness. The few idealistic supporters socialism might have had in the early history of the GDR were long dissillusioned by the eighties.

So East Germany as a separate entity needs to be propped up by the Soviet armed forces in order to survive. And a democratic Soviet Union would not provide this armed support because there are just too many advantages in co-operating with the economically strong West Germany and other Western countries.

A USSR that liberalizes and privatizes its economy but remains a dictatorship seems to me more likely to keep its satellite states, including East Germany, than giving them up.
While the credibility of the East German dictatorship among the East German people was practically non-existent in OTL, it would have looked downright absurd if East Germany would have kept its satellite status towards an economically (but not politically) liberalizing USSR.
Either the East German regime does not adopt the USSR's reforms - then all those phrases about "socialist brotherhood" and "learning from the Soviet Union is learning how to win" sound even more hollow than they sounded in OTL. Or they do adopt the reforms - and this means that the ruling people in East Germany become the very "capitalist exploiters" that they are decrying in the West - just with inferior planning and machinery and without political freedom.

But then again the fact that "USSR pulling a China" makes the East German regime look even more mendacious than in OTL, does not mean that it would not survive for many additional decades.
 
If the USSR "pulls a China", sooner or later it will face another uprising in its satellite states. IOTL austerity in Poland directly led to the rise of Solidarity. Under central planning, western sanctions in retaliation are of little significance. But under a market economy, such sanctions will threaten the Soviet regime's stability, if nothing else through the rise of unemployment. This will compel the Kremlin to find a face-saving solution granting the rebelling state a degree of freedom from Soviet control.

And once that precedent is set, things get interesting.
 
You misquoted me by saying transportation costs. I said other costs. Other costs include time to transport, quality control issues, cost of holding additional inventory. It is not just the cost of putting it on a train. Those costs add up. Particularly in a country like the Soviet Union where the infrastructure is set up to meet the needs of a communist central government rather than a market driven economy.
To say nothing of the break of gauge in between the East Bloc and the rest of Europe. It's a physical reality that vastly complicates the institutional costs associated with trade.
 
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